Hamilton v. Bromley

• Decision Date: 10 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-3111,15-3111
• Citation: 862 F.3d 329
• Parties: Harry E. HAMILTON, Appellant v. Nicole BROMLEY, Centre County Children and Youth Services; Director Owner Operator Youth Haven; Judge Bradley P. Lunsford; John Does, Jane Does, Employees of Children and Youth Services, Youth Haven or ABC Corps
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

862 F.3d 329

Harry E. HAMILTON, Appellant

v.Nicole BROMLEY, Centre County Children and Youth Services; Director Owner Operator Youth Haven; Judge Bradley P. Lunsford; John Does, Jane Does, Employees of Children and Youth Services, Youth Haven or ABC Corps

No. 15-3111

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on May 22, 2017

Filed: July 10, 2017

Jon G. Heintz [ARGUED], Jennifer L. Swize, Jones Day, 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20001, Counsel for Harry E. Hamilton

James P. Johnson [ARGUED], 1901 East College Avenue, State College, PA 16801, Counsel for Nicole Bromley

Steven F. Baicker–McKee, Babst Calland, Two Gateway Center, 6th Floor, 603 Stanwix Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Amy H. Marshall [ARGUED], Babst Calland, 330 Innovation Boulevard, Suite 302, State College, PA 16803, Counsel for Director Owner Operator Youth Haven

Michael Daley [ARGUED], Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, 1515 Market Street, Suite 1414, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Judge Bradley P. Lunsford

Before: HARDIMAN, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

It is a longstanding principle that the federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia , 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). But in Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized "a far-from-novel exception to this general rule," Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), which it expanded in subsequent decisions. Under the Court's Younger jurisprudence, federal courts are obligated to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction where it would interfere with "state criminal prosecutions," certain "civil enforcement proceedings," or "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 ("NOPSI ") (1989).

In this case, Harry Hamilton seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from an alleged conspiracy to deprive him of contact with his son. But because he now has custody of his son subject to pending state-court proceedings, the District Court opined that this case could be moot and dismissed it on Younger abstention grounds. Although the District Court erred in dismissing this case under Younger before resolving whether it is moot—a federal court can abstain from exercising its jurisdiction only if it has jurisdiction to abstain from—we find that Hamilton's custody of his son has mooted his case. We will accordingly affirm the District Court's dismissal on that alternate ground.

I

Since 2004, Harry Hamilton and his ex-wife, Sherrilyn Washington, have fought in state court for custody of their son, S.H. This case originates from that dispute, centering on a three-week period in 2014 when Hamilton had partial custody of S.H. and S.H. accused Washington of abusing him.

A

On November 7, 2014, S.H. fled from Washington's home to Hamilton's claiming that he had been abused by her. Hamilton filed a motion in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas for a temporary order giving him full custody of S.H. And after S.H. stayed with Hamilton over the weekend, Washington filed a petition for emergency custody, alleging that S.H. was with Hamilton without her consent.

That same day, Common Pleas Judge Bradley Lunsford granted Washington's petition for emergency custody and authorized the police to enforce his order. Concurrently, S.H. was referred to Centre County's Children and Youth Services ("CYS") due to S.H.'s abuse allegations. CYS concluded that the alleged incident did not meet the definition of child abuse. But it spoke with Washington—who maintained that Hamilton was influencing S.H.—and S.H.—who stated that he did not feel safe with Washington. CYS continued its investigation, giving S.H. the option of moving into a group home or remaining with his mother. S.H. continued to tell CYS that he did not want to stay with her. So CYS advised placing S.H. in a group home called Youth Haven.

On November 13, Washington arranged for S.H. to be placed in Youth Haven. At the time, she objected to S.H. being able to contact Hamilton, claiming that she had sole custody of S.H. Over her objection, CYS recommended allowing S.H. to contact Hamilton and Youth Haven agreed to facilitate that contact. The night S.H. moved in, Hamilton called S.H. The next day, he delivered clothes for S.H. And during the week that followed, he regularly spoke with S.H. on the phone. On November 16, Hamilton visited S.H. During that visit, he noticed several conditions that concerned him, including that S.H. was subject to search by staff, disproportionately assigned chores, and placed in a ground level room that lacked blinds. He shared his concerns with Youth Haven, which told CYS that S.H. could not stay there due to problems that had occurred during Hamilton's visit. To facilitate S.H.'s stay in Youth Haven, Nicole Bromley, a CYS employee, informed Hamilton that he could no longer contact S.H. at Youth Haven.

B

On November 24, 2014, Hamilton filed a pro se suit in federal district court against Nicole Bromley, CYS and certain of its employees, Youth Haven and certain of its employees, and Judge Lunsford. In his complaint, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by "placing S.H. in a shelter tantamount to confinement" and "arbitrarily and capriciously terminating all paternal visits and contact." App. 17–18. Separately, Hamilton sought a temporary restraining order, which was denied. The District Court referred the case to a magistrate judge for pretrial management and resolution of all dispositive motions.

While Hamilton's federal case progressed, custody proceedings also continued in Pennsylvania state court. On November 25, CYS updated Judge Lunsford on its abuse investigation; on November 28, S.H. left Youth Haven; and on December 2, Judge Lunsford recused himself. Eventually, Clinton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Michael Williamson took over the state case. And in April 2015, he entered an order that vacated Judge Lunsford's prior emergency custody order, granted Hamilton physical custody of S.H., and prohibited contact between S.H. and Washington.

On May 5, 2015, the magistrate judge in Hamilton's federal case learned that Hamilton regained physical custody of S.H. and issued an order for Hamilton to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on abstention or mootness grounds. The magistrate judge subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") advising dismissal of Hamilton's complaint under Younger . In so recommending, the magistrate judge noted that it was "unable to make ... a determination" as to whether Hamilton's case was moot. Hamilton v. Bromley , 2015 WL 4077591, at *5 n.2 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2015). The District Court adopted the R&R and dismissed this case on July 2, 2015. This timely appeal followed.¹

II

Although the constitutional elements of both our jurisdiction and the District Court's jurisdiction are at issue in this case, the statutory elements are not. The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a trial court's ruling on mootness, Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc ., 819 F.3d 61, 63–64 (3d Cir. 2016), and its determination of whether Younger abstention is proper. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton , 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Our review of whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is also plenary. Weitzner , 819 F.3d at 63.

III

On appeal, Hamilton argues that the District Court erred in dismissing this case. He maintains that the District Court improperly abstained under Younger and that his case has not been mooted by the fact that he has regained full custody of S.H. In responding to Hamilton's argument, the sequence in which we address mootness and abstention is critical as "[m]ootness is a jurisdictional question" that derives from Article III of the Constitution, North Carolina v. Rice , 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971), whereas Younger abstention is not. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc ., 477 U.S. 619, 626, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) ("[Younger abstention] does not arise from lack of jurisdiction ... but from strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings have already been commenced.").

Because federal courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists," Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp ., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), and because the "statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers," Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), "Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Id . Thus a court cannot abstain under Younger unless it concludes that it has Article III jurisdiction to abstain from. See, e.g ., Juidice v. Vail , 430 U.S. 327, 331, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (noting that the Court was "first obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Art. III" before addressing Younger ); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco , Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 23, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("There is no occasion to decide if abstention would have been proper unless the District Court had jurisdiction."); ...