Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metro. Mass Transit, 97-4015.

Decision Date23 October 1997
Docket NumberNo. 97-4015.,97-4015.
Citation986 F.Supp. 1126
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois
PartiesHoward D. HAMLYN, on his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ROCK ISLAND COUNTY METROPOLITAN MASS TRANSIT DISTRICT, and Loren A. Dussliere, Cecil L. Hickman, Robert E. Jensen, Laurence W. Lorensen, and John R. Hunt, in their individual capacities, Defendants.

Harvey Grossman, Lauren B. Raphael, Roger A. Leishman, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Bernard C. Gillman, Gillman, Konecky & Norman, Rock Island, IL, for Defendants.

ORDER

McDADE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Howard D. Hamlyn ("Hamlyn"), brings this action on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated against Defendants Rock Island Metropolitan Mass Transit District ("Metro Link") and its individual members for their alleged policy of denying equal access to their reduced fare program solely because Plaintiff has AIDS. On July 16, 1997, this Court certified the following class for purposes of declaratory and/or injunctive relief only:

All persons who are now or will be otherwise eligible to participate in Metro Link's Reduced Fare Program but who are or will be excluded from participation solely because they have AIDS.

The Court also found that Plaintiff has standing to bring this action on behalf of himself and the class. In particular, the Court found that Plaintiff did not need to apply for the program because Metro Link's written policy is "so facially discriminatory" that it would "deter a reasonable person in Plaintiff's position from even completing the application process." Preliminary Ruling at 5.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on liability as to the three individual claims against Metro Link. The Motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56(d). The Motion is fully briefed, and after consideration of the pleadings and statements of undisputed facts filed pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), this Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

Effective June 1997, Local Rule 7.1(D) was revised to state:

(D) Summary Judgment.

(1) Any party filing a motion for summary judgment shall file and serve with the motion a separate document (entitled "Statement of Undisputed Facts") which numerically lists each undisputed fact relied upon in the memorandum of law in support of the motion, with citation to discovery material or affidavits that support the contention that the fact is undisputed. If a fact is not numerically listed, it will not be considered by the court.

(2) Similar to answering a complaint, in response the party opposing the summary judgment, shall file a separate document (entitled "Response to [S]tatement of Undisputed Facts") which numerically responds to each of the movant's undisputed facts. The party will either admit or contest the fact. If the fact is contested, the party (1) shall submit a short and plain statement of why the fact is in dispute and (2) cite to discovery material or affidavits that support the contention that the fact is disputed.

(3) The party opposing the summary judgment motion may also—if necessary —file a separate document (entitled "[S]tatement of [A]dditional Undisputed Facts") which numerically lists each additional fact relied upon in the memorandum of law in response to the movant's summary judgment motion, with citation to discovery material or affidavits that support the contention that the additional fact is undisputed. If the party opposing summary judgment relies on additional facts in response and the facts are not numerically listed, they will not be considered by the court.

Although Plaintiff's Rule 7.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts was filed in April before the effective date of these revisions, it complies with the new rule. Defendants' Rule 7.1 "Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts," however, does not comply with the new Rule 7.1(D)(2), even though it was filed on September 2, 1997, well after the effective date of the revisions to the local rules. First, Defendants' Statement of Facts is not a response to Plaintiff's Rule 7.1 Statement, but rather a new set of facts which Defendants contend are in "dispute." Second, Defendants' Statement is not set out like an answer to a complaint, because it does not directly admit or deny whether the facts asserted by Plaintiff are "undisputed." Instead, the "response" that Defendants have filed is more like a "Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts." Defendants, however, have labeled their statement as one filed "pursuant to local rule 7.1(D)(2)." As a response, this Statement does not comply with Rule 7.1(D)(2). Accordingly, this Court will treat: Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts as admitted. Pursuant to Rule 56(d), the Court further finds that the following facts exist without substantial controversy and will be deemed established at the trial of this action.

The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue several times, stating: "[i]t is not our task, or that of the district court, to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. We rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment." Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.1995). The Seventh Circuit has "endorsed the exacting obligation [local] rules impose on a party contesting summary judgment to highlight which factual averments are in conflict as well as what record evidence there is to confirm the dispute ..." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir.1994). The Seventh Circuit has "repeatedly ... sustained the entry of summary judgment where "the nonmovant has failed to submit a factual statement in the form called for by the pertinent rule and thereby conceded the movant's version of the facts." Id. at 922. This is such a case. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, the Court takes as undisputed each fact alleged in Plaintiff's Rule 7.1 Statement. These facts are as follows.

Plaintiff Howard Hamlyn is a resident of Moline, Illinois, who has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Stmt.") ¶ 1. Defendant Rock Island County Mass Transit District ("Metro Link") is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Illinois for the purpose of providing mass transportation services to Rock Island County. Id. at ¶ 2. Metro Link is a public entity as defined by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at ¶ 3. Metro Link has received federal funding and therefore is a program covered by the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at ¶ 4.

AIDS is caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). Id. at ¶ 5. This virus attacks cells in the immune system causing a progressive impairment of the immune system. Id. Individuals whose immune system is impaired by HIV become susceptible to opportunistic infections. Id. Once the immune system becomes severely suppressed, a patient is diagnosed as having AIDS. HIV infected persons are considered to have AIDS when the number of their CD4 + lymphocytes drops below a certain level or when they develop one of twenty-six clinical conditions. Id. at ¶ 6.

Mr. Hamlyn, the Plaintiff, has AIDS. AIDS causes Mr. Hamlyn to have significant difficulty walking more than one block; significant difficulty boarding or alighting from a standard bus; significant difficulty standing in a moving vehicle; and significant difficulty using stairs or an escalator. Id. at ¶ 14. Moreover, under federal law, municipal transit authorities such as Metro Link which receive federal financial assistance must offer reduced fare rates for persons with disabilities. Id. at ¶ 7. Defendant Metro Link has a Reduced Fare Program that makes transportation services available at a reduced rate for persons with disabilities. Id. at ¶ 8. Metro Link's Reduced Fare Program uses a form labeled the "Reduced Fare Application For Persons with Disabilities" ("Application Form"). Id. at ¶ 9. The Application Form states, "WHO DOES NOT QUALIFY: A Applicants whose sole disability is ... AIDS ...." Id. at ¶ 10. Under the heading "Instructions to Physician, Psychologist, Optometrist or Audiologist," the Application Form states, "Applicants do not qualify if their sole disability is ... AIDS ...." Id. at ¶ 11. The Application Form states that applicants for Metro Link's Reduced Fare Program "do not qualify on the basis of income or financial status." Id. at ¶ 12. Under the heading "Instructions to Physician, Psychologist, Optometrist or Audiologist," the Application Form states that "Applicant is eligible for a Reduced Fare Card because of a DYSFUNCTION causing: (Please place an "X" in the appropriate spaces) Significant difficulty walking more than one block. Significant difficulty in boarding or alighting from a standard bus. Significant difficulty in using stairs or an escalator. Inability to read or understand information signs or symbols. Inability to hear announcements by operators or attendants in public transit vehicles." Id. at ¶ 13.

AIDS causes Mr. Hamlyn to have significant difficulty walking more than one block; significant difficulty boarding or alighting from a standard bus; significant difficulty standing in a moving vehicle; and significant difficulty using stairs or an escalator. Id. at ¶ 14. Mr. Hamlyn's personal physician would certify to the facts regarding his condition listed in the previous paragraph. Id. at ¶ 15. Metro Link admits that Mr. Hamlyn may have a condition that constitutes a dysfunction that will satisfy eligibility for the Reduced Fare Program. Id. at ¶ 16.

DISCUSSION
I. AIDS Is A Disability Under The Americans With Disabilities Act and The Rehabilitation Act.

AIDS is a disability under federal law. Both the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the ...

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