Hamilton v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 07 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0814-17-2 |
| Citation | 817 S.E.2d 343,69 Va.App. 176 |
| Parties | Eric HAMILTON v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Lauren Whitley, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
John I. Jones, IV, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Beales, Decker and AtLee
OPINION BY JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
Eric Hamilton ("appellant") was indicted for obstruction of justice under Code § 18.2-460(A).1 On April 18, 2017, a jury found appellant guilty of "obstructing justice as charged in the indictment." On appeal, appellant raises three assignment of error. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his Batson motion; erred in denying both his "motion to strike and renewed motion to strike as the Commonwealth did not prove the required elements under Code § 18.2-460, including intent or the prohibited act"; and erred in "instructing the jury on the elements of Va. Code § 18.2-460(B) and providing an ambiguous verdict form when Mr. Hamilton was indicted and pled not guilty to a violation of Code § 18.2-460(A)."2
During jury selection before appellant’s trial, the prosecutor asked the jury pool if anyone had ever been a victim of a crime, a witness to a crime, or charged with a crime. The question elicited affirmative responses from some of the jurors, including Juror T.W., an African-American woman, and Juror S., a Caucasian woman.3 The following conversation ensued between the prosecutor and Juror T.W.:
The prosecutor then engaged in the following exchange with Juror S.:
During appellant’s turn to voir dire the jury, his counsel asked if any member of the jury pool Juror S. responded affirmatively, stating,
Following voir dire , after the prosecutor and defense counsel each exercised four peremptory strikes, the fifteen-member pool of potential jurors was reduced to a final jury of seven members to try this misdemeanor offense. The Commonwealth struck Jurors Green and T.W., two African-American women; Juror Holmes, a Caucasian man; and Juror Cooper, an African-American man. Defense counsel used her four peremptory strikes to eliminate four Caucasian individuals—Juror Ogburn, a Caucasian man, and Juror Barden, Juror McCartney, and Juror S., all Caucasian women. The seven-member jury that then heard the case consisted of two African-American members, Jurors Moss and Broadnax, and five members who were not African-American, Jurors Jordan, Worcester, Cousins, Keevil, and Orland.
Following the Commonwealth’s peremptory strikes, appellant’s counsel made a challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), arguing that the Commonwealth was seeking to exclude three African-American members of the venire based on their race. In response, the prosecutor argued that Juror T.W. was struck because she had previously been charged with a crime and because she indicated on a survey provided by the trial court that she was unemployed. The prosecutor contended that Juror Green was struck because she also indicated on the survey that she was unemployed. The prosecutor explained, The prosecutor also stated that, with regard to Juror Green, he had no information about her past employment, and he "noticed on several occasions that [she] did not audibly respond to many of the questions, and [he] was concerned about her attention essentially to the case."
After the Commonwealth offered these explanations, the trial court asked for additional argument from appellant’s counsel. Appellant’s counsel argued that the Commonwealth’s explanation that two of the jurors were unemployed was insufficient because "[t]here has been case law that says because someone lives in a certain neighborhood or because someone is unemployed is just a code word for saying that they're African-American and for striking them." Appellant’s counsel also argued that there were other individuals on the panel "who also didn't speak." She claimed,
After hearing from both sides, the trial court concluded that it was "satisfied that there was a race-neutral basis for [the prosecutor’s] strikes." The trial judge further commented, The trial judge ultimately found that "[the prosecutor] has done nothing improper in striking those jurors." The trial then proceeded on the indictment.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial court, Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004), the evidence before the trial court established that early in the morning on October 20, 2016, Officers Henning, Owens, and Robinson from the City of Richmond Police Department arrived at appellant’s address in response to a call they received from appellant’s girlfriend regarding an alleged domestic assault. She told the officers that she lived at the address, provided them with a key, and gave them permission to enter. She informed them that appellant was inside the residence.
A video from Officer Henning’s body camera was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial, displaying the events that occurred at the residence. The video shows that the officers knocked on the door of the residence and announced their presence.4 When no one answered, they entered using the key provided by appellant’s girlfriend. After they announced themselves and then entered, appellant asked who was there, and the officers responded that it was the Richmond Police and that they needed to see appellant’s hands. Officer Henning testified that his badge was displayed. When appellant asked why they were there, the officers told him that they were there for an investigation. Appellant was positioned down a hallway from the officers—near a doorway to a separate room. Officer Henning testified that it was dark in the residence, requiring him to use a flashlight to see. The officers repeatedly directed appellant to step out into the main room and show them his hands, but he refused to comply with their instructions. Twice during the exchange, instead of following instructions, appellant stated, "Shoot me, then" and "Shoot me."
Appellant, who continued to refuse to come forward into the main room, asked if he could put on a shirt. The officers explicitly told him that he could not. Officer Henning testified that appellant’s request was denied for the officers' safety because he believed it would have required appellant to go into the back bedroom where he could have potentially retrieved a weapon. During this exchange appellant stated, "He’s going to pull a gun on me," referring to Officer Henning. Officer Henning showed appellant his hands, free of a firearm. Despite Officer Henning’s showing appellant that he was not holding his firearm, appellant continued to ignore the officers' instructions, moving toward the bedroom because he claimed he wanted to put on a shirt. Officer Henning moved into the hallway, closer to appellant, and repeatedly told appellant to show him his hands. Appellant stated, and retreated into the back bedroom. Appellant forcefully pushed on the door to close it as the officers pushed inward to keep it open. When appellant succeeded in forcing the door shut, Officer Henning and Officer Robinson then kicked it down.
After the door was knocked down, appellant did not immediately comply with the officers' commands that he step out into the main room. When appellant eventually came out and sat in a chair, Officer Henning attempted to handcuff him. The officers repeatedly told appellant to place his hands behind his back, but appellant refused to comply. Officer Henning testified, Officer Robinson testified that, as they attempted to handcuff him, appellant "was trying to resist as best he could." The body camera video shows that it took the efforts of all three officers on the scene to get appellant subdued and handcuffed.
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, counsel for appellant and the Commonwealth agreed to eleven jury instructions.
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