Hamilton v. United Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 6821.,12 C 6821.
• Citation: 960 F.Supp.2d 776
• Parties: Malcolm HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

960 F.Supp.2d 776

Malcolm HAMILTON, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 12 C 6821.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

Dec. 19, 2012.

Paul Luka, Roy P. Amatore, Amatore & Associates, PC, Chicago, IL, William Martin Walsh, Law Office of William M. Walsh, for Plaintiff.

Gary S. Kaplan, Chicago, IL, Asilia S. Backus, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Malcolm Hamilton (“Plaintiff” or “Hamilton”) originally filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Defendant United Airlines (“Defendant” or “United”) timely removed. Presently before us is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 15), filed on September 20, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).¹

The Federal Airline Deregulation Act (“FADA”) explicitly preempts state regulation “related to” an airline's “price, route, or service.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2007). Plaintiff argues that removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) was improper because his claims for whistleblowing, retaliatory discharge, and a declaratory judgment are “at best peripherally” related to United's prices, routes, or services.² (Mot. at 1.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the Whistleblower Protection Program (“WPP”) amendment to FADA does not expand the statute's preemptive force to include all whistleblowing claims relating to air safety. ( Id. at 8.) Defendant argues that FADA expressly preempts Plaintiff's state law claims because: 1) they relate to United's “safety obligations, rates routes and services,” (Notice of Removal ¶ 12); and 2) “resolution of the claims requires an examination of United's policies vis-à-vis federal law and regulations.” (Resp. at 8.) In addition, Defendant suggests that the WPP amendment to FADA bolsters the inference for preemption and provides an exclusive federal remedy for Plaintiff's claims. (Notice of Removal ¶ 11.)

For the reasons set forth below, we grant Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

BACKGROUND

United employed Hamilton from October 4, 1997 to July 12, 2010. For at least the last three years prior to his discharge, Hamilton was a flight attendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–8.) Hamilton alleges United fired him in retaliation for reporting what he believed to be United's violations of Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) regulations to an FAA official. ( Id. ¶ 55.) As a flight attendant, Hamilton recorded each flight's “holding time,” the time between landing the aircraft, deplaning passengers, cleaning the cabin, and re-boarding new passengers. ( Id. ¶¶ 9–11.) FAA regulations mandate that “when an aircraft carrying commercial passengers arrives at an airport terminal, an inspection of the aircraft and a headcount be conducted before additional commercial passengers may board the aircraft” and guide United's internal “holding time” regulations. ( Id. ¶ 13.) Sometime in 2009, while waiting to assist a wheelchair bound passenger in deplaning, Hamilton observed that new passengers had already begun to board. ( Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) Hamilton directed an FAA official standing nearby to observe the behavior. ( Id. ¶ 32.) The FAA official interviewed Hamilton about United's practice, recorded his name and badge number, and spoke with the aircraft's pilot. ( Id. ¶¶ 35–36.)

Hamilton alleges that after this incident, United accused him of inflating his “holding time” records to increase his pay and summoned him to several meetings with United's human resources department where United attempted to exert pressure on him to admit that he had recorded the time inaccurately. ( Id. ¶¶ 39–43.) Hamilton ultimately refused to make that admission and United terminated him. ( Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) Hamilton argues that United had no lawful reason to fire him. ( Id. ¶¶ 47–53.) He has brought suit alleging violations of the Illinois Whistleblower Act 740 ILCS 174/1 and common law retaliatory discharge, and seeks a declaratory judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2–701 ordering United, inter alia, to admit it had no legitimate reason to fire Hamilton and to amend his employee file to omit any negative entries. United removed the case to this court under the theory of “complete preemption” (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 10–13) and now seeks dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The “well-pleaded complaint” doctrine guides jurisdictional matters. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97–98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). The “allegations of the complaint determine whether the claim arises under state or federal law,” making the plaintiff “master of his pleadings.” Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1992); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Ordinarily, federal preemption is a defense to a plaintiff's suit and, as such, does not authorize removal because it does not appear on the face of the complaint. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987); Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1075. An exception to both rules exists “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state law cause of action through complete pre-emption ... [such that] a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 2063, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see also Turek v. General Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 425 (7th Cir.2011). In such a case, the “federal law so fills every nook and cranny that it is not possible to frame a complaint under state law.” Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1075.³

In cases of complete preemption, a defendant may remove the claim to district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the district court has original jurisdiction of the claim as it “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Davila, 542 U.S. at 207, 124 S.Ct. at 2495. A defendant bears the “burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and federal courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court.” Schur v. LA Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir.2009).

ANALYSIS

In this case, Hamilton's claims would be completely preempted and give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction if: 1) they relate to United's prices, routes, or services; or 2) Congress, through WPP, expressed a “clear and manifest” intent to occupy the field of whistleblowing regulation pertaining to air safety complaints so fully that no state claim can exist alongside them.

I. Hamilton's claims are not related to United's prices, routes, or services.

The “touchstone” of federal preemption is Congressional intent. Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1430. Congress may manifest its intent to displace state law from a particular field by: 1) expressly including relevant language in the statute; or 2) through inference “contained in [the statute's] structure and purpose.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2036 (internal citations and quotations omitted). FADA's express preemption clause provides:

Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.

49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). Congress passed FADA to “promote maximum reliance on competitive market forces.” 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(6); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230, 115 S.Ct. 817, 824, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995). Congress wanted to “ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 2034.

Based on the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that Congress “express[ed] a broad pre-emptive purpose” in the area of airline regulation. Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. Thus, FADA preempts any state law or enforcement action that has “a connection with or reference to, airline ‘rates, routes, or services.’ ” Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. However, “ ‘some state action may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner’ to have preemptive effect.” Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. at 2040 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100, n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2901, n. 21, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)); Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1431.

Under Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, a state law or action “ ‘relates to’ airline rates, routes, or services, either by expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic effect upon them.” Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1432;Mesa Airlines, 219 F.3d at 609. Thus, laws of general applicability, such as the Illinois Whistleblower Act, may still be preempted by FADA if they significantly impact an airline's prices, rates, or services. Yet even broadly preemptive statutes do not reach all claims related to their subject matter. The “broad applicability of the preemption statutes should be understood in light of their deregulatory purpose.” S.C. Johnson, 697 F.3d at 559.

A. Leading Supreme Court and Appellate Interpretations of FADA

The Supreme Court has considered FADA preemption three times. In Morales, the Court held the marketing guidelines promulgated by the National Association of Attorneys General preempted by FADA because the guidelines not only expressly referred to airline fares but because any “state restrictions on fare advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. at 2039. In Wolens, the Supreme Court found that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act impermissibly “guide[d] and police[d] the marketing practices of the airlines” and, thus, FADA preempted its enforcement. Wolens, 513 U.S. at...