Hamilton v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-00755 |
| Citation | 608 F.Supp.3d 599 |
| Parties | Timothy HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Richard Marshall Brooks, Carthage, TN, for Plaintiff.
Robert M. Burns, Samantha A. Foster, Howell & Fisher, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court are three motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 26, 30, 32, each a "motion" and collectively, the "Motions"), filed by Defendants the City of Franklin, Tennessee ("Franklin"), Tyler Wiggers, and Nicholas Smith respectively. Plaintiff filed a single response to the motions filed by Defendants Wiggers and Smith (Doc. No. 42)1 and a separate response to the motion filed by Defendant Franklin (Doc. No. 44). Each Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. Nos. 47-49). For the reasons stated herein, all three Motions will be granted.
On September 3, 2018, Plaintiff was driving a vehicle in Franklin (Williamson County), Tennessee with his girlfriend, Kanesha Vaughn, in the passenger seat (Doc. No. 43 at 3). The two were on their way home from the nearby mall. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). On the way, Plaintiff and Ms. Vaughn stopped at a Twice Daily store on Highway 96 West. (Doc. No. 43 at 3). At the time, Defendant Nicholas Smith and Defendant Tyler Wiggers (collectively, the "Individual Defendants") were police officers with the Franklin Police Department. (Doc. No. 45 at 1). As of the date at issue (September 3, 2018), the Individual Defendants were assigned as partners and working in an unmarked police car. (Doc. No. 43 at 2). Defendants contend that the Individual Defendants pulled into the Twice Daily store at the same time that Plaintiff and Ms. Vaughn were exiting. (Id. at 3).
There is one (and only one) westbound lane on Highway 96 where it intersects with 11th Avenue. (Id. at 5). This single lane is for both vehicles continuing west and vehicles turning right onto 11th Avenue North. (Id. at 6.). There is no "right turn only" lane there. (Id. ). Upon leaving the Twice Daily store, Plaintiff turned into the shoulder of Highway 96 West, rather than the westbound lane. (Id. ). Still on the shoulder, he then drove past the vehicles properly located in the westbound lane to turn right on 11th Ave North. (Id. at 7-8). Defendants contend that Smith and Wiggers witnessed Plaintiff drive on the shoulder, though Plaintiff states that neither he nor Ms. Vaughn ever saw the officers at the Twice Daily store (Id. at 8). The Individual Defendants left the Twice Daily store, but lost sight of Plaintiff's vehicle. (Id. at 10).
After turning right onto 11th Ave North, Plaintiff turned right onto Green Street. (Id. ). On Green Street, Plaintiff came to his uncle's house where he stopped in the road to speak with his uncle who was sitting on the porch. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). The Individual Defendants proceeded down 11th Ave North, and eventually passed by Plaintiff while he was speaking with his uncle on Green Street. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 3, 43 at 10). At some point, the Individual Defendants observed that Plaintiff's vehicle had aftermarket window tint. (Doc. No. 43 at 4).
After finishing his conversation with his uncle, Plaintiff continued down Green Street and turned right into the parking lot of Green Street Church of God, where he often parked his car. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-4). The Individual Defendants pulled in behind Plaintiff, got out of their vehicle, and approached Plaintiff and Ms. Vaughn, who had also exited their vehicle. (Id. at 4). The Individual Defendants directed Plaintiff and Ms. Vaughn to return to their vehicle, but the two refused to do so. (Id. ). Defendant Smith asked Plaintiff where his license was, and Plaintiff then asked the officers why he was being stopped and why they needed his license. (Doc. No. 43 at 16-17).
The interaction continued, and at some point, Plaintiff sat on the hood of his car, and Defendant Smith stood in front of him. (Id. at 20). Defendant Smith then informed Plaintiff of the reasons for the traffic stop. (Id. at 21). At that point Plaintiff provided Smith with his driver's license. (Id. ). A few moments later, Plaintiff stepped away from the vehicle and was directed to sit down, at which point he yelled, "I'm not having a seat." (Id. at 22). Defendant Smith told Plaintiff to turn around, and Plaintiff again took some steps back away from the officers. (Id. at 22-23).
The Individual Defendants approached and attempted to grab Plaintiff's arms to handcuff him, at which point Plaintiff put his hands up in the air. (Id. at 23-24). The Individual Defendants each grabbed one of Plaintiff's arms and tried to place him in handcuffs but were unsuccessful. (Id. at 24). Plaintiff was pushed onto the hood of his vehicle and handcuffed. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 5, 43 at 25). The Individual Defendants contend that the officers informed Plaintiff he was under arrest.3 (Doc. No. 43 at 25). Plaintiff was searched and then placed in a police vehicle and transported to Williamson County Jail by a third officer, Marc Swain, who had arrived at the scene a few minutes earlier. (Id. at 26-27).
Prior to being placed in the police car, Plaintiff gave his car keys to Ms. Vaughn. (Doc. No. 43 at 26). After Plaintiff was removed from the scene, the Individual Defendants requested a drug dog to come do a sniff search of the car. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 6, 43 at 28). The drug dog, provided by Williamson County (Tennessee), alerted on Plaintiff's vehicle. (Doc. No. 43 at 29-30). The Individual Defendants searched the vehicle but found no drugs. (Id. at 30). Ms. Vaughn and the car were released at the scene. (Id. at 31).
The entire incident was captured on officer body cameras, and that footage was provided to the Court to aid in its review of the present Motions. (Exhibit 9 Smith Body Cam Footage, Exhibit 10 Wiggers Body Cam Footage, and Exhibit 11 Swain Body Cam Footage).
Plaintiff filed the present action on August 27, 2019, asserting four federal claims and two state-law claims against all Defendants.
Each of the federal claims (Counts I through IV) was premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and they were styled respectively as: unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, false imprisonment/false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and failure to intervene. The state-law claims were premised on the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("TGTLA"), and were styled, respectively, as common law false arrest and common law false imprisonment.
Defendants filed the respective Motions and accompanying memoranda in support on December 21, 2020.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. On the other hand, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine[.]’ " Id.
A fact is "material" within the meaning of Rule 56(c) "if its proof or disproof might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Harris v. Klare , 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018).
It is typically stated that the party bringing the summary judgment motion (the movant) has the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. See, e.g. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. , 13 F.4th 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2021) () (quoting White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 533 F.3d 381, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2008) ); Pittman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. , 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018). But this is somewhat inexact in the aftermath of 2010 amendments to Rule 56. The movant's initial burden actually is to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and not necessarily to so demonstrate specifically by referencing portions of the record. True, prior to the 2010 amendments, referencing portions of the record seemed to be the only way to make such a demonstration, and even today that is the primary way to make such a demonstration.4 But the 2010 amendments added, inter alia Rule 56(c)(1)(B), which "recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials."
Rule 56 2010 Amendment Advisory Committee Note.
Under Rule 56(c)(1)(B), the movant actually has another available means—an alternative to citing materials in the record —for demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Specifically, the moving party may meet its initial burden (to indicate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact) by "show[ing]"—even without citing materials of record—that the nonmovant "cannot produce admissible evidence to support [a material] fact" (for example, the existence of an element of a nonmovant plaintiff's claim). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).5 If the summary judgment movant meets that burden, then in response...
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