Hamilton v. Turner
| Decision Date | 16 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-240 |
| Parties | BRANDY HAMILTON, et al, Plaintiffs, v. NATHANIEL TURNER, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiffs Brandy Hamilton and Alexandria Randle allege their Fourth Amendment rights were violated during a traffic stop when they were subjected to body cavity searches on the side of a highway. A Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) trooper initiated the traffic stop and a female DPS trooper who later arrived at the scene conducted the cavity searches. Because the DPS troopers were dismissed from this lawsuit after a settlement, the remaining claims focus on the role of Aaron Kindred, a deputy with the Brazoria County Sheriff's Department, who arrived to assist with the traffic stop and was present when the searches occurred. In addition to suing Kindred, Plaintiffs assert section 1983 claims against Brazoria County and its Sheriff, Charles Wagner, contending that Kindred's involvement in the searches was consistent with a county policy or practice relating to body cavity searches. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss turns on issues common in section 1983 cases: whether the Plaintiffs have alleged a policyor practice sufficient to state a claim against the County and its policymaker, and whether the allegations survive the qualified immunity that Deputy Kindred enjoys as a law enforcement officer.
On the evening of May 28, 2012, Hamilton and Randle were driving north on Highway 288 from Surfside Beach when they were pulled over for speeding by DPS Trooper Nathaniel Turner. The entire traffic stop is recorded on Turner's dash-camera. After asking for their identification, Turner instructed Hamilton, the driver, to get out of the vehicle. When Hamilton requested to first put on a dress over her two-piece bathing suit, Turner responded "don't worry about that, come on out here." Docket Entry No. 19 ¶ 16. Standing "very close to her," Turner asked Hamilton a series of questions about whether she had any drugs on her or in the car, and Hamilton denied having anything. Id. ¶ 17. Turner instructed Randle to also get out of the vehicle and asked her similar questions, all of which she denied.
Turner then handcuffed Plaintiffs and called dispatch to "see if a lady is in the area that can come and check these two while I search the vehicle because there is an odor of marijuana" and to request local law enforcement to "stand by and watch the ladies as [he] searched the vehicle." Id. ¶¶ 22, 23. He also told dispatchthat Randle's zipper was undone on her "'daisy duke' shorts or whatever they are called." Id. ¶ 24. After placing Hamilton in his patrol car and instructing Randle to "stand and don't move" beside the vehicle, Turner began searching the Plaintiffs' vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 27-31. Plaintiffs' friends and family arrived at the scene while Turner was searching the vehicle and he told them to go back to their cars.
At this point, Deputy Aaron Kindred of Brazoria County Sheriff's Office arrived in response to Turner's request for assistance. Turner told Kindred he was "waiting on [the female DPS Trooper] to respond to search these two females" and asked Kindred to get identification from the family and friends who "tried to roll up on [him]." Id. ¶ 35. After determining that the family and friends "were all clear," Kindred returned and assisted Turner with the vehicle search. Id. ¶ 38. During the search, Turner asked Randle if she "put that sweet under the front seat." Id. ¶ 36. Turner and Kindred discussed that there were probably more drugs,2 but that "she had time to throw it down." Id. ¶ 38.
DPS Trooper Amanda Bui arrived at the scene just after Turner and Kindred finished searching the vehicle and was briefed on the situation. She said, "do you have any gloves . . . I don't have any gloves" and one of the male officersresponded, "no, I don't have any gloves but you can use these." Id. ¶ 42. Kindred asked Bui, "do you want us to make this easier and we get in the back?" Id. Turner then told Hamilton, "she [Bui] is going to search you, I ain't, because I ain't about to get up-close and personal with your woman areas." Id.
Without asking for consent, Bui performed a body cavity search of Hamilton's vagina and anus while she was handcuffed in the passenger seat of Turner's patrol car. Turner and Kindred both had "a clear view" into the car during the search, as they "can be seen on camera." Id. ¶¶ 44, 68. Hamilton "can be seen wincing" and heard on video saying, "do you know how violated I feel?" Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. After Bui found nothing from searching Hamilton, Turner told her that Randle's "zipper is open" and "she had time and could have shoved it in her crotch." Id. ¶ 44. Bui then performed a similar body cavity search of Randle without changing her gloves from the first search. Id. ¶¶ 45, 68. During the search, Randle can be heard "yelling in agony . . . crying and asking Defendant Bui not to do this to her." Id. ¶ 48. Neither Plaintiff received a pat-down or frisk prior to the cavity search. Id. ¶ 50. Turner ultimately told Hamilton he would issue a ticket for drug paraphernalia and warned her, "[d]on't smoke weed in your car and you won't have to go through this." Id. ¶¶ 47, 50.
Plaintiffs filed this case alleging that they suffered "emotional distress and mental anguish and trauma" as a result of being "forcibly searched in their vaginasand anus[es] against protest," and seeking compensatory and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Id. ¶¶ 81, 96-99.
Sheriff Wagner and DPS Director Steven McGraw were not present at the traffic stop, but Plaintiffs allege that the officers at the scene "were acting under the direction, control, and supervision" of Wagner and McGraw. Id. ¶ 55. Moreover, they assert that Brazoria County "failed to train [its] Officers as to the proper procedure regarding searches and seizures" and that the "County's inaction against the cavity searches and unreasonable searches and seizures of their Officers have caused cavity searches to become widespread unofficial policy within Brazoria County." Id. ¶¶ 93, 94.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed McGraw from the case before he was served, Docket Entry No. 6, and subsequently dismissed DPS Troopers Turner and Bui pursuant to a settlement agreement, Docket Entry No. 30. The remaining Defendants—Deputy Kindred, Sheriff Wagner, and Brazoria County—moved to dismiss all claims against them. Docket Entry No. 9. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to replead their Fourth Amendment claims rather than ruling on Defendants' first motion to dismiss. After Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, Docket Entry No. 19, Defendants once again moved to dismiss, Docket Entry No. 20. In their renewed motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead their claims and assert qualified immunity defenses.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). The court does not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim for relief must be "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Plaintiffs bring claims against Kindred under section 1983 for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights because he "watched and did not stop a cavity search that he knew or had reason to know was unconstitutional." Docket Entry No. 19 ¶ 72. Kindred moves to dismiss the claims against him, asserting that Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to show he participated in the alleged unlawful searches and alternatively, that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
An officer who does not directly conduct an unlawful search, but is present at the scene when such a search takes place, may be liable under the doctrine of "bystander liability." That liability attaches when "the officer '(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.'" Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002)). "The rationale underlying the bystander liability theory is that a bystanding officer, by choosing not to intervene, functionally participates in the unconstitutional act of his fellow officer." Id. at 647 (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at 204 n.24).
Under the first element, the Court must determine whether the alleged cavity search would violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and if so, whether Kindred knew the search was occurring. Martin v. City of San Antonio analyzed the constitutionality of a "highly intrusive" roadside cavity search for drugs much like the one alleged here. In Martin, officers "taunted Plaintiff about the impending search," and the search "was conducted on a public street rather than at a medical facility" and "in public view of male officers and passing vehicles." 2006 WL 2062283, at *5 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2006). After conducting a lengthy review of the law related to the constitutionality of body cavity searches, see id. at *5-8, thecourt explained that "it was well settled by January 15, 2003, that strip searches and body cavity searches raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns." Id. at *6 (citing Roe v. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 409 (5th Cir. 2002...
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