Hammock v. City of Tacoma

• Decision Date: 22 November 1905
• Citation: 40 Wash. 539,82 P. 893
• Parties: HAMMOCK v. CITY OF TACOMA.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

82 P. 893

40 Wash. 539

HAMMOCK v. CITY OF TACOMA.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 22, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Thad Huston, Judge.

Action by Amanda Hammock against the city of Tacoma. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Govnor Teats, for appellant.

O. G Ellis, J. J. Anderson, and R. E. Evans, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal, rendered upon the order of the court sustaining a demurrer to appellant's amended complaint. There seems to be no merit in the motion to dismiss. The allegations of the complaint were to the effect that the plaintiff, an elderly woman, while walking along a sidewalk upon the east side of J street in the city of Tacoma, about halfway between South Forty-Third and South Forty-First streets, on the 12th day of June, 1904, was severely injured through a fall caused by a broken and rotten plank in the walk. The situation is shown by the accompanying diagram:

(Image Omitted)

The language of the claim notice is as follows 'For personal injuries, occurring to her [plaintiff] on South J street between South Forty-First and South Forty-Second streets, in the city of Tacoma, through a defective sidewalk at the point, on June 12, 1904 $2,000.' The affidavit acccompanying the notice alleges 'That, on the 12th day of June, 1904, at about the hour of 2 o'clock of said day, while walking with her daughter, Mrs. Mary Bradshaw, along and upon the sidewalk upon the east side of J street in the city of Tacoma, at a point about half way between South Forty-Second and South Forty-First streets, she was permanently injured,' etc. It appears that South Forty-Second street had not been extended from N Street to J street, a distance of four blocks, and that the next street from Forty-First street, traveling south on J street, is Forty-Third street; so that the point where the injury actually occurred was about halfway between Forty-First street and Forty-Third street, instead of half way between Forty-First and Forty-Second streets, as stated in the notice. But we think this discrepancy was not sufficient to debar the plaintiff from her right of action. It is evident that the city authorities, in looking for this place, could not have been misled, for they were notified that the accident occurred on the east side of J street. They were also notified that it was at some point south of Forty-First street. When they repaired to J street, looking for the place of accident and traveling towards Forty-Third street, they would notice that there was no Forty-Second street intersecting the east side of J street, and would naturally conclude that the street that was meant was the next street south of Forty-First street, a natural conclusion to be arrived at by the claimant, who knew that her starting point was Forty-First street, and that she was hurt between that and the intersection of the next street.

A great many cases are cited by both respondent and appellant on the proposition of the definiteness required by the notice in such cases as this, but we think there are no cases that sustain the court in holding that this notice was insufficient. The charter provision requires that such writing shall state the time, place, cause, nature, and extent of the alleged injuries, so far as practicable. There is nothing any more sacred about a notice of the place where an injury occurred than there is in any pleading in a case. The object is to give information, and, when that information is given in a practicable manner, the requirements of the law are met. Mr. Thompson, in his Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (volume 5, § 6330), voices the almost uniform sentiment of the courts on this subject in the following statement: 'It is manifestly sufficient if in such a notice the place where the accident took place is described so as to identify it with reasonable certainty, and so that the proper investigating officer can find it from the description, aided by a reasonable inquiry, and that it is...