Hamilton v. Hughey, 14

Decision Date29 December 1978
Docket Number219E,No. 14,14
Citation588 P.2d 38,284 Or. 739
PartiesClifford R. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. Bertha Ellen HUGHEY, Respondent. ; S Ct 25524.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

G. Scott Smith, Certified Law Student, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs was William T. Buckley, Lake Oswego.

D. S. Denning, Jr., Ontario, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

Before DENECKE, Chief Justice, and HOLMAN, TONGUE, HOWELL, BRYSON and LENT, Justices.

BRYSON, Justice.

This is a suit to quiet title to plaintiff's property in Malheur County and to remove a judgment lien thereon. The case was submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment with a stipulation of facts and affidavits. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, entered an order allowing defendant's motion which renewed the judgment lien, and entered a decree dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from the order and decree.

The issue in this case is whether the judgment against plaintiff's predecessor in interest in the land was validly renewed so as to renew the lien on the land.

The judgment here involved was obtained by Frank R. Hughey and was docketed on September 2, 1964. This judgment was against plaintiff's parents and plaintiff subsequently purchased the land with notice of the judgment. Mr. and Mrs. Hughey were residents of Idaho where Mr. Hughey, the judgment creditor, died on July 19, 1969. 1

Mr. Hughey's attorney of record learned of Hughey's death but did nothing about the judgment until August 20, 1974, when the attorney moved in Hughey's name for an extension of the judgment, which the trial court granted by order dated August 23, 1974. The original judgment was to expire September 3, 1974. Mr. Hughey's estate was probated in the county of Canyon, Idaho, in 1974 (the record does not show the exact date). The stipulation of facts states:

"* * * The said judgment against Merle Hamilton (from whom plaintiff purchased the property) was not mentioned in the Idaho proceedings and Bertha Ellen Hughey did not relate anything about it when she was interviewed by her said Idaho attorneys in connection with the Idaho proceedings."

Mr. Hughey's attorney "executed the Motion for Renewal of Judgment under the authority given to him many years before by the said Frank R. Hughey at their initial interview."

This case is before us on the stipulated set of facts and the trial court file.

Plaintiff contends that upon the death of Mr. Hughey, title to his property immediately vested in his heirs subject to the administration of the decedent's estate, and Frank R. Hughey being dead, was not a real party of interest to the judgment at the time the motion for renewal was filed and the order granting renewal was made. Neither Mr. Hughey's heirs nor the representative of his estate was a party to the motion for renewal of the judgment.

ORS 13.030 provides:

"Every action or suit shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except that an executor or an administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized to sue by statute, may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action or suit is prosecuted. * * *"

Plaintiff also contends that the attempted renewal of the judgment was not effective. We agree. ORS 18.360 provides:

"Whenever, after the entry of a judgment, a period of 10 years shall elapse, the judgment and the lien thereof shall expire. However, before the expiration of 10 years the circuit court in which such judgment was docketed, on motion, may renew such judgment and cause a new entry of the same to be made in the judgment docket, after which entry the lien of the judgment shall continue for another 10 years unless sooner satisfied * * *."

ORS 18.360 does not state on whose motion the judgment may be renewed. Nevertheless, our prior cases have held that the person making the motion to renew must be the real party in interest to the judgment. In First Nat'l Bk. v. Jack Mathis Gen. Cont.,...

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5 cases
  • Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • August 14, 1979
    ...cases. "The general rule is that the death of the client revokes his attorney's authority to act for him." Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739, 588 P.2d 38, 40 (1978). This rule has been applied to a settlement effected a day after a client's death in an action for damages arising out of an aut......
  • Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • October 10, 1985
    ...Breed, 118 Ill.App.3d 669, 74 Ill.Dec. 170, 455 N.E.2d 200 (1983); State v. Dickens, 214 Kan. 98, 519 P.2d 750 (1974); Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739, 588 P.2d 38 (1978); Vincent v. Vincent, 16 Wash.App. 213, 554 P.2d 374 (1976). The question is whether decedent's former attorney here can ......
  • State v. Kaiser
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1984
    ...it is a settled rule of law in Oregon that the death of a party terminates the authority of the party's attorney. Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739, 743, 588 P.2d 38 (1978); Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Cadwell, 67 Or. 301, 135 P. 880 (1913). For that reason, defendant's attorney could not petitio......
  • In The Matter of The Comp. of Karl J. Wild v. WILD
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • September 29, 2010
    ...4The parties do not dispute that the attorney lost the authority to act on Wild's behalf when Wild died. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739, 743, 588 P.2d 38 (1978). Hence, the attorney's reconsideration request was not a timely request by Wild that Wild's daughter could pursue to i......
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