Hamilton v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 20 May 1982
• Citation: 182 Cal.Rptr. 868,131 Cal.App.3d 982
• Parties: Matthew HAMILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 60585.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 868

182 Cal.Rptr. 868

131 Cal.App.3d 982

Matthew HAMILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 60585.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 20, 1982.

Hearing Denied July 22, 1982.

Magana, Cathcart, McCarthy & Pierry and Michael D. Moorhead and Mark S. Rader, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Charles Vinson Tackett, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

DALSIMER, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, Matthew Hamilton, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant County of Los Angeles after a court trial in his action under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) and the general maritime law.

Plaintiff was employed as a lifeguard and a rescue boat lieutenant by the County of Los Angeles and was permanently assigned to the rescue vessel Bay Watch Avalon by the county's Department of Beaches. He had been assigned to that vessel from 1970 until the accident in 1976. During this period of time, approximately 75 percent of his time was spent aboard the vessel. The Bay Watch is a 31-foot, rough water rescue work vessel. It is powered by twin Chrysler engines. The vessel operated in an area all around Catalina Island up to approximately five miles off the island. Plaintiff's duties included maintenance and operation of the rescue vessel and scuba diving.

On January 25, 1976, following a scuba dive from the Bay Watch Avalon undertaken by plaintiff within the course of his duties, plaintiff became afflicted with caisson disease, the bends, and was thereby permanently disabled. The purpose of the dive was to survey a reef located approximately 200 yards offshore for possible establishment of an underwater park. The maximum depth planned for the dive was 120 feet. During the dive plaintiff relied on a depth gauge supplied by the county to calculate the maximum period of time that he could safely remain underwater. Plaintiff was later informed by the captain of the rescue boat division that the depth gauge plaintiff had used was inaccurate. After becoming afflicted with caisson disease, plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from the state and received benefits from the disability retirement system of the County of Los Angeles. Defendant's second affirmative defense to the within action alleged that plaintiff's only remedy was under workers' compensation.

The trial court found that the County of Los Angeles Department of Beaches' activities are a necessary and legitimate exercise of government power and primarily a function of local concern. The trial court also found that plaintiff's contract with the County of Los Angeles was not maritime in nature. The trial court further found that while engaged in his scuba diving activities, plaintiff was a seaman. The trial court made no findings on the issues of causation, liability, or damages.

The trial court concluded that plaintiff's only remedy was pursuant to the workers' compensation laws of the State of California and that application of the exclusive remedy provision of Labor Code section 3601 ¹ creates no material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or the Jones Act and does not interfere with the uniformity and harmony of that body of law. ²

DISCUSSION

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the exclusive remedy provision of Labor Code section 3601 bars a seaman employed by a political subdivision of the state and injured in the course of his employment while engaged in activities as a seaman from recovering damages from his employer under the Jones Act or under the general maritime law.

1. The Requirement that State Legislation Not Interfere with the Uniformity of the Maritime Law.

It has long been recognized that state statutes that conflict with admiralty law as developed by the federal courts and by Congress will not be given effect if their application would materially prejudice the uniformity of the maritime law.

In Workman v. New York City, Mayor etc. (1900) 179 U.S. 552, 21 S.Ct. 212, 45 L.Ed. 314, a fireboat owned and operated by the City of New York collided with another vessel while approaching a warehouse to extinguish a fire. The court held that the public nature of the vessel's firefighting service afforded it no immunity from liability in admiralty. (Id., at p. 570, 21 S.Ct. at p. 218.) The court also held that the local law of New York, which was in conflict with federal maritime law, was preempted by the maritime law. (Id., at pp. 557-563, 21 S.Ct. at pp. 213-216.)

The Workman court reasoned as follows: "The proposition then which we must first consider may be thus stated: Although by the maritime law the duty rests upon courts of admiralty to afford redress for every injury to person or property where the subject-matter is within the cognizance of such courts and when the wrongdoer is amenable to process, nevertheless the admiralty courts must deny all relief whenever redress for a wrong would not be afforded by the local law of a particular State or the course of decisions therein.... [p] The practical destruction of a uniform maritime law which must arise from this premise, is made manifest when it is considered that if it be true that the principles of the general maritime law giving relief for every character of maritime tort where the wrongdoer is subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, can be overthrown by conflicting decisions of state courts, it would follow that there would be no general maritime law for the redress of wrongs, as such law would be necessarily one thing in one State and one in another; one thing in one port of the United States and a different thing in some other port.... That the confusion to result would amount to the abrogation of a uniform maritime law is at once patent." (Id., at pp. 557-558, 21 S.Ct. at p. 214.)

The basis for determining whether state statutes affecting admiralty law may be given effect was clarified in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086. "[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied.... Equally well established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress or affect the general maritime law beyond certain limits. They cannot authorize proceedings in rem according to the course in admiralty, [citations]; nor create liens for materials used in repairing a foreign ship, [citation]. [Citation.] And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." (Id., at p. 216, 37 S.Ct. at p. 529.)

State workmen's compensation laws have been held not to constitute a significant interference with the uniformity of the maritime law in cases wherein the location of the injury or the nature of the employment contract involved few maritime characteristics. In Grant Smith- Porter Co. v. Rohde (1922) 257 U.S. 469, 42 S.Ct. 157, 66 L.Ed. 321, a carpenter was injured while working on a partially completed vessel. The court found that the parties' contract was not maritime in nature and that the rights and liabilities of the parties had no direct relation to navigation. Stating that "... as to certain local matters regulation of which would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the latter might be modified or supplemented by state statutes," (id., at p. 477, 42 S.Ct. at p. 158), the court held that the application of Oregon's workmen's compensation law would not materially affect the uniformity of the maritime law. (Ibid.) In Millers' Underwriters v. Braud (1926) 270 U.S. 59, 46 S.Ct. 194, 70 L.Ed. 470, a diver who submerged himself from a floating barge 35 feet from the bank of a navigable river died of suffocation when his air supply failed. The diver had been employed to saw timbers that were an obstruction to navigation. The court held that the provisions of the state workmen's compensation act controlled because the case involved a matter of local concern as to which regulation by the state would not materially interfere with the uniformity of the general maritime law. (Id., at pp. 64-65, 46 S.Ct. at p. 195.)

In London Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1929) 279 U.S. 109, 49 S.Ct. 296, 73 L.Ed. 632, a sailor employed by Morris Pleasure Fishing, Inc., a corporation engaged in maintaining and operating fishing vessels from the Santa Monica Bay to fishing grounds three to five miles from the bay, drowned while attempting to rescue one of Morris Pleasure's vessels during a storm. The London Co. court recognized that the rescue of a vessel in distress is a duty which is clearly maritime and that the deceased was acting as a seaman while so engaged. (Id., at p. 123, 49 S.Ct. at p. 299.) The court held that application of the exclusive remedy provision of the California workmen's compensation law to the mother and stepfather of the deceased would violate the United States Constitution because of the material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law that would result therefrom. (Id., at p. 125, 49 S.Ct. at p. 300.) The Supreme Court stated, "There was no feature of the business and employment that was not purely maritime. To hold that a seaman, engaged and injured in an employment purely of admiralty cognizance, could be required to change the nature or conditions of his recovery under a state compensation law, would certainly be prejudicial to the characteristic features of the general maritime law." (Id., at p. 123, 49 S.Ct. at p....