Hamilton v. Ohio Dep't of Health

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14AP–1035.,14AP–1035.
• Parties: Edward HAMILTON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

42 N.E.3d 1261

Edward HAMILTON, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14AP–1035.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Sept. 30, 2015.

Edward Hamilton, pro se.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Melissa L. Wilburn, for appellees.

Opinion

SADLER

, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Edward Hamilton, appeals the November 21, 2014 decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees, Ohio Department of Health and its director (“ODH”), and denying appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} This case concerns the standing of appellant to challenge in a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief a rule promulgated by ODH that alters certain eligibility protocols, if Ohio's “Ryan White Part B” program suffers a future funding shortfall.

{¶ 3} Ohio's Ryan White Part B program, which includes the Ohio HIV Drug Assistance Program (“OHDAP”), arose under the federal Ryan White Act “Part B–Care Grant Program.” 42 U.S.C. 300ff–21

. Part B permits the federal government, “subject to the availability of appropriations,” to provide grants to enable applicant states “to improve the quality, availability and organization of health care and support services for individuals and families with HIV/AIDS.” Applicant states must provide an assurance that the state will, “to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that HIV-related health care and support services delivered pursuant to a program established with assistance * * * provided without regard to the ability of the individual to pay for such services and without regard to the current or past health condition of the individual with HIV/AIDS.” 42 U.S.C. 300ff–27(b)(7)(B)(i). A state may use the grants to support core medical services, including drug assistance programs, as well as certain support services and administrative expenses.

{¶ 4} The Ohio legislature charged ODH with administering the Ohio Ryan White Part B program, and in R.C. 3701.241(D)

allows its director discretion to adopt rules and issue orders as necessary for administration of the funds. In September 2011, appellees began the administrative rule-making process to revise the code section pertaining to eligibility for benefits under the Ohio Ryan White Part B program, now numbered Ohio Adm.Code 3701–44–03.

{¶ 5} The two appendices which support Ohio Adm.Code 3701–44–03

are central to this appeal. Appendix A establishes medical guidelines to determine the priority in which an applicant would receive OHDAP services, including access to medications, if a waiting list forms due to insufficient funds.¹ Appendix B provides the director of ODH with discretion to reduce the maximum gross family income threshold from 300 percent of the federal poverty level (“FPL”) to no less than 100 percent of the FPL, if there is insufficient funding to sustain current services of the program.²

{¶ 6} On November 2, 2011, appellant filed a complaint asking the court to declare Ohio Adm.Code 3701–44–03

unenforceable as proposed and asking the court for temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin ODH from enforcing the rule. Appellant contended that Appendices A and B amounted to a material modification of the new rule that necessitated another public hearing under the rule-making process in Chapter 119 of the Revised Code. The trial court issued an order temporarily restraining ODH from enforcing or implementing the proposed rule until the court resolved whether to grant declaratory or injunctive relief.

{¶ 7} A few weeks later, the trial court granted appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the rule from taking effect until appellees held a public hearing in compliance with Chapter 119 of the Revised Code. Analyzing the “irreparable harm” element of injunction, the trial court found “[a]t this juncture, [appellant] merely seek[s] a[n] R.C. 119.03

public hearing by which [he] may voice [his] opinion on this new rule. * * * The disenfranchisement of an affected person to be heard on new rules that would substantially change his or her life constitutes irreparable harm.” (Nov. 29, 2011 Entry Granting Preliminary Injunction, 9–10.).

{¶ 8} On August 27, 2012, appellees filed a notice of compliance with the court's order to properly promulgate the rule under R.C. 119 processes and filed a motion to dismiss asserting a lack of controversy. That same day, appellant filed a motion to file an amended complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order.

{¶ 9} On August 28, 2012, the trial court denied appellees' motion to dismiss, granted appellant leave to file an amended complaint, and denied appellant's motion for a temporary restraining order, stating: “[a] temporary restraining order contemplates a situation where there is an unusual emergency with the imminent threat of harm that requires immediate court consideration. The Court finds that [appellant] failed to satisfy the necessary elements set forth in Civ.R. 65(A)

for a temporary restraining order.” (Aug. 29, 2012 Order and Entry, 1–2.) Ohio Adm.Code 3701–44–03 became effective August 30, 2012.

{¶ 10} In the amended complaint, the touchstone for this appeal, appellant asserts an action to declare Ohio Adm.Code 3701–44–03

unlawful and to enjoin its enforcement due to the rule's violation of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act, the Ryan White Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and both the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions. The amended complaint states that appellant resides in Franklin County, Ohio, has a verified HIV infection, and currently receives benefits under the Ryan White Part B Program. The amended complaint also describes the medications funded by the program as “potentially life-saving” and potentially costing “as much as $10,000–$40,000 per year, per patient.” (Aug. 27, 2012 Verified Amended Complaint, 1, 3.).

{¶ 11} On September 28, 2012, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint based, in part, on Civ.R. 12(B)(1)

for lack of jurisdiction and Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On October 25, 2012, appellant filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and, the next day, filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss. Appellees filed a reply to appellant's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss on November 2, 2012, and a memorandum contra to appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on November 8, 2012.

{¶ 12} On April 1, 2013, the parties jointly moved the court to stay the proceedings pending a status conference with the court in November of that year to discuss the future “unknown” status of OHDAP in light of the Affordable Care Act. The trial court granted the parties' motion to stay and, after the November status conference, also granted the parties' request to continue the stay until further order of the court.

{¶ 13} On November 21, 2014, the trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss based on Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

and denied appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In so holding, the trial court found that appellant alleged only “a potential injury based upon [appellees'] conceivable response to a possible scenario (insufficiency of funds) outside of [appellant's] and [appellees'] control” and, as such, did not assert a specific injury that could be redressed by a court decision. (Emphasis sic.) (Nov. 21, 2014 Decision and Entry, 4.) As an additional basis to grant the motion to dismiss, the court also determined that the claims presented by appellant were not yet ripe for review. Finally, the trial court determined that the new information in appellant's proposed second amended complaint, relevant to whether appellant was an “applicant” subject to Appendix A, nonetheless did “not cure [appellant's] standing problem.” (Nov. 21, 2014 Decision and Entry, 6.)

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 14} Appellant presents three assignments of error for our review:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT–APPELLEE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S MOTION TO DISMISS BY CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT LACKED STANDING TO BRING A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON A LACK OF INJURY WHEN APPELLANT HAS STANDING TO REQUEST DECLARATORY RELIEF.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE REPROMULGATED RULES CREATED BY AN ABUSE OF AGENCY DISCRETION TO REMAIN IN EFFECT THAT CONFLICT WITH AND VIOLATE THE AMERICAN WITH DISABILITIES ACT, REHABILITATION ACT, DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE OHIO AND U.S. CONSTITUTION, RYAN WHITE TREATMENT AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2009, AND THE OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD COMMITTED A PROCEDURAL ERROR AND HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE COURT HAD INSTRUCTED THE PLAINTIFF THAT IT WAS WAITING FOR INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE INJURY WHEN IN FACT ALL PARTIES HAD KNOWN THAT THIS CAUSE OF ACTION WAS DECLARATORY IN NATURE AND NOT RULING ON ALL PREVIOUS PENDING MOTIONS IN AT [sic] TIMELY MANNER.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 15} Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is generally a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20

. Likewise, a trial court's order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de novo appellate review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5

. When reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the statements and facts considered in the pleadings and may not consider or rely on evidence outside of the complaint. Brown v. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 08AP–1...