Hamilton v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:12-cv-716
• Parties: DAVID J. HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio

DAVID J. HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-716

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

January 27, 2014

Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Represented by counsel from the Ohio Public Defender's Office, David Hamilton brought this habeas corpus case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 pleading one ground for relief:

Ground One: The Scioto County, Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), when it determined that the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Hamilton's request that the jury be given a voluntary-manslaughter instruction.

Supporting Facts: Mr. Hamilton was indicted for two counts of aggravated murder, and one count of each of the following offenses: murder, aggravated burglary, felonious assault, tampering with evidence, and violating a protection order. At the close of Mr. Hamilton's trial, the court refused his request that the jury be instructed on the inferior-degree offense of voluntary manslaughter. In the court's opinion, the evidence produced at trial supported a self-defense instruction, but not a voluntary-manslaughter instruction. However, because the facts presented to the jury in Mr. Hamilton's trial warranted an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Hamilton was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, and the trial court usurped the function of the jury by refusing to give such an instruction. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147,94 S.Ct. 396 (1973).

(Petition, Doc. No. 1, PageID 15.)

Procedural History

On February 21, 2009, Petitioner David Hamilton stabbed Jonathan Jackson during a fight that started in the residence of Stephanie Crump, mother of three of Hamilton's children. Jackson later died before receiving medical help. The Scioto County grand jury indicted Hamilton on two counts of aggravated murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01(A) and 2903.01(B), one count of murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(B), one count of aggravated burglary in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.11(A)(1), one count of felonious assault in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A)(2)/(D)(1), one count of tampering with evidence in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.12(A)(1) and one count of violating a protection order issued against him at the request of Stephanie Crump in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.27(A)(1). A jury acquitted him on one of the counts of aggravated murder, but convicted him on all other counts. The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole eligibility at thirty years on the aggravated murder conviction, merged the murder and felonious assault counts with the aggravated murder count, and imposed concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

Hamilton appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals raising one assignment of error:

The trial court abused its discretion and deprived Mr. Hamilton of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution by denying Mr. Hamilton's request that the jury receive a voluntary-manslaughter instruction.

(Appellant's Brief, Return of Writ, Doc. No. 6, Ex. 6.) The Fourth District decided that sole assignment of error as follows:

[*P68] In his sole assignment of error, Hamilton contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

[*P69] "Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in deciding how to fashion jury instructions. A trial court must not, however, fail to 'fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.' State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640, [at] paragraph two of the syllabus. Additionally, a trial court may not omit a requested instruction, if such instruction is 'a correct, pertinent statement of the law and [is] appropriate to the facts * * *.' State v. Lessin[,] 67 Ohio St.3d 487, 493, [1993 Ohio 52, 620 N.E.2d 72] (quoting State v. Nelson (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 79, 303 N.E.2d 865, [at] paragraph one of the syllabus).

[*P70] "In determining whether to give a requested jury instruction, a trial court may inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the requested instruction. See [Lessin] at 494. A trial court is therefore vested with discretion to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial [to] require[ ] a particular jury instruction. [State v. Mitts, 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 228, 1998 Ohio 635, 690 N.E.2d 522.] If, however, the evidence does not warrant an instruction a trial court is not obligated to give the requested instruction. See Lessin * * * at 494. Thus, in our review we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the requested charge. See Mitts [at 228]; State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 443, [at] paragraph two of the syllabus[.]" Smith v. Redecker, Athens App. No. 08CA33, 2010 Ohio 505, at ¶51-52. See, also, State v. Gary, Hamilton App. No. C-090643, 2010 Ohio 5321, at ¶23; State v. Jordan, Trumbull App. No. 2009-T-0110, 2010 Ohio 5183, at ¶27; State v. McClendon, Montgomery App. No. 23558, 2010 Ohio 4757, at ¶13; State v. Carter, Ross App. No. 10CA3169, 2010 Ohio 6316, at ¶50-51; but, see, State v. Howard, Ross App. No. 07CA2948, 2007 Ohio 6331, at ¶27 ("[T]he issue of whether an instruction is required presents a question of law for de novo review.").

[*P71] R.C. 2903.03(A) defines voluntary manslaughter. This statute provides that "[n]o person, while under the influence ofsudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another * * *."

[*P72] "Before giving a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter in a murder case, the trial judge must determine whether evidence of reasonably sufficient provocation occasioned by the victim has been presented to warrant such an instruction." State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 272, at paragraph one of the syllabus. "In making that determination, trial courts must apply an objective standard: 'For provocation to be reasonably sufficient, it must be sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her control.'" State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St. 3d 515, 2006 Ohio 6207, at ¶81, 857 N.E.2d 547, quoting Shane at 635.

[*P73] If the objective prong is met, "the inquiry shifts to the subjective component of whether this actor, in this particular case, actually was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage. It is only at that point that the '* * * emotional and mental state of the defendant and the conditions and circumstances that surrounded him at the time * * *' must be considered." Shane at 634, quoting State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, at paragraph five of the syllabus.

[*P74] When analyzing the subjective prong, "evidence supporting the privilege of self-defense, i.e., that the defendant feared for his own and other's personal safety, does not constitute sudden passion or a fit of rage as contemplated by the voluntary manslaughter statute." State v. Harris (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 527, 535, 718 N.E.2d 488. "While selfdefense [sic] requires a showing of fear, voluntary manslaughter requires a showing of rage, with emotions of 'anger, hatred, jealously, and/or furious resentment.'" State v. Levett, Hamilton App. No. C-040537, 2006 Ohio 2222, at ¶29, quoting State v. Perdue, 153 Ohio App.3d 213, 2003 Ohio 3481, at ¶12, 792 N.E.2d 747; see, also, State v. Sudderth, Lawrence App. No. 07CA38, 2008 Ohio 5115, at ¶14; State v. Hendrickson, Athens App. No. 08CA12, 2009 Ohio 4416, at ¶45-46; State v. Caldwell (Dec. 17, 1998), Franklin App. No. 98AP- 165, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6220; State v. Tantarelli (May 23, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APA11-1618, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2186 ("[A]ppellant himself testified that he was dazed and confused and that he was scared. Appellant did not state that he was angry. Instead, appellant testified that his only intent was to stop the victim from hitting him anymore. The evidence presented byappellant simply does not fit into the definition of voluntary manslaughter and the trial court correctly decided not to give this instruction to the jury.").

[*P75] Here, even assuming that the objective prong was satisfied, Hamilton did not satisfy the subjective prong of the voluntary-manslaughter test. There was insufficient evidence that Hamilton actually was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage. Hamilton testified at length that he killed Jackson out of fear for his own safety.

[*P76] Hamilton claimed that he acted in self-defense, not under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage. Hamilton testified that Jackson was the initial aggressor. Hamilton testified that Jackson threw him (i.e., Hamilton) against the refrigerator. Then, after Hamilton attempted to get away, Hamilton testified: "[Jackson] grabs hold of me again and he's just throwing me around. I get threw back up against the refrigerator, and at this point I don't know who this person is, and I don't know why he's even trying to fight with me. I'm pretty scared. I remember grabbing a knife." Tr. at 952-53 (emphasis added).

[*P77] Hamilton testified that he showed Jackson the knife, but it "just seemed like it didn't bother [Jackson.]" Id. at 954. Hamilton then testified that he tried to make his way to the front door, but Jackson pulled him back. Hamilton testified: "I'm not fighting with him. He

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