Hamilton v. Coffee Health Grp.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: C. LYNWOOD SMITH
• Citation: Hamilton v. Coffee Health Grp., 949 F.Supp.2d 1119 (N.D. Ala. 2013)
• Decision Date: 06 June 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV–10–S–3621–NW.
• Parties: Sheryl Leggs HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. COFFEE HEALTH GROUP, now known as Regional Care Hospital, Defendant.

949 F.Supp.2d 1119

Sheryl Leggs HAMILTON, Plaintiff,

v.COFFEE HEALTH GROUP, now known as Regional Care Hospital, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV–10–S–3621–NW.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northwestern Division.

June 6, 2013.

Michael L. Weathers, Florence, AL, for Plaintiff.

Patrick F. Clark, Natalie N. Turner, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiff, Sheryl Leggs Hamilton, initiated this action as a pro se litigant on December 29, 2010.¹ The defendants included plaintiff's former employer—an entity identified in the pleadings as “Coffee Health Group, now known as Regional Care Hospital”—and four former co-workers: Team Leader Melinda England; Manager of Patient Accounts David Davis; Central Business Office Director Diane Myrick; and Human Resources Director Cheryl Lee.² The complaint accused those defendants of discriminating against plaintiff on the basis of her race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”).³

Prior to commencing this action, plaintiff lodged a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(“EEOC”), asserting that she had been reprimanded, disciplined, and then fired on the basis of her race and age.⁴ The EEOC investigated plaintiff's charge, closed her file, and issued a notice of right to sue.⁵ Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint based upon the allegations in her EEOC charge.⁶ Plaintiff's complaint included the additional accusation that defendant had removed her from the position of “hospital cashier,” and replaced her with a white clerk.⁷

Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against the four individuals, and the claim based on plaintiff's removal from the cashier position.⁸ At that point, plaintiff retained an attorney, who filed a response conceding that the challenged claims were due to be dismissed.⁹ Accordingly, this court dismissed the claims against the four individuals, and the claim based on plaintiff's removal from the cashier position.¹⁰ The parties then stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff's claim for violation of the ADEA, ¹¹ and the court accordingly dismissed that claim as well.¹²

Thus, only two claims remain pending: the Title VII retaliation claim addressed in Part IV of this opinion, infra; and the Title VII racial discrimination claim discussed in Part V, infra. The following opinion addresses, first, defendant's motion to strike portions of the declaration submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, and then defendant's dispositive motion.¹³

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

Coffee Health Group, now known as Regional Care Hospital (“defendant”), moves to strike a variety of words, sentences, and paragraphs from plaintiff's declaration in opposition to summary judgment.¹⁴ The first forty-six paragraphs of the declaration contain plaintiff's factual allegations, and the last three paragraphs— which together span fourteen pages—state her rejections of the four declarations submitted by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment.¹⁵ Defendant argues that portions of plaintiff's declaration contain conclusory allegations, are not based upon plaintiff's personal knowledge, or constitute a “sham” because they contradict, without explanation, plaintiff's prior deposition testimony.¹⁶

In response, plaintiff argues that the court should treat her declaration leniently, because she is a layperson—an allegation that is made without apparent embarrassment, despite the fact that plaintiff has been represented by counsel since June 13, 2011.¹⁷ In addition, plaintiff submitted a twenty-two-page supplemental declaration in an attempt to explain the contradictions between her deposition testimony and her original declaration.¹⁸

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) states that: “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Thus, “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.” Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.2000).

Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to “disregard an affidavit as a sham when a party to the suit files an affidavit that contradicts, without explanation, prior deposition testimony on a material fact.” Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1300 n. 6 (11th Cir.2012) (citing Van T. Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984)). In order for that rule to apply, however, “ ‘[t]he earlier deposition testimony [must] consist of clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Kernel, 694 F.3d at 1300 n. 6 (alterations supplied) (citing Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir.1986)). The so-called “sham affidavit rule” applies with equal force to declarations. See, e.g., Baloco v. Drummond Co., No. 7:09–CV–00557–RDP, 2012 WL 4009432, *36 (N.D.Ala. Sept. 12, 2012) (citing Van T. Junkins, 736 F.2d at 657).

In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), and this Circuit's prohibition on “sham” affidavits, the court will strike the following parts of plaintiff's testimony.

1. Allegations That Melinda England Made Racist Statements to Plaintiff

Plaintiff asserts in her declaration filed in opposition to summary judgment that Team Leader Melinda England said that “African–Americans were lazy and would not pull their load,” “African–Americans were not responsible people,” and that plaintiff, “as an African–American, was lazy and would not work.” ¹⁹ During her earlier deposition, however, plaintiff testified as follows:

Q. ... Did Melinda England ever make any race-based comments to you?

A. She as soon to have, she gave me that look.

Q. So you're basing her racism on a look?

A. She had that look.

Q. Okay. And you believe it was a racist look?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. But she never made any comments to you?

A. She didn't make a comment to me.²⁰

“Recognizing that parties may try to escape summary judgment by using affidavits to create issues of fact where none existed, [the Eleventh Circuit has] allowed an affidavit to be disregarded as a ‘sham’ if it flatly contradicts earlier deposition testimony in a manner that cannot be explained.” Akins v. Fulton County, 278 Fed.Appx. 964, 968 (11th Cir.2008) (alteration supplied).

Given the contradiction between the assertions in plaintiff's declaration that England made specific racist statements to her, and plaintiff's prior deposition testimony that clearly, and without qualification, stated that England did not make any racist comments to her, this court will strike plaintiff's contradictory declaration statements.

2. Allegations That Melinda England Made Racist Statements About Plaintiff to David Davis

Plaintiff also alleged in her declaration that Team Leader Melinda England told Manager of Patient Accounts David Davis that “African–Americans were lazy and would not pull their load,” “African–Americans were not responsible people,” and that plaintiff, “as an African–American, was lazy and would not work.” ²¹

As previously noted, “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4) (alteration supplied).

Plaintiff has produced no evidence that she has personal knowledge of a conversation between Melinda England and David Davis in which such statements allegedly were made. Accordingly, this court will strike that portion of plaintiff's declaration. See, e.g.,Fed.R.Evid. 802.

B. Federal Rule of Evidence 701

Plaintiff also argues that some of the testimony contested by defendant is admissible as “lay opinion evidence” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701(a), because she has personal knowledge of the matters to which she attests, and defendant's “full and fair opportunity to cross-examine” plaintiff at trial will cure any defects in the assertions contained in her declaration.²²

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows a lay witness to testify in the form of an opinion, provided such testimony “is limited to” those opinions or inferences that are: “(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701. ²³ Plaintiff's attorney focuses upon subpart (a) of that Rule, but the most important part in the context of the present issue is the “helpfulness” requirement embodied in Rule 701(b). That subpart is designed to “provide assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach.” United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rule) (emphasis supplied); see also Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 912 (2d Cir.1997) (same). Thus, if “ ‘attempts are made to introduce meaningless assertions [that] amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by [ Rule 701(b) ].’ ” Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Advisory Committee Note) (alterations supplied).

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that, in the context of employment discrimination suits, “a discharged employee's mere suspicion of ... discrimination, unsupported by personal knowledge of...