Hamilton v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 89A04-1103-CR-134,89A04-1103-CR-134
• Parties: JAMES N. HAMILTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

JAMES N. HAMILTON, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 89A04-1103-CR-134

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

March 20, 2012

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be

regarded as precedent or cited before

any court except for the purpose of

establishing the defense of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, or the law of the

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

J. CLAYTON MILLER

Jordan Law, LLC

Richmond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Attorney General of Indiana

JODI KATHRYN STEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge

Cause No. 89D02-1010-FD-90¹

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge James N. Hamilton appeals his convictions following a jury trial for two counts of receiving stolen property,² each as a Class D felony. On appeal, Hamilton raises the following issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hamilton's convictions; and

II. Whether the trial court erred by denying Hamilton's oral motions for mistrial and for continuance based upon the State's discovery violation.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of August 7, 2009, Linda ("Linda") and Larry Hays returned to their home in Richmond, Indiana, after an overnight trip, and found that a big stone had been thrown through the glass in their back door and that their bedroom had been ransacked. The Hayses discovered that numerous items of Linda's jewelry had been stolen, including a gold butterfly pinkie ring and a gold rope chain necklace. Richmond Police Detective Kenneth Powell ("Detective Powell"), who was assigned to investigate the burglary, provided a description of the stolen items to several pawn shops and secondhand stores in the Richmond area, including Foster's E Street Gallery ("Foster's Gallery"). Foster's Gallery, which is owned and operated by Charles Foster ("Foster") and his wife, Beth, is located just a few minutes' drive away from the Hayses' home.

Five days after the burglary was discovered, on August 12, 2009, Hamilton entered Foster's Gallery and offered to sell Foster three pieces of jewelry—the goldbutterfly pinkie ring, the gold rope chain necklace, and a gold ring with an indecipherable name on it. Tr. at 206. Foster agreed to buy the jewelry and paid Hamilton seventy-seven dollars, in the form of a check made out to Hamilton. After Hamilton left Foster's Gallery, Foster checked the jewelry against a list of stolen items and discovered that the butterfly pinkie ring and the gold rope chain necklace were on the list.

Foster contacted the Richmond Police Department. When Detective Powell arrived at Foster's Gallery, Foster showed the detective the three pieces of jewelry. From a photo array prepared by Detective Powell, Foster was able to identify Hamilton as the man from whom he had purchased the jewelry. Subsequently, Linda positively identified the butterfly ring as being hers and stated that the necklace was "exactly like" her gold rope chain necklace that had been stolen. Id. at 167. Linda, however, did not recognize the second gold ring. Detective Powell testified that the second gold ring appeared to be a "female's ring," and while he could not decipher the name inscribed in the ring, the lettering seemed to be "N-A-R-I-D," which was not defendant's name. Id. at 206. At trial, Linda testified that she did not give anyone permission or authorization to either take or sell her jewelry. Id. at 169. The State charged Hamilton with two counts of Class D felony receiving stolen property.³

At trial, the State sought to introduce into evidence the cancelled check that Foster used to pay Hamilton for the jewelry. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the State had failed to produce the check during discovery. The trial court sustained theobjection and excluded the check. Later, when Detective Powell testified that he had received a copy of the check from Foster, defense counsel again objected, contending that this testimony bolstered Foster's testimony that he, in fact, paid Hamilton for the jewelry. Defense counsel moved for mistrial. The trial court denied Hamilton's motion for mistrial but granted Hamilton a continuance until the next afternoon. The following day, Hamilton again requested a continuance to obtain handwriting analysis of the signature on the back of the check. The trial court denied Hamilton's request for a continuance and affirmed its ruling that the check was excluded from evidence. The jury found Hamilton guilty as charged, and he was convicted accordingly. He now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hamilton first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for receiving stolen property. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, "appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict." Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)). "It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction." Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence "overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Id. at 147 (citing Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind.1995)). "'[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.'" Id. (quoting Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

To convict Hamilton of Class D felony receiving stolen property, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable double that Hamilton knowingly or intentionally received, retained, or disposed of the property of another person that had been the subject of a theft. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b). Hamilton was charged with two counts of receiving stolen property—one for the gold butterfly ring and one for the gold rope chain necklace—as follows:

. . . on or about August 12, 2009, in Wayne County, State of Indiana, James N. Hamilton did knowingly or intentionally dispose of property that had been the subject of Theft . . . .

Appellant's App. at 11, 23. In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime, the State was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamilton knew that the property was stolen. Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2010); Gibson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ind. 1994); see Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) ("Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct.").

Witness testimony revealed that the Hayses were away from their Richmond, Indiana home for one night, and returned on August 7, 2009 to find that their house had been broken into and items had been stolen. In their report to the police, the Hayses noted that the stolen items included, among other things, Linda's gold butterfly pinkiering and her gold rope chain necklace. Five days later, on August 12, 2009, Hamilton entered Foster's Gallery. Foster's Gallery "[b]uy[s] and sell[s] antiques, gold, silver, coins, [and] art," and is located "a few minutes['] drive from where [the Hayses] house is located." Tr. at 166, 175. Foster admitted that "from time to time . . . the police contact [him] in cases in which somebody has attempted or has in fact sold stolen property." Id. at 177.

Hamilton offered to sell Foster three pieces of gold jewelry—a ten-karat gold butterfly pinkie ring, a fourteen-karat gold rope chain necklace, and a ten-karat gold ring with an indecipherable name on it. Id. at 180, 206. Foster agreed to buy the jewelry and paid Hamilton seventy-seven dollars, in the form of a check made out to Hamilton. After Hamilton left Foster's Gallery, Foster checked the jewelry against a list of stolen items and discovered that the butterfly pinkie ring and the gold rope chain necklace were on the list. Linda positively identified the gold butterfly pinkie ring as the one that was stolen, and identified the necklace, although devoid of identifying marks, as being "exactly like" her gold rope chain necklace that had been stolen. Id. at 167. At trial, Linda testified that she did not give anyone permission or authorization to either take or sell her jewelry. Id. at 169. Considering the explicit elements of the crime, this was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the butterfly ring and necklace were stolen from Linda and that Hamilton disposed of the property of another person that had been the subject of a theft. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b).

The issue that remains, however, is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Hamilton knew that the butterfly ring and the gold rope chain necklace had beenstolen. Citing to our Supreme Court's holding in Fortson, Hamilton contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for two counts of receiving stolen property. Particularly, he cites to the following language: "Knowledge that the property is stolen may be established by circumstantial evidence; however, knowledge of the stolen character of the property may not be inferred solely from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property." Appellant's Br. at 9 (quoting Fortson, 919 N.E.2d at 1143) (emphasis added). This language, while certainly pertinent to our analysis, is not new to the analysis of sufficiency in the context of receiving stolen property. Instead, it is a reiteration of language that has existed in this area for years.⁴ See ...