Hammil v. State
| Decision Date | 20 November 1890 |
| Citation | 90 Ala. 577,8 So. 380 |
| Parties | HAMMIL v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from city court of Mobile county; O. J. SEMMES, Judge.
The appellant in this case was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. On the day set for the trial, the state and the defendant having announced "Ready," the court proceeded to impanel the jury, and one Ira W Porter having been drawn, and called as a juror, and having been sworn to answer as to his qualifications as a juror, was asked by the clerk as follows: "Have you a fixed opinion in this case that would bias your verdict?" The witness answered: "I have an opinion, but don't know whether it would bias my verdict or not." The court then asked the juror: The juror answered: The court then said: The juror answered "I can't swear that it would." The court then said: "Sir?" The juror replied: "Can't say that it would bias my verdict." The court then said "Do you answer yes, or no?" The juror then replied "Well, I will answer no." The solicitor for the state accepted said juror, whereupon the attorney for the defendant challenged him for cause; but the court overruled the challenge, and put the juror upon the defendant, and the defendant thereupon duly excepted.
The evidence, as shown by the bill of exceptions, is in conflict on almost every point; but the phases of the facts, as applicable to the questions settled, are substantially as follows: The defendant had lost a dog, and, upon being informed that the deceased, one Maguire, had him, he went to the house of the deceased, and asked the wife of the deceased if his dog was there. One phase of the evidence tended to show that the wife of Maguire replied that they had the dog while the other phase tended to prove that she answered the inquiry of the defendant by telling him that they did not have his dog. About the time of the reply of his wife, the deceased came out of his house, and cursing the defendant drove him away from his premises, telling him that he had better never cross his path again. The defendant said he only wanted to get his dog, and, upon leaving the premises, said: "I will bet a hundred dollars that I will get that dog." As the defendant left the place, deceased cursed him, and told him he "was not white." At this time, the defendant did not have his gun or rifle. The defendant went home, lighted his lamp, sat down a while, then got up, got his rifle, and started up the street on which the deceased lived. After eating his supper, the deceased, who was a policeman, started towards town. The defendant was walking along the street talking to a woman, when the deceased came up to within 10 feet of him. The evidence was in direct conflict as to what occurred at this time, when the defendant and deceased met. The evidence for the defendant tended to show, that the deceased accosted the defendant, and said, "You damn, thieving son of a bitch, I will kill you," and put his hand upon his pistol-pocket; that the defendant looked around, and, seeing what the deceased was about to do, threw down his rifle, and shot him twice in quick succession; while the evidence for the state rebutted this, and tended to show that, when the defendant and deceased met, the defendant said something that was not heard; that deceased replied that he did not have defendant's dog; that defendant said something else that was not heard; and that, upon deceased replying by cursing the defendant, the defendant immediately took his gun from his shoulder, and shot the deceased. As preparatory, and for the purpose of laying a predicate upon which to introduce in evidence what purported to be the dying declaration of the deceased, it was shown by the evidence introduced that, a few minutes after the deceased was shot, he called for some one to go for the doctor, and the priest; and it was also shown that, just after he made what purported to be his dying declaration, he caused his wife and child to be called to him, and that in a few minutes after he kissed them, or had them to kiss him, he died. It was also shown that the wound in his abdomen was necessarily fatal, and, as soon as he received it, he was in a critical condition; and that, while he was making his statement, he was in fact dying, although perfectly rational and clear in his statements. It was also shown that one of the attending physicians, some time before the dying declaration was made, told deceased's wife that he could not recover; but this statement was not communicated to the deceased, nor was it shown that any one told him of his dangerous condition, nor that the deceased said anything further about dying than was stated by him to the justice of the peace, and put in the declaration. One Thrower, a justice of the peace, testified that he went to the deceased a short time before he died, and told him that "he was very bad off, and told him if he had anything to say he had better do it; that the did not think he had long to live; and that the deceased consented," and asked Thrower to examine him, which Thrower did. The witness then produced a paper, which he said he wrote down as the deceased stated it, and the deceased signed it in his presence, after it had been read over to him. The state then offered this paper in evidence, and commenced reading it to the jury, when the court suggested the propriety of the state's attorney allowing the defendant's counsel to examine it, for there might be some part of it to which the court would sustain an objection, if made by the defendant's attorney. Upon the paper being handed to the defendant's attorney, and it being read by him, the counsel...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Siebert v. State
...of the accused. Such opinion must be so fixed as that it would bias the verdict a juror would be required to render. Hammil v. State, 90 ala. 577, 8 So. 380." McCorvey v. State, 339 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1058 (Ala.1976). "A 'fixed opinion' which will bias a......
-
Smith v. State
...of the accused. Such opinion must be so fixed as that it would bias the verdict a juror would be required to render. Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380." McCorvey v. State, 339 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1058 (Ala.1976). "A 'fixed opinion' which will bias a......
-
Thomas v. State, 6 Div. 177
...Blackburn v. State, 98 Ala. 63, 13 So. 274; Pulliam v. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 839; Young v. State, 95 Ala. 4, 10 So. 913; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380; Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala. 1; Sims v. State, 139 Ala. 74, 36 So. 138; Marshall v. State, 219 Ala. 83, 121 So. 72, 63 A.L.R. 560;......
-
Oryang v. State, CR-91-1800
...of the accused. Such opinion must be so fixed as that it would bias the verdict a juror would be required to render. Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380.' McCorvey v. State, 339 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1058 (Ala.1976). 'A "fixed opinion" which will bias a......