Hamilton v. CCM, Inc.

Decision Date10 January 1980
Docket NumberNo. 21113,21113
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesLawson W. HAMILTON, Jr., Pratt Mining Company, and Xcello Corporation, Respondents, v. CCM, INC., and Maryland National Bank, Appellants.

Earl D. Hewlette, Jr. of Boyd, Knowlton, Tate & Finlay, Columbia, for appellants.

James M. Herring, Hilton Head Island; and P. Thomas Denny, Charleston, W. Va., for respondents.

RHODES, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court permanently enjoining appellants CCM, Inc. (CCM) and its mortgagee, Maryland National Bank, from constructing or erecting any improvements on certain real estate owned by CCM on Hilton Head Island, the action having been brought by respondents as co-owners of real estate situate in proximity to the area in dispute. We reverse.

Although numerous plats have been offered into evidence, the outcome of this litigation is largely controlled by the construction given an instrument referred to as the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat. The area in dispute, although designated as "B-2" on a subsequent plat, is neither designated on nor within the surveyed portion of the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat, but lies within a space outside the perimeter of the surveyed portion of the plat, depicted thereon as a total blank. Parcel B-2, as specifically shown on the subsequent plat, consists of 0.38 acres of land and was sold to CCM for $181,000. The lower court determined that the disputed area was clearly depicted on the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat to be an open space easement, upon which no construction could take place. The development of the disputed area was thereupon enjoined by order of the lower court, as noted previously.

The disputed property is located in the Harbour Town area of Hilton Head Island and is generally referred to as the area situated between the Harbour Town cemetery and the eighteenth fairway of the Harbour Town Golf Course. CCM purchased this disputed parcel of land from The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) on September 27, 1976 and subsequently mortgaged it to the Maryland National Bank for the purpose of securing a construction loan to CCM for the development of an eight-unit condominium.

Respondents are co-owners of a townhouse located approximately ninety feet from Parcel B-2 on Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Block A of the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat and separated from the area in dispute by an intervening unimproved area. This townhouse was purchased by respondents on April 1, 1976 from Joab and Katherine Dowling by reference to the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat, which was dated June 25, 1970 and recorded June 29, 1970.

The common grantor of CCM's and respondents' real property was the Lighthouse Beach Company, a limited partnership composed of Travelers, The Prospect Company, and the Sea Pines Management Company (Sea Pines). Lighthouse Beach Company had, previous to the purchase by CCM, developed a subdivision of single family lots within the surveyed area of the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat.

Subsequent to the development of the Harbour Town Townhouse subdivision, Lighthouse Beach Company continued to retain ownership of other land in the Harbour Town area, including the area embraced by Parcel B-2. In 1975 Lighthouse Beach Company was dissolved and its properties were divided between Sea Pines and Travelers through the execution of two deeds. Each of these deeds conveyed numerous parcels of land, although neither deed made specific reference to Parcel B-2.

It was thereafter discovered that Parcel B-2 had not been specifically conveyed to either Travelers or Sea Pines but that the title to a tract of land which included Parcel B-2 had in fact passed by virtue of a residual or catchall clause contained in the dissolution deed from Lighthouse Beach Company to Sea Pines. Upon this discovery, this tract of land was conveyed in 1976 by Sea Pines to Travelers. Travelers then conveyed the property, including Parcel B-2, to CCM.

The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether an open space easement restricting the use of all or part of Parcel B-2 exists. This basic issue will be treated under three topics:

(1) whether the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat clearly and without ambiguity creates an open space easement over the disputed area;

(2) whether an implied open space easement was created by the intent of the common grantor developer as demonstrated by the surrounding circumstances;

(3) whether a reciprocal negative easement permanently restricting the development of Parcel B-2 was created by the common grantor developer, Lighthouse Beach Company.

The first question addressed is the validity of the lower court finding that an inspection of the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat mandates an interpretation that an open space easement was "clearly" designated as covering the area in dispute. It is upon this finding that the lower court primarily predicated its ruling. We have carefully examined the plat and are of the opinion that it does not support such an unequivocal finding. The plat is patently ambiguous in this respect. Indeed, one of respondents' witnesses, David Mellichamp, testified that the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat did not affect Parcel B-2, while another of respondents' witnesses, Joab Dowling, stated that the plat was ambiguous. The experts who testified were divided on the question of whether the plat evidenced an intent to restrict the use of Parcel B-2.

It being impractical to print the plat as a part of this opinion, it is difficult without such a reference to articulate the many and various details shown on it that lead us to the conclusion that the plat relative to an open space easement over Parcel B-2 is ambiguous. The plat subdivides the area into seventy-six townhouse lots grouped into three irregular blocks, together with walkways, access roads, and other easements. Each of the lots is surveyed in detail with distances and courses platted. The above-described subdivision area is enclosed by a surveyed perimeter line giving courses and distances and is bounded generally on the north by Lighthouse Lane, a cemetery, and an area left entirely blank on the plat; east by Mizzen Mast Lane; south by the seventeenth fairway of the Harbour Town Golf Course and an area marked as "open space"; and, on the west by a blank area separating the subdivision from the eighteenth fairway of said golf course. Separating this property from each of the two fairways is a sketched, unsurveyed, wavy line, 1 which the lower court held to be the outside boundary of an open space easement. The area in dispute is located on the northwest unsurveyed portion of the plat between the cemetery to the east and the eighteenth fairway to the west.

A restriction on the use of property must be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication, Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d 906 (1956), and all such restrictions are to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Davey v. Artistic Builders, Inc., 263 S.C. 431, 211 S.E.2d 235 (1975). It has also been stated by this court that in the interpretation of maps and plats intention will not be inferred from symbols of uncertain meaning or from fanciful adornments on the plat and vacant areas will not of themselves be taken as dedicated. Antonakas v. Chamber of Commerce, 130 S.C. 215, 126 S.E. 35 (1924). The words "open space" do not appear on the plat in the area where Parcel B-2 would be located or in proximity thereto. While the words "open space" appear three times on the plat, the nearest such designation is separated from Parcel B-2 by an intervening row of townhouse lots. The lower court held, as noted above, that a proper construction of the Harbour Town Townhouse Plat, as a whole, would lead to a determination that areas within the wavy treeline symbol would be subject to an open...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • Queen's Grant v. Greenwood Development
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 10, 2006
    ... ... GREENWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a Palmetto Dunes Resort, Inc., Respondent-Appellant ... No. 4101 ... Court of Appeals of South Carolina ... Heard ... Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 158, 263 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1980); Hoffman v. Cohen, 262 S.C. 71, 76, ... ...
  • Cedar Cove Homeowners Ass'n v. DiPietro
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 2006
    ... Page 284 ... 628 S.E.2d 284 ... CEDAR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent, ... Rudy DiPIETRO and Margaret L. DiPietro, Appellants ... No. 4092 ... Court ... See, Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 263 S.E.2d 378 (1980); Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d ... ...
  • Contegni v. Payne, 6493
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 11, 1989
    ..."[I]n the interpretation of maps and plats intention will not be inferred from symbols of uncertain meaning...." Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 157, 263 S.E.2d 378 (1980). As we will not extend the reach of a restrictive covenant by implication; Marion Road Assn., supra; it would be i......
  • Snow v. Smith
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 2, 2016
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT