Hammer v. Garfield Mining Milling Co

• Decision Date: 08 April 1889
• Citation: 9 S.Ct. 548,32 L.Ed. 964,130 U.S. 291
• Parties: HAMMER v. GARFIELD MINING & MILLING CO. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

130 U.S. 291

9 S.Ct. 548

32 L.Ed. 964

HAMMER v. GARFIELD MINING & MILLING CO.¹

April 8, 1889.

E. W. Toole and J. K. Toole, for plaintiff in error.

Eppa Hunton, for defendant in error.

FIELD, J.

This was a suit to quiet the title of the plaintiff below, the Garfield Mining & Milling Company, to a lode mining claim in Montana. It was brought under an act of the territory providing for an action by any person in possession, by himself or his tenant, of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate, or interest. Comp. St. 1887, § 366. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York, for the purpose of carrying on the business of mining and milling ores bearing gold, silver, and other precious metals, in Montana, and that it has complied with all the laws of the territory relative to foreign corporations; that it is the owner of a certain quartz lode in the county of Lewis and Clarke, in the territory, known as the 'Garfield' lode or mining claim, which has been surveyed, and is designated upon the records of the office of the United States surveyor general of the territory, and contains an area of 20 acres and 62-100 of an acre, the metes and bounds of which are given; that the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have been in the possession of and entitled to the lode ever since its discovery and location; that, notwithstanding its right to the possession, the defendant below, (the plaintiff in error here,) Auge O. Hammer, on or about the 1st of January, 1883, assumed to enter upon the premises and relocate the same, and caused the relocation to be recorded in the records of the county under the name of the 'Kinna Lode;' that he pretends to claim an interest or estate therein adversly to the plaintiff, and has made application to the United States land-office at Helena, in the territory, for a patent therefor; that the plaintiff has duly filed in that office its adverse claim to the premises, setting forth its nature and origin; and that the proceedings in the land-office have been stayed until the final determination by the court of the right of possession to the premises. Two other persons, by the names of Kinna and Bliss, are also made defendants, who, it is averred, assert some claim to the premises by a relocation at the same time with the defendant Hammer. The complaint alleges that the claims of all the defendants are without right, and that no one of them has any estate or interest in the mining ground, nor in any part thereof. The prayer of the complaint is (1) that the defendants may be required to set forth the nature of their respective claims, and that all adverse claims be determined by a decree of the court; (2) that by such decree it be declared and adjudged that the defendants have not, nor has any of them, any interest or estate in or right to the possession of the premises, or any part thereof, and that the title of the plaintiff to the same is good and valid, and that it is entitled to their possession; and (3) that the defendants be forever bebarred from asserting any claim whatever to the premises, or any part thereof.

All the defendants filed demurrers to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The defendant Hammer withdrew his demurrer, and filed an answer. It does not appear from the record what disposition was made of the demurrer of the defendants Kinna and Bliss, but as they do not appear to have taken any further part in the defense of the action, and are not mentioned in the judgment or in the appeal taken to the supreme court of the territory, it may be presumed that the action was discontinued as to them. The answer of Hammer denies that the plaintiff is the owner of the lode described in the complaint, or of any part of it; or that it is now, or has been for a long time, in possession thereof, or of any part thereof; or that it or its predecessors in interest have ever since the discovery and location thereof been in possession of it, or of any part thereof, or entitled to the possession thereof; or that the defendant at any time assumed to relocate the premises, and to cause the relocation to be recorded in the records of the county; or that his claim is without right. The answer also sets up that on the 1st of January, 1883, one Iner Wolf entered upon the premises described, the same being then vacant mineral land of the United States, and discovered thereon a vein or lode of quartz bearing silver and other precious metals, and named the same the 'Kinna Lode,' which he then located in accordance with the requirements of the law, and had a notice of the location filed for record with the county recorder; that afterwards the defendant became the purchaser of the premises from Wolf, and has ever since been their owner, and entitled to their possession; and that whatever claim the plaintiff ever had to them became forfeited before the 1st of January, 1883, since which time it has not had any estate, title, or interest therein, or possession thereof. A replication to the answer having been filed, the issues raised were tried by a jury, which found a general verdict for the plaintiff, upon which the court entered judgment in the following form, after stating the pleadings, trial, and verdict: 'Wherefore, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff have judgment as prayed for in its complaint herein against the defendant Auge O. Hammer, and that all adverse claim of the said defendant, and of all persons claiming or to claim the premises in said complaint described, or any part thereof, through or under said defendant, are hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid and groundless, and that the plaintiff is, and it is hereby declared and adjudged to be, the true and lawful owner of the land described in the complaint, and every part and parcel thereof, and that the title thereto is adjudged to be quieted against all claims, demands, or pretensions of the said defendant; and said defendant is hereby perpetually estopped from setting up any claim thereto, or any part thereof.' Then follows a description of the premises, and an order that plaintiff recover costs. On appeal to the supreme court of the territory, the judgment was affirmed, (8 Pac. Rep. 153,) and to review the latter judgment the case is brought to this court.

As seen by this statement, the suit is brought for special relief, and the judgment entered is such as a court exercising jurisdiction in equity alone could render. The courts of Montana, under a law of the territory, exercise both common-law and equity jurisdiction. The modes of procedure in suits, both at law and in equity, are the same until the trial or hearing. As we said in Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 679: 'The suitor, whatever relief he may ask, is required to state, 'in ordinary and concise language,' the facts of his case upon which he invokes the judgment of the court. But the consid- eration which the court will give to the questions raised by the pleadings, when the case is called for trial or hearing, whether it will submit them to a jury, or pass upon them without any such intervention, must depend upon the jurisdiction which is to be exercised. If the remedy sought be a legal one, a jury is essential, unless waived by the stipulation of the parties; but if the remedy sought be equitable, the court is not bound to call a jury, and if it does call one, it is only for the purpose of enlightening its conscience, and not to control its judgment. The decree which it must render upon the law and the facts must proceed from its own judgment respecting them, and not from the judgment of others.' The court might therefore have heard this case, and disposed of the issues, without the intervention of a jury; but, it having called a jury, the trial was conducted in the...