Hammoud v. Rubio

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
• Writing for the Court: Toby Crouse, United States District Judge
• Docket Number: 24-cv-01139-TC
• Decision Date: 30 December 2025
• Citation: Hammoud v. Rubio, 24-cv-01139-TC (D. Kan. Dec 30, 2025)
• Parties: ROULA HAMMOUD, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. MARCO RUBIO,[1] Defendant

1

ROULA HAMMOUD, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. MARCO RUBIO,^[1] Defendant

No. 24-cv-01139-TC

United States District Court, D. Kansas

December 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Toby Crouse, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Roula Hammoud and Taha Matteo sued the United States Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, asserting that consular officers in Lebanon have unreasonably delayed making a final decision on their children's visa applications for admission into the United States. Doc. 1. Rubio moved to dismiss. Doc. 10. For the following reasons, his motion is granted.

I

A

A party may move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). There are, generally speaking, two ways to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction, one being facial and the other being factual. Laufer v Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2022). A facial challenge accepts the facts in the complaint as true but argues they fail to state a basis for jurisdiction, while a factual attack contests the validity of jurisdictional facts. Id. Either way “[t]he objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction ... may be raised ... at any stage in the litigation.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3)). An objection to a plaintiff's standing is an objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 868 (10th Cir. 2020). Jurisdictional questions may be entwined with the merits of a case. If they are, then a court must convert a putative Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a motion for summary judgment. Kerr v. Polis, 20 F.4th 686, 700 (10th Cir. 2021).

B

Plaintiffs Roula Hammoud and Taha Matteo brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, seeking an order directing that a final decision be made on their children's visa applications. Doc. 1.^[2] The facts of their case are straightforward, but a description of the legal context governing the relevant visa-application process will help contextualize the parties' dispute.

1. The Immigration and Nationality Act typically requires that a noncitizen seeking admission to the United States obtain a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a); Dep'tof State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 903 (2024). Visa decisions are left to the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702-03 (2018). In particular, “Congress sets the terms for entry, and the Department of State implements those requirements at United States Embassies and consulates in foreign countries.” Munoz, 602 U.S. at 903.

Congress created a special application process for immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seeking admission to the country. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 89 (2015). This process first requires the citizen-relative to file a petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services asking to classify the noncitizen who is seeking admission as an immediate relative. Munoz, 602 U.S. at 904. Immediate relatives include citizens' parents, spouses, and unmarried children under the age of 21. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 46 (2014). A noncitizen whose petition is approved may then apply for a visa. Munoz, 602 U.S. at 904. The visa- application process entails submitting written materials and participating in an interview with a consular officer abroad. Id.

After the interview, the consular officer decides whether to issue or refuse the noncitizen's visa application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). A consular officer may not issue a visa to an applicant who does not meet the eligibility requirements set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act and its corresponding regulations. Kerry, 576 U.S. at 89; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) & (g); 22 C.F.R. § 41.121. For example, consular officers must refuse visa applications if the applicant has been convicted of certain crimes, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), or if the applicant has engaged in terrorist activity, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). See also Kerry, 576 U.S. at 89; Munoz, 602 U.S. at 905.

Sometimes consular officers must refuse visa applications for less evident reasons. Relevant here is when a consular officer refuses a visa application because further administrative processing is required to ensure that the applicant is eligible for admission into the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g); see, e.g., Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178, 2024 WL 3517852, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (“After a consular officer makes an official decision refusing to issue a visa because the applicant has not carried her burden of showing eligibility, the official may then conclude that the applicant could perhaps still receive a visa eventually if circumstances change.”). The Foreign Affairs Manual, which provides guidance to consular officers making visa decisions, notes that an officer who has refused a visa application for further administrative processing may re-open and re-adjudicate the application, overcoming the initial refusal. 9 FAM 306.2-2(A)(a)(2)(a).

2. That legal background sets the stage for the visa-application process that applied to the plaintiffs' children in this case. In 2016, the plaintiffs-Roula Hammoud and Taha Matteo-got married in Lebanon. Doc. 1 at ¶ 11. At the time, Hammoud had two biological children, I.B. and L.B., who became Matteo's stepchildren. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 10. Matteo is a U.S. citizen, id. at ¶ 1, and in 2023, Hammoud became a citizen too, id. at ¶ 11. The married couple lives in Wichita, Kansas, along with a child that the pair had together. Id. at ¶ 26. The other two children, however, reside in Lebanon. Id. at ¶ 2. Their visa applications are the crux of this lawsuit.

In November 2020, Matteo started the process of obtaining visas for I.B. and L.B., who were fourteen and ten-years old, respectively. Doc. 1 at ¶ 12. Matteo first petitioned to classify I.B. and L.B. as his immediate-relative stepchildren. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b). The National Visa Center, which is part of the Department of State, approved Matteo's petitions and assigned case numbers for I.B. and L.B.'s visa applications. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 15-17. The National Visa Center further determined that I.B. and L.B. had submitted the necessary documentation to qualify for a visa, so it scheduled an interview for the children, which took place in Lebanon in May 2023. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 18-20. According to the plaintiffs, the children's visa applications have been in “ongoing ‘administrative processing'” since then. Id. at ¶ 27. The parties agree that the consular officers made the decision not to issue visas to I.B. and L.B. pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). Doc. 10 at 4; Doc. 12 at 2. That provision precludes officers from issuing a visa to an individual when, after the interview, there are still questions regarding the applicant's eligibility to enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1). And the parties agree that the consular officers' decision that further administrative processing was warranted is characterized as a “refusal” of I.B. and L.B.'s visa applications, even though they dispute the legal significance of that characterization. Doc. 12 at 2; Doc. 13 at 1.

Matteo and Hammoud have sought answers from the consular office in Lebanon regarding the status of I.B. and L.B.'s visa applications. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23. They allege that their “attempts to resolve this matter have been either ignored or met with dismissive boilerplate responses.” Id. And the plaintiffs further state that the processing delay has left them “in absolute despair.” Id. at ¶ 28. Specifically, Hammoud has sought medical treatment due to the “tremendous stress and anguish” that she has experienced while separated from her children. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 27.

Based on the processing delay, Matteo and Hammoud sued the Secretary of State of the United States, who is currently Marco Rubio. Doc. 1. The plaintiffs assert two causes of action. One is a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, and the other is a request for a writ of mandamus. Id. at 7-8. Under both claims, Matteo and Hammoud request an order requiring Rubio “to issue a final decision on the visa applications of [I.B. and L.B.].” Id. at ¶ 54. Rubio moved to dismiss. Doc. 10. In particular, Rubio asserts that the plaintiffs lack standing because they have not alleged an injury that a judgment in their favor could meaningfully redress. Id. at 6. And, even if Matteo and Hammoud had standing, Rubio contends that the delay they describe was not unreasonable. Id. at 9-13.

II

Matteo and Hammoud have not established that a judgment granting the relief they seek could meaningfully redress their injury-the alleged delay in resolving their children's visa applications. As a result, they do not have standing to pursue their claims.

A

“Article III confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “For there to be a case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have . . . standing.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. “Regardless of the stage of litigation at which [federal courts evaluate] standing, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had a sufficient stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Rio Grande Found v. Oliver, 57 F.4th 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2023). Plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” WildEarth Guardians v Pub/Serv. Co. of Colo., 690 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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