Hamlin v. Transcon Lines

• Citation: 701 P.2d 1139
• Decision Date: 18 June 1985
• Docket Number: 83-222,Nos. 83-221,s. 83-221
• Parties: Marilyn A. HAMLIN, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Calvin Harold Hamlin, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. TRANSCON LINES; Russel N. Holmes; Raymond E. Befus, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Gerald A. Befus, deceased; and the State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants). Raymond E. BEFUS, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Gerald A. Befus, deceased, Appellant (Defendant), v. TRANSCON LINES; Russel N. Holmes; the State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants), v. Marilyn A. HAMLIN, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Calvin Harold Hamlin, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 1139

701 P.2d 1139

Marilyn A. HAMLIN, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Calvin Harold Hamlin, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. TRANSCON LINES; Russel N. Holmes; Raymond E. Befus, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Gerald A. Befus, deceased; and the State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants).

Raymond E. BEFUS, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Gerald A. Befus, deceased, Appellant (Defendant), v. TRANSCON LINES; Russel N. Holmes; the State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants), v. Marilyn A. HAMLIN, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Calvin Harold Hamlin, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Nos. 83-221, 83-222.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 18, 1985.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

This matter comes here upon the State's Petition for Rehearing, even though the State is the successful party in this appeal. While it is indeed unusual for the successful party to petition this Court for a rehearing, we find the State to have misconstrued our opinion, and, because it is the duty of the office of the Attorney General to administer the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, we will respond to the petition so that all misconceptions or similar misunderstandings may be laid to rest.

The Court, having carefully considered said Petition, and being fully advised in the premises, finds that the State has failed to demonstrate that this Court has in any way misinterpreted the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-119, W.S.1977, 1984 Cum.Supp., and its relation to Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and § 27-12-103(a) of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804, W.S.1977.

The State of Wyoming takes the position that this Court's opinion frustrates the purposes of the Governmental Claims Act by denying aid to those injured by public employees unless such injured person first obtains and satisfies his or her judgment against the negligent employee. It is difficult for this Court to understand how the State's attorney could possibly read the Court's opinion to hold for such a conclusion. The State's interpretation conflicts with the explicit language of the Court's opinion which recognizes that the Governmental Claims Act authorizes a direct claim against the State in favor of all persons injured by negligent State workers except in those situations where the injured party is also an employee of the State and covered by worker's compensation. The Court's opinion says:

"* * * [B]ecause the legislature felt that the citizens of Wyoming would best be served by structuring a method whereby they could, in specific instances, bring tort and contract actions against the State and its employees--it enacted the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. As noted, the purpose of the Act is to 'balance the respective equities between persons injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers' (emphasis added). Thus the legislature's intended purpose is to waive sovereign immunity of the State and its employees in tort and contract--in those certain specified instances which are contemplated by the Act and only to the extent contemplated." (Emphasis added.) Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 697 P.2d 606, 612-613 (1985).

The Court's opinion, dated April 1, 1985, makes it clear that in every instance in which the injured party is not a governmental employee covered by the Worker's Compensation Act, he or she is authorized to bring an action in tort directly against the state or any other governmental entity by which the tortfeasor is employed. Such a plaintiff is not only entitled to seek a judgment against the State or other governmental entities for the negligence of their employees, but the plaintiff may also proceed to obtain satisfaction of that judgment in full from the resources of the governmental entity which employed the tortfeasor. The Governmental Claims Act and the doctrine of respondeat superior compel this conclusion.

As the Court's opinion clearly holds, it is only in those situations where the injured governmental employee-plaintiff is covered by worker's compensation that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the worker's compensation laws preclude a direct action in tort against the employer-governmental entity. The Worker's Compensation Act and the waiver-of-immunity provisions of the Governmental Claims Act do, however, permit the injured governmental employee to structure a claim against his or her co-employee provided the claimant can prove culpable negligence. Section 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977. Thus, the very narrow fact situations to which the holding of the Court's opinion in the case at bar would apply--except where the plaintiff chooses to bring suit against the governmental employee only--are those in which the injured person is an employee of a governmental entity and is covered by worker's compensation. In these circumstances, as the Court's opinion specifically holds, the employee does not have a cause of action against the governmental-entity employer because of the exclusive-immunity provisions of the worker's compensation law, § 27-12-103(a), and for the further reason that the injured party is not a third-party beneficiary of the statutory-indemnity agreement contemplated by § 1-39-104(b), since such injured person is not one against whom "liability is alleged."

The State, in its brief in support of the petition for rehearing, strenuously objects to the Court's holding that a party injured by governmental action may assert a claim against the public employee responsible for that injury. The principal contention underlying all of the State's arguments is that the Governmental Claims Act recognizes only one claim or cause of action for the redress of governmental wrongs: namely, a claim against the governmental entity itself. The State directs our attention to § 1-39-104(a), which provides in part:

"(a) A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112."

From this it is argued that, since each of the statutory exceptions to absolute immunity cited in § 1-39-104(a) provides that the "governmental entity is liable"--no mention being made of the public employee's liability--public employees acting within the scope of their duties therefore enjoy absolute immunity from suit for any and all wrongs they commit.

The express language of the Governmental Claims Act itself refutes this notion. Preliminarily, we recall the elementary rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be considered so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812, 813 (1984); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982). Also applicable is the oft-repeated rule that this Court must assume that the legislature did not intend futile things. Thomson v. Wyoming In-stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778 (1982); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, supra; Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979); DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Brinegar v. Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62 (1962). If we were to adopt the State's reasoning that governmental employees enjoy complete immunity under the Governmental Claims Act, we would render superfluous and futile numerous sections of the Governmental Claims Act, including the indemnification provisions of § 1-39-104(b):

"(b) When liability is alleged against any public employee, if the governmental entity determines he was acting within the scope of his duty, whether or not alleged to have been committed maliciously or fraudulently, the governmental entity shall provide a defense at its expense. A governmental entity shall save harmless, and indemnify its public employees against any tort claim or judgment arising out of an act or omission occurring within the scope of their duties." (Emphasis added.)

This section plainly recognizes that public employees may be subject to tort claims and judgments as a result of their work-related activities.

Section 1-39-116(b) provides that the judgment or settlement obtained pursuant to the Governmental Claims Act, not the Act itself, bars further action by the claimant against the responsible employee:

"(b) The judgment in an action or a settlement under this act constitutes a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject matter of the original suit or claim, against the governmental entity or the public employee whose negligence gave rise to the claim." (Emphasis added.)

The applicable statute of limitations, § 1-39-114, recognizes the validity of claims against governmental employees:

"Except as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 1-39-113. In the case of a minor seven (7) years of age or younger, actions against a governmental entity or public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act are forever barred unless commenced within two (2) years after occurrence or until his eighth birthday, whichever period is greater. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

Finally, § 1-39-117(b) establishes that venue for claims brought under the Act shall be in the county where the defendant public employee resides:

"(b) Venue for any claim against the state or its public employees pursuant to this act shall be in the county in which the public employee resides or the cause of action arose or in Laramie county. ...