Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Decision Date | 26 July 1965 |
Docket Number | No. C64-736.,C64-736. |
Citation | 243 F. Supp. 793 |
Parties | Lloyd HAMMONDS, Plaintiff, v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
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Sheldon R. Walker, Willoughby, Ohio, Edward H. Stinson, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer, Smith Warder, Eugene Bleiweiss, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.
Plaintiff has complained that the defendant insurance company, without just cause, had persuaded the plaintiff's treating physician to discontinue that relationship, and, further, that the defendant induced the doctor to divulge confidential information gained through the physician-patient relationship. In particular, it is alleged that the defendant, at the behest of a prominent defense attorney, persuaded Dr. Alexander Ling, the plaintiff's treating physician, to surrender certain undisclosed confidential information for use in pending litigation against the plaintiff on the false pretext that the plaintiff was contemplating a malpractice suit against Dr. Ling. We overruled the defendant's Motion to Dismiss on January 6, 1965, 237 F.Supp. 96, holding that the alleged misconduct, if proven true, would require the defendant to respond in damages to the plaintiff. The defendant has now moved for a summary judgment, contending that the operative facts are not in controversy and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment is an "Appendix" in which the defendant again challenges the wisdom of the Court's earlier opinion in support of the order overruling the Motion to Dismiss. We recognize this "Appendix" as a Motion for Reconsideration of that opinion, and therefore we will give first attention to this Motion before addressing the defendant's prayer for summary judgment.
The motion for reconsideration is directed to that part of the Court's opinion (237 F.Supp. 96, 101-102) dealing with the alleged inducement of the physician's breach of his duty to secrecy. The vigor with which counsel for defense (who are regularly concerned with the legal responsibilities of the medical profession) advance the argument that a physician may reveal information gained in confidence, requires that we re-emphasize the reasons underlying our first Memorandum. The defendant argues that, since there was no common law privilege clothing communications between doctor and patient with confidentiality, there can be no common law action for the breach of confidence1 nor for the inducement of such a breach. The privileged communication statute, according to the defendant, merely precludes a doctor from testifying in court as to communications received while treating a patient; as far as the law and the statute are concerned, the doctor is uninhibited in his private discussions about his patient2 and the insurance company is perfectly free to promote a full discussion in private of any communication made by the patient to the doctor. The defendant has thus illustrated its total failure to grasp the basis of the Court's earlier opinion in this case. Modern public policy, not the archiac whims of the common law, demands that doctors obey their implied promise of secrecy.
This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that a court, confronted with a unique situation, must, after an unsuccessful search for binding precedent on point, repair to the dictates of public policy to do justice between litigants at the bar of justice. What is the meaning of "public policy?" As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 68, 115 N.E. 505, L.R.A.1917D, 641 (1916):
We see this concomitant policy reflected in three separate indicia: the promulgated code of ethics adopted by the medical profession on which the public has a right to rely; the privileged communication statute, which precludes the doctor from testifying in open court; and that part of the State Medical Licensing Statute which seals the doctor's lips in private conversation.
In all medical jurisprudence there are few problems which have deserved and received more concentrated attention than the protection of the personal information which a patient remits to his physician. This relationship Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law, 113 (1956). To foster the best interest of the patient and to insure a climate most favorable to a complete recovery, men of medicine have urged that patients be totally frank in their discussions with their physicians. To encourage the desired candor, men of law have formulated a strong policy of confidentiality to assure patients that only they themselves may unlock the doctor's silence in regard to those private disclosures. The result which these joint efforts of the two professions have produced, and which we recognized in our earlier opinion, has been urged or forecast in una voce by commentators in the field of medical jurisprudence. Stetler & Moritz, Doctor and Patient and the Law, 269-273 (1962); Regan, supra; Shartel & Plant, Law of Medical Practice, 48-50, 162, 178-180 (1959); DeWitt, Physician in the Courtroom, Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances, p. 33 (1954); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served Or Obstructed By Closing the Doctor's Mouth On the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale Law Journal, 606, 616 (1943). To these commentators, the Court's earlier ruling comes as no surprise.
The defendant generously concedes that the Hippocratic Oath embodies some restriction on a doctor's right to discuss the condition of, and communications from, his patient. The Oath of Hippocrates, in so far as here pertinent, provides:
"Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which ought not to be spoken abroad I will not divulge as recommending that all such should be kept secret."
We agree with the defendant that there are some situations3 where divulgence will inure to the benefit of the public at large or even to the patient himself, but we have no such situation before us. The plaintiff here was engaged in litigation for an injury (which Dr. Ling was treating) allegedly sustained at the negligent hand of the Euclid-Glenville Hospital, which was represented by an attorney for whom the defendant here allegedly secured confidential information from Dr. Ling. In this adversary judicial system, with its intensity heightened by the continuing friction between insurance companies and claimants, is there no impropriety in a doctor discussing the case of his patient-plaintiff with the lawyer for the defending insurance company? Who would dare say so?
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