Hamilton v. State
| Decision Date | 09 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 65A04–1412–CR–592.,65A04–1412–CR–592. |
| Citation | 43 N.E.3d 628 |
| Parties | Melvin C. HAMILTON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William W. Gooden, Mt. Vernon, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Melvin Hamilton appeals his convictions for three counts of Class A felony child molesting. We reverse and remand.
[2] The sole restated issue before us is whether the trial court properly allowed witnesses for the State to vouch for the credibility of the alleged victims.
[3] A.S. and D.P. are the foster children of Heather and Charles Reese. Hamilton is Charles's stepfather. Hamilton frequently babysat the children at his home in Posey County. In 2014, A.S. was ten, and D.P. was five. A.S. and D.P. called Hamilton “Pappy.” Tr. p. 29.
[4] On February 24, 2014, A.S. and D.P. spent the night at Hamilton's house. During the night, D.P. awoke to Hamilton putting his finger in her “private.” Id. at 46. A.S. was in the same room at the time, and Hamilton also put his finger in her “private” while D.P. watched. Id. at 56. Hamilton had done similar things to A.S. on at least five prior occasions.
[5] On the following morning, D.P. spontaneously told Heather that Pappy had touched her; when asked where, D.P. pointed to her vagina. Both D.P. and A.S. subsequently were interviewed by Molly Elfreich, a trained forensic interviewer, and D.P. and A.S. described the molestations to her. A medical doctor also examined D.P. and A.S., who recounted the molestations to the doctor.
[6] After the forensic interview and medical examination, Detective Jeremy Fortune of the Posey County Sheriff's Department interviewed Hamilton. During the interview, the following exchanged occurred:
[7] The State charged Hamilton with three counts of Class A felony child molesting and one count of Class C felony child molesting. At his jury trial, during cross-examination of D.P., counsel for Hamilton asked, “Has anyone told you what to say today?” Tr. p. 51. D.P. said no one had. Similarly, counsel for Hamilton asked A.S. during cross-examination, “Has anyone told you what you should say here today?” Id. at 59. A.S. stated only that she had been told to tell the truth.
[8] The State also called Elfreich to testify after D.P. and A.S. testified. Without objection, the State asked Elfreich to describe various factors that she would look for as indicators that a child had been coached; namely, whether the child has trouble recalling details or has to start a story over when detailed questions are asked. Also without objection, the State asked Elfreich whether she had observed those factors when interviewing D.P. and A.S., and she testified that she had not. Then, over Hamilton's objection, the State asked Elfreich whether she had observed any indicators of coaching in either child, and she testified that she had not. Also, Hamilton objected to the jury hearing Detective Fortune say during his interview of Hamilton that D.P.'s statements describing her molestation had been “powerful.” Ex. 7 p. 29. The trial court overruled this objection.
[9] The jury found Hamilton guilty of three counts of Class A felony child molestation and not guilty of the Class C felony child molestation charge. The trial court sentenced Hamilton accordingly, and he now appeals.
[10] Hamilton contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to purported vouching by Elfreich and Detective Fortune regarding the truthfulness of D.P.'s and A.S.'s testimony. “A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind.2012)
. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.
Rose v. State, 846 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) ).
[12] The Hoglund court overruled Lawrence. Specifically, the court held allowing testimony that a child is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters is “indirect vouching testimony [that] is little different than testimony that the child witness is telling the truth.” Id. at 1237
. The court held that such testimony is at odds with Evidence Rule 704(b) and that it was inappropriate to carve out an exception to the rule for sex abuse cases. Id.
[13] In Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind.Ct.App.2012)
, trans. denied, this court addressed Hoglund 's holding in the context of testimony related to whether an alleged child sex abuse victim had been “coached.” Ultimately, we stated:
We hold that general testimony about the signs of coaching, as well as the presence or absence of those signs in the child victim at issue, preserves the ultimate credibility determination for the jury and therefore does not constitute vouching. By contrast, where a witness opines as to whether the child victim was coached—offering an ultimate opinion ... the witness invades the province of the jury and vouches for the child.
. Another panel of this court followed Kindred in Archer v. State, 996 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied.
[14] Very recently, in Sampson v. State, No. 87S01–1410–CR–684, 38 N.E.3d 985, 2015 WL 4597558 (July 30, 2015)
, our supreme court overruled Kindred and Archer.1 In Sampson, the State asked a forensic interviewer a number of questions related to coaching of alleged child sex abuse victims, including what the possible signs are of a child having been coached and whether the interviewer had observed any such signs in the alleged victim in the case. The defendant failed to object to any of the questions and was convicted of Class C felony child molesting.
[15] After reviewing case law from Indiana and other jurisdictions, the court held:
We conclude therefore that the subtle distinction between an expert's testimony that a child has or has not been coached versus an expert's testimony that the child did or did not exhibit any “signs or indicators” of coaching is insufficient to guard against the dangers that such testimony will constitute impermissible vouching as we expressed in Hoglund. Nevertheless, “once a child's credibility is called into question proper expert testimony may be appropriate.” Steward [v. State ], 652 N.E.2d [490,] 499
[ (Ind.1995) ]. “[B]ehavioral characteristics of child abuse victims, even where inadmissible to prove abuse, are far less controversial when offered to rebut a claim by the defense that a child complainant's behavior ... is inconsistent with her claim of abuse.” Id. at 496. We thus align ourselves with those jurisdictions that permit testimony about the signs of coaching and whether a child exhibited such signs or has or has not been coached, provided the defendant has opened the door to such testimony.
.2
[16] The Sampson opinion also contains the following observation as to what constitutes “opening the door” to otherwise inadmissible vouching evidence: “Opening the door refers to the principle that where one party introduces evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal evidence otherwise would have been inadmissible.” Id. at 992 n. 4
. “ ‘The door may be opened when the trier of fact has been left with a false or misleading impression of the facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind.2009) ). Although this court has generally stated that, “when a defendant interjects an issue in a trial, he opens the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence,” we also have emphasized, “evidence relied upon to open the door must leave the trier of fact with a false or misleading impression of the facts related.” Beauchamp v. State, 788 N.E.2d 881, 896 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)
.
[17] In Steward, relied upon by the Sampson opinion, the court held that expert testimony regarding “child sexual abuse syndrome” is inadmissible unless a defendant has first called a child's credibility into question. Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 499
. Specifically, the court noted that “if the defense discusses or presents evidence of” behavior that is seemingly inconsistent with having been abused, “or if during trial testimony the child recants a prior allegation of abuse,” then expert testimony...
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