Hamilton v. Board of Trustees of Oconee County School Dist., 0235

• Citation: 319 S.E.2d 717,282 S.C. 519
• Decision Date: 18 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 0235,0235
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: , 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1216 Beatrice HAMILTON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OCONEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent. . Heard

Page 717

319 S.E.2d 717

282 S.C. 519, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1216

Beatrice HAMILTON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OCONEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.

No. 0235.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard April 18, 1984.

Decided Aug. 20, 1984.

Dallas D. Ball, Liberty, for appellant.

Kenneth L. Childs and Emma Ruth St. Pierre of Childs & Duff, Columbia, for respondent.

SHAW, Judge:

The appellant--Beatrice Hamilton instituted this lawsuit and seeks to be rehired by the respondent--the Oconee County School District Board of Trustees. The circuit court ruled the Board's failure to renew Mrs. Hamilton's annual employment contract did not violate any of her state or federal constitutional rights. We affirm.

Mrs. Hamilton was employed by the Oconee County School District from September of 1977 until June of 1980 as a secretary in the Maintenance Department. In May of 1980, Mrs. Hamilton was informed that her employment contract would not be renewed for the following school year. This action was based on Board policies against nepotism. Mrs. Hamilton was married to the then Superintendent of Education of Oconee County.

In November of 1973, the Board passed policy 8250 which provides in part:

No person who is related by blood or marriage to any member of a board of trustees shall be employed by such board except upon the consent of two-thirds of the members thereof in a duly called board meeting, with the roll call vote entered upon the proceedings of the Board.

In November of 1977, the Board passed policy 4111 which provides in part:

Conflict of interest or accusations of nepotism are likely to result from the employment of relatives. If it is necessary to employ a relative (because of lack of other applicants or other compelling reasons), such a person may not be employed under the direct supervision of a relative who occupies a position which has influence and control of employment, promotion, salary administration, class schedule, and other related management of personnel considerations.... This policy shall be effective upon the date of its adoption and is not retroactive.

There was testimony this policy was not intended to limit or affect policy 8250. In May of 1979, policy 8250 was amended. The relevant amendments include the addition of the following two sentences, "Employment includes certified and classified personnel" and "The above policy also applies to the Superintendent of Education". In an affidavit submitted by Dr. Henry R. Keummerer, Vice-Chairman of the Board at the time of the amendment, he stated the amendment was intended as a clarification of the intent of the policy as originally enacted.

Mrs. Hamilton was hired in 1977 without a vote by the Board. In 1979, her contract was renewed for the 1979-1980 school year with the understanding that her contract would not be renewed for the year 1980-1981. This information was communicated to the Superintendent and Mrs. Hamilton.

In May of 1980, the Board again voted not to renew Mrs. Hamilton's employment contract. After being informed of the vote, Mrs. Hamilton requested and was granted a grievance hearing before the Board. She was represented by an attorney at this hearing. Another vote was taken, and Mrs. Hamilton did not receive the two-thirds votes necessary to have her contract renewed (four votes were in favor of renewal, three against; two abstained from voting).

Mrs. Hamilton appealed the Board's decision to the Court of Common Pleas as allowed by Section 59-19-560 of South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976. Following a decision adverse to her by the circuit court, she filed this appeal.

Section 59-19-560 provides, upon an appeal from a county board of education, the circuit court shall consider and dispose of the case as other equity cases are tried and disposed of (with or without reference to a master or special referee); all parties at interest shall have such rights and remedies, including the right of appeal, as are now provided by law in such cases. This statute has been held to require the exhaustion of all administrative remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Stanley v. Gary, 237 S.C. 237, 116 S.E.2d 843 (1960).

Despite the requirement of exhaustion of all administrative remedies, our scope of review is not governed by the substantial evidence rule. That standard applies to court review of cases brought under the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act, S.C.Code Ann. Section 59-25-410 et seq. (1976 and Cum.Supp.1983). Laws v. Richland County School District No. One, 270 S.C. 492, 243 S.E.2d 192 (1978); Lexington County School District One Board of Trustees v. Bost, 316 S.E.2d 677 (S.C.1984). That Act is not applicable to the instant case. The appeal from the decision of the County Board of Education to the circuit court was properly brought under Section 59-19-560 which requires the circuit judge to try these cases de novo as equity cases. Therefore, the Court of Appeals can find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence and correct errors of law. Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976); Lexington County School District v. Bost, supra.

Mrs. Hamilton claims the Board's failure to renew her employment contract violated her constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of the law.

As part of her equal protection argument, Mrs. Hamilton claims she is being discriminated against because of her marriage to the Superintendent of Education, the right of freedom of choice in marriage relations is a fundamental right, and any law or policy restricting this choice is subject to "strict scrutiny" in determining its constitutionality. In support of this proposition, she cites Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967).

Mrs. Hamilton's proposition of law is quite correct, but not applicable to her situation. To be entitled to a strict scrutiny review of a law impinging upon this undeniably fundamental right, Mrs. Hamilton must show the law directly and substantially interferes with the right to marry. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). Any reasonable law, regulation, or policy which does not significantly interfere with decisions to marry and does not operate to prohibit or penalize the right to marry will not be subject to rigorous scrutiny. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Southwestern Community Action Council v. Community Services Administration, 462 F.Supp. 289 (S.D.W.Va.1978).

Mrs. Hamilton has failed to show the policy in question substantially interferes with her right to marry. She has shown no direct infringement on the rights of cohabitation, sexual intercourse, or procreation. Since the Board's policy does not significantly interfere with the exercise of this fundamental right, a strict scrutiny review is not proper. Southwestern Community Action Council v. Community Services Administration, supra. The application of strict scrutiny is appropriate only where the obstacle to marriage is a direct one, i.e., one that operates to preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of people. Mapes v. U.S., 576 F.2d 896, 217 Ct.Cl. 115 (1978).

We find policy 8250 to be a reasonable regulation. Its purpose is entirely proper and valid: preventing conflicts of interest and nepotism. The same conclusion was reached in Keckeisen v. Independent School District 612, 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 57, 46 L.Ed.2d 51 (1975), where a school board policy prohibiting the employment of a husband and wife within the school district was held to be constitutional. The state's interest in providing its children with a meaningful education is fully and directly served by preventing conflicts of interest in the administration of the educational system. This interest outweighs Mrs. Hamilton's somewhat attenuated claim...