Hamilton v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 02 December 2010
• Citation: 79 A.D.3d 1210,913 N.Y.S.2d 372
• Parties: Robert H. HAMILTON et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. David MURPHY, Appellant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

913 N.Y.S.2d 372

79 A.D.3d 1210

Robert H. HAMILTON et al., Respondents-Appellants,

v.David MURPHY, Appellant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 2, 2010.

Mark Schneider, Plattsburgh, for appellant-respondent.

Walter & Mishler, P.C., Albany (Lanny E. Walter of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Before: MERCURE, J.P., PETERS, ROSE, MALONE JR. and EGAN JR., JJ.

PETERS, J.

Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (McGill, J.), entered January 14, 2010 in Clinton County, which, among other things, awarded plaintiffs judgment upon finding defendant in civil contempt.

The parties are owners of properties on Mountaineer Drive in the Town of Ausable, Clinton County. In order to access their respective properties, plaintiffs must travel down Ausable Beach Road and make a sharp, nearly 90-degree turn onto Mountaineer Drive. After defendant placed a large log on the edge of the roadway where Ausable Beach Road and Mountaineer Drive intersect, plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that defendant interfered with their right-of-way over Mountaineer Drive and impeded their ability to freely and safely bring large vehicles, such as boats and campers, down to their properties. In July 2008, the parties, each represented by counsel, entered into a "So-Ordered" stipulation whereby they agreed to settle the dispute. The stipulation established, by reference to anAugust 2002 survey prepared by Carey Surveying Company, a 16 1/2-foot right-of-way in favor of plaintiffs. As depicted in the 2002 survey, within that right-of-way runs a gravel roadway as well as strips of land that border each side of the gravel road. The stipulation also required defendant to remove all impediments to the right-of-way and refrain from placing any other obstructing obstacles within it.

Defendant thereafter removed the log in compliance with the stipulation, but subsequently installed "no trespassing" metal signs within inches of where the log had been. Plaintiffs then had the right-of-way resurveyed, which located the metal signs within the agreed-upon right-of-way, and sent correspondence along with the resurvey to defendant advising him that his placement of the signs was in violation of the stipulation and requesting that he remove them. When defendant failed to do so, plaintiffs moved to hold him in contempt. Defendant cross-moved to vacate the stipulation and to dismiss plaintiffs Robert H. Hamilton and Patricia J. Hamilton from the action. Supreme Court denied defendant's cross motion and, following an evidentiary hearing, found defendant in civil contempt and ordered him to pay $6,330.24 in fees and disbursements. These cross appeals ensued.¹

Supreme Court properly declined to vacate the stipulation.Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and will not lightly be set aside ( see Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178 [1984]; Springer v. Winney, 295 A.D.2d 845, 846, 743 N.Y.S.2d 902 [2002] ). "Consequently, only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation" ( Robison v. Borelli, 239 A.D.2d 656, 657, 657 N.Y.S.2d 783 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Canino v. Electronic Tech. Co., 49 A.D.3d 1050, 1051, 856 N.Y.S.2d 683 [2008]; French v. Quinn, 243 A.D.2d 792, 793, 663 N.Y.S.2d 127 [1997], lv. dismissed 91 N.Y.2d 1002, 676 N.Y.S.2d 128, 698 N.E.2d 957 [1998] ). No such showing has been made here.

Defendant was represented by counsel throughout the settlement negotiations and agreed to the stipulation in lieu of litigating the matter. Both defendant and his attorney had an opportunity to review the terms of the stipulation, as well as the 2002 survey depicting the right-of-way, and correspondence exchanged between the parties prior to its execution clearly reveals that they had a full understanding of the nature, size and location of the right-of-way that they were agreeing to and their respective rights with regard thereto. Defendant asserts that, because the deeds of those plaintiffs which grant the right-of-way do not specify its dimensions, the width of the right-of-way should have been limited to that of the gravel roadway. Yet defendant agreed to a 16 1/2-foot right-of-way and, however improvident he may now view that decision, such second thoughts are insufficient to set aside an otherwise valid agreement ( see Fox v. Merriman, 307 A.D.2d 685, 686-687, 763 N.Y.S.2d 377 [2003];Turk v. Turk, 276 A.D.2d 953, 955, 714 N.Y.S.2d 566 [2000]; Robison v. Borelli, 239 A.D.2d at 657, 657 N.Y.S.2d 783; Vermilyea v. Vermilyea, 224 A.D.2d 759, 761, 636 N.Y.S.2d 953 [1996] ). Nor do we find merit in defendant's assertion that he was coerced into signing the stipulation due to the threat of legal action that plaintiffs lawfully commenced ( see Matter of Stearns v. Stearns, 11 A.D.3d 746, 747-748, 783 N.Y.S.2d 686 [2004] ). Furthermore, as a stipulation of settlement, being contractual in nature, may create new rights between the parties and/or settle future claims between them, plaintiffs' prior title rights to the right-of-way are irrelevant ( see e.g. Matter of Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v. Lord, 60 N.Y.2d 845, 847-848, 470 N.Y.S.2d 134, 458 N.E.2d 375 [1983]; Chase Manhattan Bank v. State of New York, 13 A.D.3d 873, 874, 787 N.Y.S.2d 155 [2004]; Honeywell, Inc. v. Technical Bldg. Servs., 103 A.D.2d 433, 435, 480 N.Y.S.2d 627 [1984] ). Thus, defendant is bound by the stipulation.

Nor did Supreme Court abuse its discretion in finding defendant in civil contempt. To warrant such a finding, "it must beestablished that there was a lawful court order in effect that clearly expressed an unequivocal mandate, that the person who allegedly violated the order had actual knowledge of its terms, and that his or her actions or failure to act defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced a right of the moving party" ( Beneke v. Town of Santa Clara, 61 A.D.3d 1079, 1080, 876 N.Y.S.2d 229 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Judiciary Law § 753[A][3]; McCain v. Dinkins, 84 N.Y.2d 216, 226, 616 N.Y.S.2d 335, 639 N.E.2d 1132 [1994]; Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 A.D.3d 1308, 1309, 900 N.Y.S.2d 508 [2010] ).

Here, despite defendant's assertions to the contrary, the so-ordered stipulation is not ambiguous as to the parameters of the right-of-way. It clearly states that the boundaries of the right-of-way are defined by the 16 1/2-foot wide area outlined in the 2002 survey map, not, as defendant suggests, the gravel roadway which meanders through the right-of-way. Furthermore, each paragraph of the stipulation setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties does so with specific reference to the right-of-way, rather than the gravel road. Plaintiffs demonstrated that the signs installed by defendant were within the boundaries of the right-of-way and impeded their right of free and unobstructed travel to their...