Hamilton v. Gavin
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22 C 02285 |
| Parties | Eric Hamilton, Plaintiff, v. Larry Gavin; Karen Jones-Hayes; Damita Delitz; Michael Miller; Thomas Dart, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Eric Hamilton (“Hamilton”) has sued various Cook County Jail officials in their individual capacities, as well as Cook County Jail Executive Director Michael Miller and Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their actions leading up to and following an April 2020 riot in the Cook County Jail. Specifically, Hamilton alleges Defendants modified security procedures which exposed Hamilton to a risk of injury, failed to protect him from other rioting detainees, forcibly moved him without a walking device, and failed to provide him with adequate medical attention and necessary medications. Defendants have moved to dismiss Hamilton's Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against them for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 30. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiffs complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the claim's basis. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “ ‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' ” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Hamilton is a fifty-four-year-old man with serious medical conditions including diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, neuropathy, and amputated extremities on his right leg. SAC, ECF No. 17, ¶ 81. Because of his various medical conditions, he requires a walking device and receives heart, pain, and neuropathy medication twice daily and doses of insulin thrice daily. Id. ¶¶ 3, 28-30.
At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was awaiting trial at the Cook County Jail and was housed in the jail's Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”) due to his medical conditions. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. Hamilton was placed in Division 8-3G of the RTU, a “dormitory-style unit that houses up to 39 detainees in an open-room layout rather than cells.” Id. ¶ 23. Hamilton alleges that, in response to COVID-19 outbreaks, Defendants Dart and Miller promulgated a policy whereby detainees who were otherwise ineligible for dormitory-style housing due to violent or disruptive behavior were transferred to Division 8-3G for quarantine if they tested positive for or were otherwise exposed to COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 24-26. Inmates allegedly could not be transferred out of the Division without the express approval of Defendant Miller. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Gavin, Jones-Hayes, and Delitz were aware that correctional officers stopped “performing regular walk-throughs or standing guard inside Division 8-3G.” Id. ¶ 27.
On the evening of April 28, 2020, and continuing into the early morning hours of April 29, 2020, thirteen detainees in Division 8-3G created and consumed a liquid intoxicant made from prescription medications, or “hooch,” and began “stealing personal possessions, [and] harassing and threatening dormitory residents.” Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Unspecified correctional officers became aware of this group, briefly entered Division 8-3G around 2:00 AM, and confiscated some of the hooch. Id. ¶ 37. Hamilton alleges that these officers failed to fully sweep the premises or remove all the hooch and contraband. Id. ¶ 37. They further failed to “restrain, isolate, or remove” the thirteen intoxicated detainees from Division 8-3G because of the policy which prevented their transfer. Id. ¶ 38.
The next morning, a new set of unnamed officers punished the detainees' behavior by disabling the telephone and television. Id. ¶ 41. The intoxicated detainees became angry, and a riot broke out. Id. ¶ 42. They threw unsecured objects in the room, such as mop buckets, brooms, the telephone, and a computer. Id. Hamilton did not participate in the riot and attempted to protect himself while the intoxicated detainees threw some objects in his direction. Id. ¶ 43. Another detainee, who had allegedly obtained mace from a correctional officer, sprayed it throughout the room. Id. ¶ 44. This caused Hamilton to sustain “injuries to his eyes, nose, and mouth.” Id. ¶ 45. Hamilton and other detainees “pleaded for Cook County Jail staff to protect them from the group of rioting detainees but those pleas were ignored.” Id. ¶ 46.
According to Hamilton, “Defendants Gavin, Jones-Hayes, and Delitz directed Cook County Jail staff to avoid entering” Division 8-3G as they observed the riot through protective glass windows and security cameras for over an hour. Id. ¶¶ 4748. Eventually, Defendants Gavin, Jones-Hayes, and Delitz ordered an Emergency Response Team to forcibly restrain all detainees in Division 8-3G, including Hamilton. Id. ¶ 50-51. Two unnamed officers, allegedly at the direction of Defendants, attempted to move Hamilton to a general population cell. Id. ¶ 52. He requested a wheelchair, walking device, or elevator to assist him because of his amputated toes and balance issues. Id. ¶ 53. The officers ignored his request and forced him to walk down several flights of stairs. Id. ¶ 54. Hamilton struggled to keep his balance. Id.
Defendants held Hamilton in a general population cell for twelve hours. Id. ¶ 55. While there, he was denied medical care for his reactions to the mace and was not given his insulin and medications to control his heart and neuropathy conditions. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. He received one insulin dose on April 29, 2020 when he was moved back to Division 8-3G over twelve hours later. Id. ¶ 57.
On April 26, 2022, Hamilton filed a pro se complaint against Defendants Gavin, Jones-Hayes, Delitz, Dart, and “John Doe 1-4.” R. 6. The operative Second Amended Complaint, which Hamilton filed with the assistance of counsel on September 12, 2022, names Michael Miller as well. R. 17. Against Gavin, Jones-Hayes, and Delitz in their individual capacities, Count I alleges a failure to protect Hamilton from the rioting inmates because they “purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly turned a blind eye” to conduct by officers working under their command and failed to timely respond to the riot. SAC ¶ 60. Against Dart and Miller in their official capacities, Count II alleges a failure to protect stemming from institutional policies that increased the risk of harm and prevented transfer of violent detainees. Id. ¶¶ 71-74. Counts III (against Gavin, Jones-Hayes, and Delitz) and IV (against Miller and Dart) allege deliberate indifference to Hamilton's serious medical needs after the riot because Defendants were aware of his conditions, ordered him to be moved without attending to his injuries, refused to offer a walking device, and placed him in general population housing without his medications. Id. ¶¶ 81, 84-85, 89-90. Hamilton alleges that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, he sustained “significant risk of serious injury or death for failure to receive his regular medication,” serious injuries to his eyes, nose, and throat, and “psychological injuries, mental trauma, fear, stress, pain and suffering.” Id. ¶¶ 69, 78, 87, 92.
Defendant Miller argues that he should be dismissed from the lawsuit because the official-capacity claims against him are time-barred and redundant. Miller argues that, because every suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is actually a suit against the entity the official represents, the official-capacity claims against Miller are duplicative of the official-capacity claims against Dart because they both are officials within the Cook County Sheriff's Office.
The Court agrees. See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978); Doe v. Sch. Dist. U-46, 557 F.Supp.3d 860, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2021). The official-capacity claim against Miller, is in reality a claim for relief against the Cook County Department of Corrections, a department within the Cook County Sheriff's Office. Moy v. Cnty. of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 526 (1994); see also Hildreth v. Cook Cnty., 2010 WL 1656810, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2010) (). And...
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