Hammond v. State

• Citation: 21 So. 149,74 Miss. 214
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 18 January 1897
• Parties: CEPHAS HAMMOND v. STATE

21 So. 149

74 Miss. 214

CEPHAS HAMMOND v. STATE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 18, 1897

October 1896

FROM the circuit court, first district, of Panola county HON EUGENE JOHNSON, Judge.

Cephas Hammond was indicted by the grand jury of the first district of Panola county, in March, 1896, for the murder of his stepson, an infant about two years of age. The indictment was adjudged defective and a second one was found. The defendant moved the court to quash the second indictment, because his wife, the mother of the child, had testified to material facts against him before the grand jury and the indictment was found upon her testimony. On the hearing of the motion several members of the grand jury were introduced as witnesses by the defendant without objection by the state. The motion was sustained, and the second indictment (No. 986) was quashed. The state excepted to the ruling and appealed therefrom. The grand jury still being in session, a third indictment was found against Hammond charging him with the same offense. He was tried upon the last indictment convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life, and appealed. The testimony against him was almost wholly circumstantial. The instruction given for the state, passed upon in the opinion of the court, is in these words "The court instructs the jury for the state that you are not required to know that defendant inflicted wounds on the child by violence, nor is it necessary for you to know that the child died from such wounds. All that is required is for you to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence and from them to conscientiously believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he made wounds on the child from which it died."

Judgment affirmed.

W. D. Miller, for appellant, Hammond.

The evidence in this case against the accused is wholly circumstantial, and falls very far short of that standard or degree of proof absolutely essential to conviction under the well-established and familiar rules in such cases. There was no proof whatever that the accused inflicted the alleged wounds upon the child, or, even if he did, that these wounds produced the death. There was no proof as to the cause of the death. The alleged threats of the accused against the child, as well as the mother, if made by him at all, were without any significance, under the circumstances, and appear to have been but idle, unmeaning assertions, made openly and publicly at times and places evincing no serious intention, but in real truth excluding the idea of any purpose to execute them.

It was error to permit evidence to go to the jury even tending to connect the accused with the alleged crime until the corpus delicti was established by full, clear, and unequivocal proof beyond a reasonable doubt. "In cases of felonious homicide the corpus delicti consists of two fundamental and necessary facts; first, the death, and second, that it was caused by criminal agency." Pitts' case, 43 Miss. 472; Sam's case, 4 Geo. (Miss.), 347; Stringfellow's case, 4 Cushman (Miss.), 157. Corpus delicti is made up of two elements: First, of the fact that a certain result has been produced; second, of the fact that some one is criminally responsible for the result." 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 309. "Circumstances to show corpus delicti and then to show defendant's guilt should be separately presented." 73 Am. Dec., 312; 48 Mich. 482; State v. Flannagan, 26 W.Va., 116. "Before presumptive evidence tending to connect prisoner with the crime can be invoked, the corpus delicti must be established clearly, unequivocally, and beyond a reasonable doubt." Ryan v. Commonwealth, Va. Ct. of App., 9 Va. L. J., 607.

The instruction given to the jury on behalf of the state was erroneous and misleading. (The instruction referred to is the one copied in the statement supra.)

Suppose Hammond did "make wounds on the child from which he died, " that might even be true, and yet the accused not be guilty. Suppose they were made by the accused accidentally, or unintentionally, or not with any criminal intent, or not while engaged in any unlawful act, or the like, surely he would not be guilty of murder. The instruction is misleading throughout, from beginning to end, and absolutely excludes from the consideration of the jury any chance, casualty or accident by which he might have made the wounds on the child, and which might reduce the crime to manslaughter if it did not exonerate. See, as to this instruction, Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 95; Burt v. State, 72 Miss. 408; Hemphill v. State, 16 So. 491; Johnson v. State, 16 So. 494.

The court below erred in refusing the instruction asked for by the accused as to good character being sufficient to raise a doubt as to guilt. "Good character of a defendant is of itself a sufficient fact from which a reasonable doubt of guilt may arise. People v. Kerr (N.Y.Sup. Ct.), 6 N.Y.Sup., 674. "Evidence of good character must be considered in all cases when it is offered, as well when the other evidence is direct as when it is circumstantial. Its weight is not confined to doubtful cases, but it may of itself create a doubt. The degree of its force is to be estimated by the attending circumstances and not by the grade of the offense." 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., p. 111. The accused was entitled to the protection which a good character often alone affords, especially in a case of circumstantial evidence, and he unquestionably had the right to have the jury so informed.

Wiley N. Nash, attorney-general, for the state.

On the state's appeal: Under our statute, this court is requested to pass upon the question raised in the record, whether an indictment should be quashed for the reason that the wife of the party indicted gave material testimony before the grand jury that found the bill; the statute provides that where an exception is presented in a case, by the state, the case shall be treated as if an appeal had been formally prosecuted by the state. All questions of law, thus presented, shall be decided by the supreme court. Code 1892, § 39. The statute in regard to husband and wife testifying is code 1892, § 1739. The following authorities hold that an indictment should not be held bad because the grand jury heard improper evidence: Thompson & Merriam on Juries, p. 693, sec. 642, and notes 1, 2, and 3, citing State v. Walcott, 21 Conn. 272, 280; State v. Boyd, 2 Hill (S. C.), 88; State v. Tucker, 20 Iowa 508; State v. Fassett, 16 Conn. 457, 472; Bloomer v. State, 3 Sneed, 66; People v. Shoug, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.), 244; Hope v. People, 83 N.Y. 418; State v. Logan, 1 Nev., 509; Turk v. State, 7 Ohio (Part II.), 242; People v. Briggs, 60 How. Pr., 17; Steele v. State, 1 Tex., 142, 145.

On defendant's appeal: The whole case was fairly submitted to the jury both upon the law and the facts. The court expressly stated to the jury in the first charge for appellant that the corpus delicti in this case consisted of two essential facts--the dead body, and that the death was caused by violence or some criminal agency--and that the corpus delicti must, in such cases, be established clearly unequivocally, and beyond a reasonable doubt, before any evidence can be considered connecting the defendant with the crime. The assignment of error, based upon the charge asked by appellant, and refused by the court, is as follows: "Good...