Hamilton v. Rdi/Caesars Riverboat Casino LLC

• Decision Date: 14 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. NA01-74-C B/S.,NA01-74-C B/S.
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.2d 929
• Parties: Tonya L. HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. RDI/CAESARS RIVERBOAT CASINO, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

179 F.Supp.2d 929

Tonya L. HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. RDI/CAESARS RIVERBOAT CASINO, LLC, Defendant.

No. NA01-74-C B/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division.

January 14, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

W. Brady Miller, Marks & Miller Psc, Louisville, KY, for plaintiff.

Susan Lonowski, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, Gene F. Price, Frost Brown Todd LLC, New Albany, IN, for defendant.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, Judge.

I. Introduction.

This is an employment discrimination case brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The plaintiff, Tonya Hamilton, alleges that her former employer, RDI, tolerated or condoned Ms. Hamilton's male co-employees subjecting her to harassment based on her sex, retaliated against her because of her complaints of the harassment, and then constructively discharged her by making her work life intolerable.

The case is before the court on defendant's two motions for summary judgment. One motion seeks to dismiss Ms. Hamilton's complaint on timeliness grounds in that she failed to file it within ninety days after the EEOC issued her Right to Sue Notice. The second goes to the substance of Ms. Hamilton's claims. It argues that Ms. Hamilton has presented legally insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of her claims and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although defendant filed these motions separately, we consolidate them for disposition. For the following reasons we DENY defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of timeliness, but GRANT defendant's motion for summary judgment on the merits.

II. Statement of Facts.

Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the defendant submitted a statement of facts. Contrary to the Rule, the plaintiff did not address defendant's factual statements. Nor did she set forth additional facts, supported by evidence, to advance her own case. Since we have an independent obligation under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial and whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we decline defendant's invitation simply to deem all of its fact statements to be admitted. We do, however, accept as true defendant's statements which are supported by evidence and are otherwise admissible.

Tonya Hamilton began working in RDI's maintenance department as a painter in January 2000. She alleges that on February 14 she was sexually harassed by male co-workers. According to her EEOC charge and her statement to the company's human resources department, she went to the engine room of RDI's river boat as she routinely did at the start of her shift. There she met three male co-employees: Assistant Engineer, Carroll Bennett; Bridge Mate, Kevin Mullen; and Chief Engineer, Pete Hutson. The three were having a discussion about turtle vomit. Def. Facts ¶¶ 1-5.

Mr. Hutson began talking about a couple in bed and mud on a woman's vagina. Sitting in front of a computer screen, Mr. Bennett turned to Ms. Hamilton and asked her whether she had ever left a job because of sexual harassment. Ms. Hamilton replied that she had not. Mr. Bennett accessed a computer and some text appeared on the screen. He then moved away from the computer. Ms. Hamilton began reading the material on the screen. She quit reading when she got to the word vagina. Def. Facts ¶¶ 5-6.

Ms. Hamilton found the incident offensive. She complained about it to her supervisor, Vernon Smith, who told her that he would report the incident to Port Engineer Robert Brinck and get back to her after that. Ms. Hamilton provided the company with a typewritten, signed statement. In it, she stated that she did not want to return to the engine room and that Mr. Smith had to get her tools from the engine room because she did not want to be in the company of the three individuals. Def. Facts ¶ 7-9. The next day, February 15, Mr. Smith told Ms. Hamilton that she should not go into the engine room because the three men did not want her there. Def. Facts ¶ 10.

On February 16, Ms. Hamilton met with Sherry LeClair, the company's Vice President for Human Resources. She told Ms. LeClair that the men didn't want her to go into the engine room. Ms. LeClair told her that she could go back into the engine room as usual. Def. Facts ¶ 11. Ms. Hamilton acknowledges that RDI "investigated the matter and took some type of administrative action." Def. Facts ¶ 12; Case Management Plan, ¶¶ II-A, III. Ms Hamilton did not complain of harassment thereafter. Def. Facts ¶ 12.

After having complained to human resources, Messrs. Mullen, Bennett, and Hutson stopped speaking to Ms. Hamilton and ignored her. Def. Facts ¶ 13. They turned away from her and responded to her greetings with silence. They gave her dirty looks. They spoke to her only when required to do so by the job and then in a hostile or combative tone. They erected a sign stating "MEN AT WORK" in an area she had to pass through daily. Pl. Declar. Ms. Hamilton complained to management about the men's hostility, but was told there was nothing that could be done about it. After the conduct persisted for about a month, Ms. Hamilton quit her employment on March 15, 2001. Def. Facts ¶ 14.

III. Discussion.

A. The Standard on Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998).

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. "If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against her." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920. Therefore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir.1997). If genuine doubts remain, and a reasonable factfinder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.

B. Preliminary Issues.

1. Defendant's Statute of Limitations Claim.

In a separately-filed motion for summary judgment, Caesar's asks us to dismiss Ms. Hamilton's complaint because she failed to file her complaint within ninety days after the EEOC issued her Right to Sue Notice (RTS). For the following reasons, we DENY Caesar's motion.

The only facts pertinent to Caesar's statute of limitations argument are those concerning when Ms. Hamilton received her Right to Sue Notice (RTS) and when she filed her complaint. The EEOC issued the RTS on November 1, 2000. Ms. Hamilton filed her complaint on February 2, 2001. Ms. Hamilton concedes that she filed her complaint 93 days after the EEOC mailed her RTS, but she argues that the three-day delay was justified because the EEOC sent her RTS to the wrong address through no fault of hers.

Title VII provides that an aggrieved person must bring a lawsuit within ninety days after actual receipt of her RTS Notice. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); Threadgill v. Moore U.S.A., Inc., 269 F.3d 848, 850 (7th Cir.2001); Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 532. n. 11 (7th Cir.1993). An exception to the actual notice rule arises when the individual fails to receive notice through her own fault. Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir.1999). An individual who has filed with the EEOC has an affirmative obligation to inform the EEOC of any change in address. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b); St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.1984). And perhaps the most common reason for attributing fault to the charging party when she does not receive actual notice is that she failed to inform the EEOC of a change of address.

That is not the case here. The parties agree that Ms. Hamilton did provide notice of her change of address to the EEOC and the EEOC investigator dutifully noted the change. Ms. Hamilton says that she gave the EEOC her father's long-standing address when she...