Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 06-164-KD-C.

• Decision Date: 13 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-164-KD-C.,06-164-KD-C.
• Citation: 508 F.Supp.2d 1045
• Parties: Terry HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JACKSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

508 F.Supp.2d 1045

Terry HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 06-164-KD-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

June 13, 2007.

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Willie J. Huntley, Jr., Huntley Law Firm, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

Andrew John Rutens, Galloway, Wettermark, Everest, Rutens & Gaillard, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

DuBOSE, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff's Response, the Defendants' Reply, and all evidentiary materials offered in support thereof. (Docs.30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 40, 41, 43). For the reasons given below, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED IN PART.

I. Factual Background¹ & Procedural History

Plaintiff Terry Hamilton ("Hamilton") filed this suit against officers of the Jackson Police Department, the Chief of the Jackson Police Department, and the City of Jackson as a result of an incident that occurred on or about March 17, 2004, at the Jackson Police Department.² (Doc. 1). In sum, the Complaint' and response to summary judgment allege that Hamilton met his stepdaughter, Renita Greer ("Greer"), at the Jackson Police Department to discuss an altercation between Greer's son, Blake Hartley, and another young man. (Docs.1, 40). Both Greer and Hamilton were dissatisfied with the police department's decision not to arrest or charge the other man involved in the altercation. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 2-4). When the pair met at the Jackson Police Department Building, they initially met with Defendant Barry Fowler ("Fowler"), an officer with the Jackson Police Department. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 3-4). They were escorted into a supervisor's office, and were followed by' Defendants Aaron Carpenter ("Carpenter"), Daryl Jackson ("Jackson"), and Gary Garrett³ ("Garrett"), all of whom are officers with the Jackson Police Department. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 4-7). Once in the supervisor's office Fowler sat behind a desk and Hamilton and Greer sat together on the opposite side of the desk. (Does. 40; 41-2 at 4-7). Officers Jackson, Garrett, and Carpenter stood in varying positions between Hamilton and Greer and the doorway. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 6-7).

During the conversation with Fowler, Hamilton and Greer "eventually felt they were getting nowhere." (Doc. 40). Hamilton then suggested to Greer that they go talk to the Mayor of Jackson and stood to leave. (Does. 40; 41-2 at 8-9). Greer got up to follow Hamilton and then Officer Fowler came from his side of the desk, pushed Greer out of the way, and "grabbed Hamilton with one hand, pressed him up against the door ... and then grabbed Hamilton by the throat with the other hand." (Does. 40 at 2; see 41-2 at 9-11). "Hamilton was then grabbed on each arm by [Officers] Carpenter and Jackson. Fowler had his hand on both sides of Hamilton's throat." (Does. 40 at 2; see 41-2 at 9-11). Fowler held Hamilton by the throat and squeezed for 30-40 seconds "almost causing Hamilton to blackout and lose consciousness." (Dots. 40; see 41-2 at 9-11, 15-17). "While Fowler was choking Hamilton, Fowler said, `Terry Hamilton, you are not going to threaten me. I will lock you up in a cell.'" (Docs. 40 at 2, see 41-2 at 11-12). Officer Fowler eventually released his grip and told Hamilton to sit in the chair. (Does. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 11). Hamilton complied and requested some water, which he received. (Does. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 8-11). Fowler continued his statement that he would not be threatened. (Does. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 8-11). Eventually, after 8-10 minutes, Hamilton was allowed to leave the Jackson Police Department. (Dots. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 14).

The Chief of the Jackson Police Department, Charles Burge ("Burge"), arrived at the Police Department after the incident occurred. (Doc. 32-7 at 11). The Plaintiff was not present when Burge arrived. (Doc. 32-7 at 10). Officer Fowler informed Chief Burge that Mr. Hamilton had become irate and had to be restrained during a conversation at the police station regarding an incident involving his (step) grandson. (Doc. 32-7 at 9). Chief Burge instructed the officers to write statements of what they had observed. (Does. 32-7 at 9; 41-13; 41-14). Burge reviewed the statements provided by the officers and concluded that no policy or procedural general order had been violated by any member of the police department. (Doc. 32-7 at 4-6).

Officer Fowler has been employed as a Police Officer for the City of Jackson for 24 years. (Doc. 32-5 at 3). Jackson has been employed with the Jackson Police Department for five years. (Doc. 32-6 at 3). Officers Carpenter, Fowler, and Jackson have completed the minimum standard training required by the State of Alabama for sworn law enforcement officers. (Does. 32-8 at 2-3; 41-10; 41-11; 41-12). All members of the Jackson Police Department have continued to meet their state mandated training requirements each year. (Doc. 32-7 at 12). No meritorious claims of excessive force have been filed with the Jackson Police Department against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, or Jackson. (Doc. 32-8 at 3).

Plaintiff's Complaint asserts five counts. Count One asserts that the City of Jackson, Alabama ("the City") and Burge as the Chief of the Jackson Police Department, negligently failed to properly train and/or supervise officers Fowler, Carpenter, Garrett and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 4). Count Two asserts a battery claim against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 Count Three alleges false imprisonment against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson.) Court Four alleges outrage against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 6). Lastly, Count Five alleges violation of Title 21, United States Code Section 1983 against all defendants.⁴ (Doc. 1 at 7).

II. Applicable Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).⁵ The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). The party seeking summary judgment always bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

If the nonmoving party fails to make "a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determination of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir.1992)(internal citations, and quotations omitted), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993). Thus, the court's role at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of any factual dispute, however, will not automatically necessitate denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir.2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct. 869, 160 L.Ed.2d 825 (2005).

III. Analysis

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Actions brought in federal court to address and remedy a violation of the Constitution by a state actor are enabled through Section 1983, which provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper, proceeding for redress. For `the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order "[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

"To state a Section 1983 claim the plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). However, "[s]ection 1983 ...