Hamilton v. Reynolds, Docket Nos. 64518

• Decision Date: 15 December 1983
• Docket Number: 65960,Docket Nos. 64518
• Citation: 129 Mich.App. 375,341 N.W.2d 152
• Parties: David A. HAMILTON, Administrator of the Estate of Teckla Marie Hamilton, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John REYNOLDS and K.L. Reddy, M.D., Defendants-Appellees, and David A. HAMILTON, Administrator of the Estate of Teckla Marie Hamilton, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Michigan and Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, Defendants. 129 Mich.App. 375, 341 N.W.2d 152
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 152

341 N.W.2d 152

David A. HAMILTON, Administrator of the Estate of Teckla

Marie Hamilton, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John REYNOLDS and K.L. Reddy, M.D., Defendants-Appellees, and David A. HAMILTON, Administrator of the Estate of Teckla

Marie Hamilton, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Michigan and Northville Regional Psychiatric

Hospital, Defendants.

Docket Nos. 64518, 65960.

129 Mich.App. 375, 341 N.W.2d 152

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 6, 1983.

Decided Sept. 7, 1983.

Released for Publication Dec. 15, 1983.

[129 MICHAPP 376] Charfoos, Christensen, Gilbert & Archer, P.C. by Christina Adrienne G. Southgate, Detroit, for plaintiff.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and George L. McCarger [129 MICHAPP 377] and Craig Atchinson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.

Before WALSH, P.J., and BEASLEY and SULLIVAN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff David A. Hamilton, administrator of the Estate of Teckla Marie Hamilton, deceased, appeals the entry of accelerated judgment for defendant, John Reynolds, GCR 1963, 116.1(2), and the entry of summary judgment for defendant K.L. Reddy, M.D., GCR 1963, 117.2(1).

Plaintiff's decedent was killed in her home by a patient from the state-operated Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital. The patient had left the hospital grounds after being given a grounds pass by defendant Reddy.

In Wayne County Circuit Court, plaintiff sued defendant Reynolds, director of the hospital, and defendant Reddy, the patient's physician at the hospital, alleging negligence and nuisance. In the Court of Claims, plaintiff sued the State of Michigan and the hospital alleging nuisance and structural defect in the hospital building.

Plaintiff's motion for consolidation of the two lawsuits was granted by the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims file was transmitted to the Wayne County Circuit Court. The Wayne County circuit judge to whom the case against the individual defendants had been assigned was assigned by the state court administrator as Court of Claims judge for purposes of hearing the case against the state and the hospital. (The instant appeals do not directly involve plaintiff's claims against the state and the hospital.)

Defendant Reynolds moved for accelerated judgment,[129 MICHAPP 378] alleging that exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against him, a state official, lay in the Court of Claims. The circuit court agreed and granted accelerated judgment. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant Reynolds is not a state official, and, alternatively, that defendant Reynolds was sued in his individual capacity. We are not so persuaded and, therefore, affirm the entry of accelerated judgment for defendant Reynolds.

Plaintiff does not challenge the notion that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against state officials for actions performed in their official capacities. Williams v. Shin, 111 Mich.App. 84, 314 N.W.2d 529 (1981); Burnett v. Moore, 111 Mich.App. 646, 314 N.W.2d 458 (1981); Crider v. Michigan, 110 Mich.App. 702, 313 N.W.2d 367 (1981), lv. den. 414 Mich. 953 (1982); Meda v. City of Howell, 110 Mich.App. 179, 312 N.W.2d 202 (1981); Abbott v. Secretary of State, 67 Mich.App. 344, 240 N.W.2d 800 (1976). MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419.

In Bandfield v. Wood, 104 Mich.App. 279, 304 N.W.2d 551 (1981), this Court found that the supervisor of a prison camp is not a state official for purposes of determining Court of Claims jurisdiction. The Court cited a rule identified in People v. Freedland, 308 Mich. 449, 457-458, 14 N.W.2d 62 (1944), where the issue had been whether the defendant had taken a bribe as a "public officer". ¹ [129 MICHAPP 379] See also Burnett v. Moore, supra, where the Court found that a state police trooper is not a "state officer" within the meaning of Freedland and Bandfield.

Review of the Supreme Court's Freedland opinion discloses that the Court did not resolve the issue presented in that case by mere mechanical application of the five elements of the cited Montana rule. Rather, the Court identified several rules and concluded that an employee whose duties were primarily clerical was not a public officer. The court's primary focus was on the degree of discretion and independence associated with the position. 308 Mich. 456-457, 14 N.W.2d 62. The Freedland defendant's position as sales tax division bookkeeper was vested with considerably less "dignity [and] discretion" than are inherent in the state position occupied by defendant Reynolds. See 308 Mich. 458, 14 N.W.2d 62.

Even assuming, without deciding, however, that application of the rule cited supra, n 1, is appropriate in determining the status of individual defendants for Court of Claims jurisdiction purposes, we find that, even under that test, defendant Reynolds is a "state official". The office of director of state mental health facilities was authorized by the Legislature. M.C.L. Sec. 330.1120; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(120). Such directors are under the authority of the director of the Department of Mental Health and possess considerable administrative and decision-making authority, as delegated by the state director and conferred by the Legislature, to be exercised[129 MICHAPP 380] in furtherance of the state's constitutional mandate to protect and promote public health and to foster and support institutions for the care of the mentally handicapped. Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 51, and Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 8. M.C.L. Sec. 330.1116; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(116). See, e.g., M.C.L. Sec. 330.1400 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(400) et seq.; 1979 AC, R 330.4005 et seq. And, clearly, the director's position cannot reasonably be dismissed as temporary or occasional. Because he is a state official, defendant Reynolds's motion for accelerated judgment was properly granted. Plaintiff's allegations are strictly concerned with defendant's conduct in his official capacity; his assertion to the contrary is unpersuasive.

Defendant Reddy, a government employee, moved for summary judgment, alleging immunity from liability for the acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff. At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff agreed that, under Fuhrmann v. Hattaway, 109 Mich.App. 429, 311 N.W.2d 379 (1981), lv. den. 414 Mich. 858 (1982), his negligence claim as to defendant Reddy was not viable. But he noted that he had also advanced a theory of nuisance, which would not be subject to a defense of governmental immunity. The court found immunity and granted summary judgment.

We have carefully considered plaintiff's arguments concerning his allegations of nuisance, and we find...