Hammer v. Atchison

• Decision Date: 04 June 1975
• Docket Number: 4451,Nos. 4450,s. 4450
• Citation: 536 P.2d 151
• Parties: Richard HAMMER and John L. Byrtus, as Executors of the Estate of Joe Snoddy, Deceased, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Ruth G. ATCHISON, Executrix of the Estate of Leone G. Snoddy, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff below) (two cases).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 151

536 P.2d 151

Richard HAMMER and John L. Byrtus, as Executors of the Estate of Joe Snoddy, Deceased, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Ruth G. ATCHISON, Executrix of the Estate of Leone G. Snoddy, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff below) (two cases).

Nos. 4450, 4451.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 4, 1975.

Lawrence A. Yonkee and Tom C. Toner, Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellants.

Henry A. Burgess, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.

RAPER, Justice.

This appeal presents interrelated questions in the construction of a written antenuptial agreement with respect to a will subsequently made and the construction of a will with respect to the antenuptial agreement. There are no questions concerning the validity of either document.

On December 9, 1966, Joe Snoddy and Leone Georgen, also known as Leona Georgen entered into a prenuptial agreement. They were married less than a week later. On November 22, 1968, Joe Snoddy executed a will. He died on December 19, 1970, and his will was regularly admitted to probate. The appeal is taken from a judgment in her favor entered in a civil action by Leona G. Snoddy against the executors of her deceased husband's estate to recover one-fourth of the net estate pursuant to the provisions of a prenuptial agreement, in writing, for which she had properly filed claim; the executors appeal. Appeal is also before the court by the executors of the Joe Snoddy estate from a judgment and order entered in the probate court ordering the executors to pay to Leona G. Snoddy $101,400.00 in addition to one-fourth of the net estate of Joe Snoddy. The cases are consolidated. Leona Snoddy has since died and her executrix has been substituted as a party in her stead in the civil action.

After introductory recitations, the antenuptial agreement, with Joe Snoddy as first party and Leona Georgen as second party, is in its pertinent terms as follows:

'I.

'First Party shall execute a codicil to his Last Will and Testament, dated April 16, 1966, or execute a new Will, and in said Codicil or Will or any other Will executed by First Party, First Party shall give, devise and bequeath unto Second Party one fourth (1/4) of First Party's net estate which term 'net estate' shall mean the residue remaining after deduction of all valid debts and funeral and administration expenses but before the deduction for estate or inheritance taxes. However, Second Party shall be obligated to pay out of the said one-fourth share of First Party's estate which Second Party shall receive any and all inheritance taxes which are determined to be chargeable against said one-fourth share. First Party's legal representatives shall have the authority to deduct any such inheritance taxes which may be determined chargeable against said one-fourth share from said one-fourth share. First party agrees to die testate.

* * *

* * *

'IV.

'Except as herein set forth, each party waives, discharges and releases any and all claims and rights that he or she may acquire by reason of the marriage:

'(a) To share in the estate of the other party upon the latter's death by way of dower, curtesy, widow's allowance, Statutory allowance or distribution in intestacy; and

'(b) To elect to take against the other Party's last Will and Testament under any Statutes, now or hereafter in force, of any State of the United States of America, or any other State or Nation in which the deceased Party may have property at the time of death or in which the Parties or either of them may reside;

'(c) To act as Executor or Administrator of the other Party's estate. Neither Party, however, shall be disqualified by the terms hereof to serve and act as Executor or Executrix of the other's estate if so designated.

'V.

'Except as herein set forth, each Party hereby accepts the provisions of any Last Will and Testament which has been or may hereafter be made for the survivor of either of them in full discharge, settlement and satisfaction of any and all other right, title and interest, which either might acquire in the estate and property of the other, but for such testamentary provisions and the provisions of this Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent either of said parties from accepting or receiving any benefit, gift, devise or bequest which the other may freely and voluntarily choose to make in favor of him or her by Last Will and Testament, Codicil or other testamentary instrument.'

The will of Joe Snoddy in its applicable parts is as follows:

'FIRST: I direct the payment of all my just debts, expenses of last illness, my funeral expenses, the expenses of administering my estate and all State Inheritance and Federal Estate Taxes, payment of which is not otherwise provided for.

'SECOND: I give and bequeath to my wife, Leone G. Snoddy, also known as Leona G. Snoddy, the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) and I request that said sum be distributed and paid over to said Leone G. Snoddy just as soon as the District Court having jurisdiction over my estate will permit such distribution.

'THIRD: I further direct that the Executors of my estate pay to my wife, Leone G. Snoddy, the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, retroactive to the month of my death, said payment to continue each month until the legacy provided for in Paragraph SECOND of this Will has been fully paid. Upon payment of said legacy, said monthly allowance will terminate and no further allowance be paid. I do direct my Executors, however, from the residue of my estate, to pay and Inheritance Tax or other tax that may be chargeable against the legacy which I leave for my wife, Leone G. Snoddy.

* * *

* * *

'FIFTH: I direct that all testamentary expenses and all transfer estate and debt taxes, whether Federal, State, Municipal or Inheritance and all other taxes of that general nature which shall become payable by reason of my death, shall be paid out of the principal of my residuary estate, whether assessed in respect to property owned by me at the time of my death, or in respect of any other property included in the computation of such taxes.'

The total amount of the estate was $902,845.30 with expected expenses of administration and taxes deducted, to leave a net estate of $788,044.43, one-fourth of which would be $197,011.10. Under the view taken by the appellee and which was directed by the trial court, the debt created by the prenuptial agreement would be satified followed by payment of the $101,400.00 bequeathed by the will. Under the view of appellants, the $101,400.00 legacy should be credited against the obligation to devise to Leona Snoddy one-fourth of his net estate. The $1,400.00 in this figure is the total of the $200.00 monthly payments made under the THIRD direction of the will, before payment of the $100,000.00. The total legacy has been paid. No testimony was taken prior to decision.

The appellants advocate by paraphrasing from 6 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, § 57.11, p. 352, the following rule:

'If the testator's obligation is one which by its terms is required to be satisfied by a legacy, a legacy in the will although of less value will be presumed to be a partial satisfaction of a contractual obligation.'

Appellants rely on Slover v. Harris, Wyo.1957, 314 P.2d 953, in which the testator was childless and had raised the plaintiffs like his own sons. They lived and worked on the testator's ranch without compensation from the time that they were youngsters. By will, the plaintiffs were left only a life estate in his property. First asserting an agreement that they were to receive the fee by oral promise of the testator, for services, for alternate relief, they claimed compensation for services under a quantum meruit theory. This court held that there was no oral contract and that plaintiffs would have to elect between an implied contract in quantum meruit and the life estate under the will. At page 964 of the opinion, the court said:

'* * * It is true that the courts generally seem to be inclined to hold that a devise or legacy shall not...