Hamilton v. Baystate Med. Educ. & Research Found.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: PONSOR
• Citation: Hamilton v. Baystate Med. Educ. & Research Found., 866 F. Supp. 51 (D. Mass. 1994)
• Decision Date: 27 October 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-30179-MAP.
• Parties: William HAMILTON and Charlene Hamilton, Plaintiffs, v. BAYSTATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., Baystate Medical Center, Inc., and Baystate Health Systems, Inc., Defendants.

866 F. Supp. 51

William HAMILTON and Charlene Hamilton, Plaintiffs, v. BAYSTATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., Baystate Medical Center, Inc., and Baystate Health Systems, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 92-30179-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

October 27, 1994.

Francis W. Bloom, Wilbraham, MA, for plaintiffs.

Toby G. Hartt, Jay M. Presser, Skoler, Abbott & Presser, Springfield, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises from the termination of employment in 1989 of Dr. William Hamilton, a pathologist at Baystate Medical Center in Springfield, Massachusetts. Dr. Hamilton alleges breach of contract, as well as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In a separate count, Charlene Hamilton, the doctor's wife, alleges a claim for loss of consortium.¹ Defendants Baystate Medical Center, Inc. ("Baystate"), Baystate Medical Education and Research Foundation, Inc. ("BMERF") and Baystate Health Systems, Inc. ("BHS") have moved for summary judgment on all counts.² Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, summary judgment will be granted for defendants on all remaining counts in plaintiffs' complaint.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only "... if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter as law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.1988), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Although the court must view the record favorably to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that every essential element of its claim or defense is at least trialworthy." Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Association, 929 F.2d 881, 884 (1st Cir.1991). "If evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts are as follows.

William Hamilton had worked as a pathologist at Baystate since June 15, 1970. Beginning in 1986, defendants claim that Hamilton's performance as a pathologist began to deteriorate and became progressively worse with each passing month. The first indication of Hamilton's slip in performance was when he incorrectly labelled a specimen in his pathology report in January of 1986, causing some confusion in the Medical Records Department. A year later, in January 1987, a customary review of one of Dr. Hamilton's cases revealed a serious misdiagnosis. In a biopsy of a right and left breast, Hamilton incorrectly diagnosed a tumor in the right breast as benign rather than malignant, and improperly classified the tumor in the left breast. On August 26, 1988, Dr. John P. Sullivan ("Sullivan"), Hamilton's supervisor and the Chairperson of the Pathology Department, met with Hamilton. They discussed three more cases in which Hamilton erred in either the diagnosis or labelling of the specimen. Lastly, and most tragically, in November 1988, Hamilton misdiagnosed a sample of breast tissue and concluded that the patient had cancer of the right breast. As a result, the patient underwent an unnecessary mastectomy as well as chemotherapy and radiation treatment.

On January 19, 1989, Sullivan suggested to Hamilton that he take some vacation time to determine if he was ill. At this time, Sullivan also told Hamilton that he should consider resigning. January 19, 1989 was the last day plaintiff performed his duties at Baystate.

At about that time, Hamilton learned that he had been suffering from Graves Disease for roughly the previous three years. Graves Disease causes the body's immune system to attack the thyroid gland and results in the production of excessive thyroid hormone, resulting in the impairment of a person's memory and ability to concentrate. Dr. Haag, Hamilton's treating physician, characterized his condition as severe and believed the Graves Disease was most probably responsible for Dr. Hamilton's drastic slip in performance as a pathologist. Hamilton then filed for long term disability benefits in April of 1989. While his application for long term disability benefits was pending, Hamilton was placed on sick leave. He used up all five months of his paid vacation and sick time.

By late spring of 1989, Hamilton's thyroid hormone levels were within normal limits and controlled by medication. In an August 25, 1989 letter to Sullivan, Hamilton indicated that he intended to return to work on September 1, 1989. In this same letter he also stated that he did not view himself as being "cured." Sullivan denied Hamilton's request to return to work.

Sullivan, Hamilton and other physicians met at Baystate on September 1, 1989. At this meeting, Hamilton reiterated his desire to return to work on a part-time basis. Dr. Sullivan once again denied his request, claiming that he was concerned about patient safety. Hamilton alleges that no one at this meeting told him he was formally discharged.

On September 7, 1989 Hamilton wrote Sullivan asking to return to work on September 11, 1989. The following day, Sullivan phoned Hamilton. Plaintiff alleges that during this phone conversation Sullivan did not inform him that he was discharged. Defendants claim that by this time they had effectively discharged Hamilton.

In September of 1989 plaintiff retained an attorney to negotiate a settlement on his claims against the hospital. Plaintiff denies that he was ever told that he was terminated. Hamilton received final approval of disability benefits in February of 1990.

Defendants move for summary judgment on each of the four remaining counts. The counts allege breach of contract (Count III), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), and loss of consortium (Count VI). The court will address each count below.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Contract: Count III

Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached their employment contract by terminating him without just cause and by not following the pre-termination process set forth in the staff guidelines. Defendants contend that the deterioration in Hamilton's performance was sufficient to justify his termination in the manner employed.

1. Termination of Employment Contract

Hamilton alleges his firing breached the employment contract he had with BMERF. BMERF was created in 1986 in order to bill privately for physicians' services performed at Baystate. After its creation, all members of the Pathology Department were required to become BMERF members. Each year individual members and BMERF execute member agreements. Although the yearly renewal of the contract is customary, it is unknown whether a BMERF agreement was ever executed between Dr. Hamilton and BMERF for 1989.

Although plaintiff is unable to produce an express contract covering 1989, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court assumes that there was, at a minimum, an implied contract between Dr. Hamilton and defendants.³ Under the express terms of the member agreement with BMERF, defendants retained the right to terminate employment in the following circumstances:

"... if the Foundation learns of circumstances which the Foundation reasonably believes substantially and adversely affect the Member's ability to fulfill the duties hereunder ..."

For three years Hamilton suffered from a disease which palpably affected his mental faculties. He committed serious medical errors, made a gross misdiagnosis resulting in an unnecessary mastectomy and subjected this patient to high levels of needless radiation therapy. It is undisputed that Hamilton himself told Sullivan that he did not regard himself as being cured. Although plaintiff asserts that he received medical clearance from expert medical personnel, he has presented no evidence to support the claim that he was capable of returning to work.⁴

All evidence before the court confirms the reasonableness of defendants' belief that Hamilton could not fulfill his obligations under the terms of the employment agreement. Whether plaintiff could have properly performed his obligations does not matter. Based on the undisputed facts, defendants' belief that Hamilton's illness substantially and adversely affected his ability to fulfill his obligations was certainly reasonable.

A similar conclusion would be reached applying Massachusetts common law. The courts have established that an employee "with a contract for a term certain may only be terminated prior to the expiration of that term for justifiable cause." Goldhor v. Hampshire College, 25 Mass.App. 716, 722, 521 N.E.2d 1381 (1988), citing Mahoney v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 332 Mass. 496, 499, 125 N.E.2d 788 (1955). Absent contractual definition in the context of the contract, "just cause" means an employer can discharge an employee if

There existed (1) a reasonable basis for employer dissatisfaction with an ... employee, entertained in good faith, for reasons such as lack of capacity or diligence, failure to conform to usual standards of conduct, or other culpable or inappropriate behavior, or (2) grounds for discharge reasonably related, in the employer's honest judgment, to the needs of his business.

Goldhor, 25 Mass.App. at 723, 521 N.E.2d 1381 (emphasis included).

The court in Goldhor stated "`just cause' must necessarily leave some scope for the exercise of subjective judgment on the part of the employer." Goldhor at 722, 521...