Hammonds v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC
| Decision Date | 28 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:10-cv-103-TFM |
| Parties | KATHERINE ELIZABETH HAMMONDS Plaintiff, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This action is assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and order entry of judgment by consent of all the parties (Docs. 9-10, filed March 25, 2010) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (Doc. 16, filed November 15, 2010). Upon consideration of the motion, the Court finds it is due to be GRANTED.
The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both.
The underlying facts of this case are necessarily viewed in favor of the nonmovant plaintiff. Plaintiff Katherine Elizabeth Hammonds ("Hammonds" or "Plaintiff") is a former employee of Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC ("Hyundai" or "Defendant"). She started working for Hyundai as a Process Engineer in the Paint Shop in August 2007. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Doc. 26 at p. 2.1 In March 2008, Hammonds made an internal complaint regarding allegations of sexual harassment by a co-worker on at least 2 separate occasions - one in November 2007 and another in March 2008. Id. at p. 3-4. Hyundai initiated an investigation in which Hammonds participated by meeting with the investigator and providing statements. Id. at p. 4. Shortly after the investigation, the alleged harrasser left Hyundai's employment. Id.
On July 8, 2008,2 Hammonds turned in her resignation and two week notice because she planned to move to Texas to be with her fiance. See Doc. 18 at p. 6; Doc. 26 at p. 6. Her final day would be July 22, 2008. Id. On July 21, 2008, Hammonds officially told Hyundaithat she wanted to rescind her resignation letter and remain in her position with the company. See Doc. 18 at p. 6; Doc. 26 at p. 7. Hyundai ultimately chose not to allow Hammonds to rescind the resignation and her exit interview occurred on July 22, 2008. See Doc. 26 at p. 11.
Subsequently, Hammonds began work with MPW, a Hyundai contractor, in October 2008. Id. at p. 13. She would work at the Hyundai facility as a contract employee. Id.; Doc. 18 at p. 7. On October 7, 2008, Hammonds went to Hyundai to begin her work as a MPW contractor, but was ultimately told that she could not be issued a security badge. Id. After informing MPW of the security badge problem, she was told she could not work for them because she could not work at the Hyundai facility as a contractor. See Doc. 26 at p. 15.
Hammonds initiated her suit on February 8, 2010 when she filed her complaint against Hyundai. See Doc. 1. She asserted claims for sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I), retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count II), and intentional interference with business relations in violation of Alabama state law (Count III). Id. Within each count, Plaintiff asserted multiple basis for her claims. Id. Hyundai timely filed its answer. See Doc. 4.
O n November 15, 2010, Hyundai filed its motion for summary judgment along with its brief in support and evidentiary attachments. See Docs. 16-18. After receiving an extension of time, Plaintiff filed her response in opposition and evidentiary support on January 28, 2011. See Docs. 26-27. Hyundai filed a reply brief on February 4, 2011. SeeDoc. 28. Thus, the motion for summary judgment is fully briefed and ripe for review.
A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2011). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Ritchey v. S. Nuclear Operating Co., Inc., 2011 WL 1490358 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion quoting Anderson). At the summary judgment juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Only disputes about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id.
The movant bears the initial burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. A party must support its assertion that there is no genuine issue of material fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern admissibility of evidence at trial. Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Moore, 637 F.3d at 1232, 2011 WL 1316172 at *7 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). The court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Rosario v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs, Inc., 506 F.3d 1039, 1043 (11th Cir. 2007)); Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (). However, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Lejaun v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). In short, summary judgment is proper after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
At the outset, "Plaintiff concedes her Title VII sex discrimination claims as to being subjected to unwarranted discipline and stricter scrutiny and as to not being allowed to return on site at [the Hyundai facility]." See Doc. 26 at p. 1, n. 1. As such, summary judgment is granted as to those claims. The four claims remaining for the Court's review are the TitleVII Sexual Discrimination claim for termination,4 Title VII Retaliation claim for termination,5 Title VII Retaliation claim for non-admittance to the Hyundai facility,6 and the state law claim for intentional interference with business relations.7
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "A plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or statistical proof." Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Hammonds presents no statistical evidence nor does she argue that there is direct evidence of discrimination. Direct evidence of discrimination is "evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or presumption." Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004)). Thus, "only the most blatant remarks, whose intent couldmean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimination." Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (quoting Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086). Therefore, Hammonds must prove her discrimination claim by relying on circumstantial evidence.
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