Hamlin v. City of Peekskill Bd. of Educ., 03 Civ.4850(CM).

Decision Date13 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03 Civ.4850(CM).,03 Civ.4850(CM).
PartiesMichelle HAMLIN, by infant under fourteen years of age, by her father and natural guardian, Carson HAMLIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PEEKSKILL BOARD OF EDUCATION, "Jane Doe No. 1," Green Chimneys Children's Services, "Jane Doe No. 2," Miles Square Transportation, Inc., "John Doe No. 1," "John Doe No. 2," and "John Doe No. 3," Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Carolyn V. Minter, Ossiningg, NY, for Plaintiff.

John P. Meenagh, Jr., Kelly and Meenagh, Poughkeepsie, NY, David Sculnick, Gordon & Silber, P.C., New York City, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING ALL DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

MCMAHON, District Judge.

Michelle Hamlin is a teenager who lives in the City of Peekskill. Michelle is a special needs child. She attends a residential school run by Green Chimneys Children's Services ("Green Chimneys") by arrangement with, and at the expense of, the Peekskill City School District ("Peekskill").

From time to time, the Peekskill children at Green Chimneys were transported from that school to their homes for weekend visits, on buses contracted for by the school district. During one such trip, which took place on April 22, 2002, plaintiff claims that she was coerced into committing a sexual act by another student, Michael Cunningham. Plaintiff reported this incident to her parents, who have sued Peekskill, Green Chimneys and the private bus company that provides transportation to Peekskill students on their daughter's behalf. Plaintiff has also sued a number of John and Jane Doe parties, but none has been identified and no motion to add named individuals has been presented to the Court. Since more than three years have passed from the date of the alleged incident, any claims against these unnamed parties — whether under federal or state tort law — are time barred.

All defendants have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. For the following reasons, all motions are granted.

I. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no "genuine issue of material fact" and the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought and must draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Whether any disputed issue of fact exists is for the Court to determine. Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1989). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).1 The party opposing summary judgment "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998). Moreover, not every disputed factual issue is material in light of the substantive law that governs the case. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Finally, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. To withstand a summary judgment motion, sufficient evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.

Under this standard, all defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claims asserted against them under federal law.

II. DISCUSSION

The undisputed facts are set forth above. To the extent it is necessary to refer to additional facts, those facts will be discussed in the context of the particular Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

A. The Motion of Defendant City of Peekskill Board of Education

Peekskill moves to dismiss the federal claims on several grounds. It argues that it did not deprive plaintiff of any rights secured to her under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments; that it did not maintain any policy or practice that evidenced deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights; and that in any event, plaintiff's claim does not lie under § 1983, but rather under Title IX.

It is, frankly, difficult to understand the nature of plaintiff's claim against Peekskill. It appears to be as follows: the girl lived in Peekskill and was originally educated in the Peekskill Public Schools; she was attending Green Chimneys at the behest of the Peekskill School District;2 Peekskill had arranged for her transportation home from Green Chimneys on the weekend in question; an incident occurred between plaintiff and another student on the private bus that was provided by Peekskill for that purpose; therefore, Peekskill is responsible for any harm that befell Michelle as a result of this incident.

The premise does not hold up.

The Constitution does not ordinarily require the State to protect citizens from the harmful acts of private persons, such as the other student involved in this incident. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Only last month, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2796, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005), holding that police officers cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to enforce an order of protection.

Of course, there are exceptions to the general rule. In DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998, the Supreme Court held that an affirmative duty to protect arises "when the State by affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs." However, the facts of this case present no such "affirmative exercise of power" or "restraint" on Michelle's liberty. Compulsory attendance at school and transportation on a school bus have both been held not to fall within that exception. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (3d Cir.1992) (en banc)("By requiring [Plaintiff] to attend assigned classes at [public school] as part of her high school educational program, and authorizing officials to engage in disciplinary control over the students, the school defendants did not restrict [Plaintiff's] freedom to the extent that she was prevented from meeting her basic needs."); Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education, 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir.1995) ("Although options may be limited for practical or financial reasons, parents can weigh for themselves the" benefits and consequences of placing their child in a school bus, and "the need for an alternative means of transportation.").

The State also assumes a responsibility it would not otherwise have when it takes some affirmative step to expose the victim "to any danger to which she was not already exposed." Sargi, 70 F.3d at 913. But there is no evidence in the record that Peekskill took any affirmative action that exposed plaintiff to any danger. It arranged generally for Michelle's bus transportation by contracting with a well-known transportation provider, pursuant to a contract that required the bus company to comply with all applicable laws. It is undisputed that the bus was supervised by an adult monitor as well as a driver. There is no evidence that Peekskill was ever placed on notice by anyone that Michelle had been abused, by Michael Cunningham or any other student, or that there were any special issues relating to her transportation (such as any need to keep her away from boys, see Green Chimneys discussion, infra).

To the extent that any defendant was directly responsible for what went on in the bus, it was defendant Mile Square. But Peekskill could not be held liable for any defalcation by Mile Square under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. And there is no evidence in this record tending to show Monell liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Finally, defendant is correct that claims of sexual harassment in the schools are actionable only under Title IX. Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kortright Cent. School Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.1998).

The federal claim against Peekskill is dismissed with prejudice. I decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims asserted against Peekskill, and so dismiss those claims without prejudice.

B. The Motion of Defendant Mile Square Transportation Company

Mile Square is a private company that provides bus services to a number of schools and camps in and around Westchester County. It argues that no federal claim lies against it because Mile Square is not a state actor.

Mile Square is correct.

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lie only against state actors — that is, persons acting under color of state law — who deprive the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured to her by the United States Constitution. Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.2002); Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1338 (2d Cir.1987). It is well settled that a state contractor and its employees do not become state actors simply because they are carrying out a state-sponsored program or are being compensated by the State....

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