Hamilton v. Great Falls St. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 February 1896 |
| Citation | 43 P. 713,17 Mont. 334 |
| Parties | HAMILTON v. GREAT FALLS ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
On motion for rehearing. Denied.
For prior report, see 42 P. 860.
1. Appellant asks for a rehearing. The first point urged is that the court should have decided whether the plaintiff, a married woman, could recover damages "for any impairment of her capacity as a previously healthy woman, if she were such, to earn money." We think she could. Plaintiff's capacity to earn is her own, and she is entitled to recover for any diminution of her capacity to work that is shown to have resulted from the injury. It is unnecessary to decide, in this case, whether the profits or use of that capacity belong to another. The capacity is her own, and for its impairment she can recover. Jordan v Railroad Co., 138 Mass. 425; 2 Sedg. Dam. § 486.
2. It was not necessary to specially plead damages done to plaintiff by reason of any impairment of such capacity, as obviously, where a woman is injured to such an extent as to cause her great pain and suffering in and about her womb and back, she will, until her recovery at least, suffer an impairment of her general capacity to earn money. To what extent plaintiff's capacity was impaired was, therefore, properly submitted to the jury, as part of her general damages. Railway Co. v. Bowlin (Tex. Civ App.) 32 S.W. 918; Harmon v. Railroad Co. (Mass.) 42 N.E. 505.
3. The court charged, among other things, that damages could be awarded for "such consequences as are reasonably likely to ensue in the future"; and, again, "plaintiff may recover for all pain and suffering which she has sustained or, in reasonable probability, will hereafter sustain," etc. The defendant now contends that damages can only be awarded when it is rendered reasonably certain from the evidence that damages will inevitably and necessarily result from the original injury. In this case all testimony as to future disability consisted of expert medical opinions. Certainty of future effects was impossible, and reasonable probabilities were necessarily the bases of the opinions expressed. Therefore, to say that she could recover for suffering which she would in reasonable probability sustain was practically to say that she might recover for suffering which she was reasonably certain to sustain. The degree of proof would be the same in either case. The instructions complained of are in direct...
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