Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc.

Citation209 F.Supp.3d 379
Decision Date21 July 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action NO. 09-11461-DPW
Parties Diane HAMILTON, Lynne P. Cunningham and Claire Kane, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., Partners Community Healthcare, Inc., the Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc., Brigham and Women's/Faulkner Hospitals, Inc., Martha's Vineyard Hospital, Inc., the Massachusetts General Hospital, Mclean Healthcare, Inc., the Mclean Hospital Corporation, Nantucket Cottage Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Healthcare System, Inc., North Shore Children's Hospital, Inc., North Shore Medical Center, Inc., NSMC Healthcare, Inc., the Salem Hospital, Union Hospital Auxiliary of Lynn, Inc., and Faulkner Hospital, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Jody L. Newman, Collora LLP, William A. Haddad, Beck Reed Riden LLP, Boston, MA, Michael J. Lingle, Patrick J. Solomon, Jessica L. Witenko, Thomas & Solomon LLP, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Angelo Spinola, Lisa A. Schreter, Anne M. Mellen, Bradley E. Strawn, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Atlanta, GA, Jerry H. Walters, Jr., Littler Mendelson, PC, Charlotte, NC, Christopher B. Kaczmarek, David C. Casey, Littler Mendelson P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Diane Hamilton, Lynne P. Cunningham and Claire Kane (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought this action raising federal claims on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees of a number of healthcare facilities allegedly affiliated with Partners Healthcare System, Inc. Plaintiffs contend that their employers maintain policies in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (First Cause) depriving them of compensation for time worked. Plaintiffs further contend that their employers' policies violate recordkeeping (Second Cause) and fiduciary (Third Cause) responsibilities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. , and constitute a scheme to deceive Plaintiffs and deprive them of their wages using mail fraud in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (Fourth Cause). The defendants moved [Dkt. No. 115] for judgment on the pleadings on all counts.1 By endorsement, I have granted [Dkt. No. 221] the motion by endorsement. This Memorandum and Order provides the parties with the extended explanation I promised for that disposition of the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The named defendants in this action are the following entities: Partners HealthCare System, Inc., Partners Community Healthcare, Inc., The Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc., Brigham and Women's/Faulkner Hospitals, Inc., Martha's Vineyard Hospital, Inc., The Massachusetts General Hospital, McLean Healthcare, Inc., The McLean Hospital Corporation, Nantucket Cottage Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Health Care System, Inc., North Shore Children's Hospital, Inc., North Shore Medical Center, Inc., NSMC Healthcare, Inc., The Salem Hospital, Union Hospital Auxiliary of Lynn, Inc., and Faulkner Hospital, Inc.2 Compl. ¶ 14.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs also list 27 health care facilities and centers associated with the named defendants and over 100 "affiliated" health care facilities and centers. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiffs refer to the named defendants, their facilities and centers, and the affiliated facilities and centers as "Partners" or "Defendants." Id. ¶ 17. With respect to the Plaintiffs themselves, the complaint merely states that they were "[a]t all relevant times ... employees under the FLSA, employed within this District and resid[ing] within this District," id. ¶ 76, and provides no further details regarding their employment.

Plaintiffs' claims are premised on allegations that Defendants maintain pay policies that deny Plaintiffs their compensation for all hours worked. Id. ¶ 79. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants (1) automatically deduct thirty minutes of time per day from each employee's paycheck for meal breaks without ensuring that such breaks are taken, (2) suffer or permit Plaintiffs to work before and/or after each scheduled shift without compensation, and (3) suffer or permit Plaintiffs to attend compensable training programs without pay. Id. ¶¶ 80-108.

Plaintiffs filed this action in this court on September 3, 2009. The next week, they filed a complaint in the Middlesex Superior Court asserting violations of Massachusetts wage laws, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 148, 150 & ch. 151 §§ 1A, 1B, and claims under Massachusetts contract and tort law. On October 16, 2009 the Defendants removed the state claim action to this court, where it has been docketed as 09-cv-11725.

The plaintiffs' complaint was met with a motion to dismiss the RICO count, asserting inadequate pleadings. [Dkt. No. 10]. When the parties reported that they were engaged in mediation before any hearing, I denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for remand "without prejudice to resubmittal if the ongoing protracted mediation process proves unsuccessful." (Unnumbered docket entry 05/6/2010).

The mediation process ultimately generated two successive motions for preliminary approval of class and collective action settlements. At separate hearings on each wave of motions, I denied them because—for a variety of reasons—I could not find the settlements proposed had any prospect of final approval as fair, adequate or reasonable. See generally Dkt. No. 95 (Dec. 23, 2010 Tr. concerning initial motion for preliminary approval); Dkt. No. 110 (Mar. 2, 2011 Tr. concerning amended motion for preliminary approval). My fundamental concern, as expressed at those hearings, was that the settlement proposals – involving some 63,000 employees in a multiplicity of job classifications at a multitude of institutional settings—raised inadequately addressed structural problems. Cf. In re Payment Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 827 F.3d 223, 235–36, 2016 WL 3563719 at *8 (2d Cir. June 30, 2016).3

Although I informed the parties that I would entertain one last effort by them aimed at securing approval to notice a proposed settlement, the defendants instead resumed pleadings motion practice by filing motions for judgment on the pleadings as to all counts in both the federal claim and the state claim actions. At a scheduling conference after those motions were filed, Plaintiffs' Counsel voiced the possibility that they might seek leave to amend, but have never followed through with a proper motion to amend.4 After an extended period of time I explain in this—and the related Memorandum and Order I enter in the state claims action today—the reasons why I am entering the final judgments in this and the related case on the basis of the operative complaint.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made "after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." A motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss. Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. v. Arlequín , 583 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodríguez Santana, et al. , 573 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir.2009) ("[T]o survive a motion to dismiss (or a motion for judgment on the pleadings), the complaint must plead facts that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.")); see also Erlich v. Ouellette, Labonte, Roberge and Allen, P.A. , 637 F.3d 32, 35 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (describing the standards for evaluating motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings as "essentially the same").

Motions to dismiss are reviewed "accepting as true all well-pleaded facts" in the complaint, "analyzing those facts in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff's theory, and drawing all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff." United States ex. rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc. , 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir.2011).

A complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint attacked on a motion to dismiss "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. and allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The First Circuit has summarized the Twombly and Iqbal standard as requiring "an adequate complaint" under Rule 8(a)(2) to "provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim." Ocasio Hernández v. Fortuño Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011).

Iqbal and Twombly set out two working principles underlying the standard for adequately pled complaints; these principles translate to a two-pronged approach for courts evaluating motions to dismiss. Id. The first principle is that "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court must therefore begin its analysis by "identifying and disregarding statements in the complaint that merely offer ‘legal conclusion[s] couched as ... fact[ ] or [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.’ " Ocasio Hernández , 640 F.3d at 12 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Only factual...

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