Hamilton v. Harvey

• Decision Date: 26 September 1887
• Citation: 121 Ill. 469,13 N.E. 210
• Parties: HAMILTON v. HARVEY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

121 Ill. 469

13 N.E. 210

HAMILTON

v.HARVEY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 26, 1887.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county; H. M. SHEP ARD, Judge.

John S. Miller and B. F. Chase, for appellant.

James Frake, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

This is a bill filed in the superior court of Cook county, January 22, 1886, by the appellant against the appellee, for the specific performance of the following instrument:

‘CHICAGO, ILL., November 17, 1885.

‘ Mr. W. R. Hamilton-DEAR SIR. I hereby agree to lease my bldg. at Racific Junction, known as the ‘Foster Rotary Plow Factory Co.,’ at $100 per month for 1st year, or the privilege hereafter of buying, if they choose, at $10,000; or, if building should not be suitable, will donate 200 square ft. along the R. R. for company to build on. Will allow you as commission for said location 1-3 interest in 5 acres located near said works.

‘I. R. HARVEY.’

Answer was filed to the bill, and replication to the answer. The case was heard upon the pleadings; and upon proofs taken by the complainant. The defendant introduced no testimony. The court below dismissed the bill for want of equity.

The circumstances surrounding the execution of this instrument were briefly as follows: Appellee owned some land at Pacific Junction, in Cook county, and also held the equitable title to the lots upon which stood a building known as the ‘Foster Rotary Plow Company Factory.’ Appellee and other property owners were desirous of having a factory located in the vicinity, which would employ a large number of men, and thus give value to their property. Appellant, a real-estate agent in Chicago, undertook to accomplish what was desired. Through his efforts, a lease dated December 18, 1885, was made by W. C. Grant, trustee, to L. C. Maxwell, C. R. Johnson, and C. H. Jackson, representing the Maxwell Patent White Lead Works, leasing the premises occupied by said building from January 1, 1886, to December 31, 1887, at $1,000 for the first year, and $1,200 for the second year.

We think that the bill was properly dismissed. The instrument here recited is too uncertain and indefinite to justify a court of equity in decreeing its specific performance. An application for the specific performance of a contract is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court. Courts of equity will decree a specific performance where the contract is in writing, and is certain, and is fair in all its parts, and is for an adequate consideration, and is capable of being performed, but not otherwise. Bowman v. Cunningham, 78 Ill. 48. It must be reasonably certain as to its subject-matter, its stipulations, its purposes, its parties, and the circumstances under which it is made. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1405. It is essential that the description of the subjectmatter should be so definite that it may be known with certainty what the purchaser imagined himself to be contracting for, and that the court may be able to ascertain what it is. Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.) § 327. The description of the land to be conveyed is indefinite and uncertain. The words are, ‘will allow you as commission * * * 1/3 interest in 5 acres located near said works.’ The five acres are not described. It is not stated that they are owned by Harvey, the vendor. Their direction from the ‘works,’ whether north, south, east, or west, is not indicated.

In Capps v. Holt, 5 Jones, Eq. 153, the description was ‘a tract of land lying on the north side of the Watery Branch, in the county of * * *, and state of * * *, containing 150 acres.’ The court said: ‘The position thus given is not definite enough, and no decree for conveyance could be based upon it. * * * The writing, of itself, clearly is too vague and uncertain in the description of the land bargained for to warrant us in declaring where it is, by what termini included, and decreeing a conveyance of it.’

In Jordan v. Fay, 40 Me. 130, the description in the memorandum was, ‘a lot of land joining a small tract now occupied by Michael Micue.’ The court held: ‘There is in the writing no reference by which the land can be determined with any greater certainty than by the memorandum. The location, size, and shape of the lot are entirely wanting in the description, and, without out a resort to parol evidence, it would be impossible to ascertain what land was intended to be the subject of the agreement; and it forms no ground for a specific performance.’

In Hammer v. McEldowney, 46 Pa. St. 334, the description was ‘the houses on Smithfield street,’ in the city of Pittsburgh. After speaking of the alleged contract as being ‘without any designation of the houses, where situate on the street mentioned, of what size, dimensions, or material, or the area of ground to be embraced, and without in fact disclosing to whom they belonged,’ etc., the court say: ‘It is a settled rule in equity that the specific performance of a contract will not be decreed unless its terms are clear, and capable of ascertainment from the instrument itself. * * * So, courts of equity will not ordinarily entertain bills for the specific execution of contracts with variations or additions or new terms to be made and introduced into them by parol. * * * It requires no argument or illustration to bring this imperfect or indefinite contract within these rules.’

In Carr v. Building Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 424, and 22 N. J. Eq. 85, the resolution of the company was ‘that two acres be sold.’ It was held to be upon its face vague and uncertain. The court there say: ‘The vagueness and uncertainty is patent, and no parol proof can be admitted to explain it.’

In King v. Ruckman, 20 N. J. Eq. 316, Ruckman, by a written contract, agreed to sell King certain tracts of land in Bergen and Rockland counties, New York, ‘describing them as all the lands he owned and held contracts for in the township of Harrington,’ etc.; ‘ and also two lots of land situated in Hackensack township, in the county of Bergen.’ The court say: ‘As to the parts in Harrington township and the county of Rockland, the description is sufficiently certain. It is, ‘all the land owned by Ruckman, or for which he held contracts,’ within certain boundaries. The maxim is, id certum est quod certum reddi potest. It can be shown with certainty what lands he owned or held contracts for in these boundaries. But the last clause seems uncertain. * * * It does not describe them as two lots owned by him, for then, if he owned only two lots there, it might be rendered certain. This contract would be complied with by his conveying two lots of ten feet square, or two lots containing a thousand acres. Nor can this part be rejected as...