Hampton v. Butts

• Decision Date: 24 January 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:12-cv-350-TWP-DKL
• Parties: KEVIN HAMPTON, Petitioner, v. KEITH BUTTS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

KEVIN HAMPTON, Petitioner,

v.KEITH BUTTS, Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-350-TWP-DKL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

Dated: January 24, 2013

ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Kevin Hampton ("Mr. Hampton") for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

Mr. Hampton seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

II. PARTIES

Mr. Hampton is an inmate confined at a state prison in Indiana. The respondent, Keith Butts, is Mr. Hampton's custodian, sued in his official capacity as a representative of the State of Indiana.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Hampton was convicted in 2006 in Vigo County, Indiana of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in Hampton v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (Hampton I). The trial court's denial of Mr. Hampton's petition for post-conviction relief was affirmed on appeal in Hampton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (Hampton II). The Indiana Supreme Court granted Mr. Hampton's requestfor transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the Indiana Court of Appeals' opinion affirming the trial court's denial of the petition for post-conviction relief, but affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment denying Mr. Hampton's petition for post-conviction relief. Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. 2012) (Hampton III). This action followed.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIM

The evidence relating to Mr. Hampton's offenses as set forth at direct appeal is as follows:

On May 18, 2000, D.L. invited some friends to her home in Terre Haute to play cards, listen to music, and drink beer. At some point during the evening, D.L. and a friend—Courtney Smith—walked next door and obtained some marijuana from a neighbor. Hampton was at the residence at the time. Thereafter, D.L. and Smith visited some other friends at various locations in Terre Haute.

D.L. returned home the following morning, and one of her friends, Justin Morrison, telephoned D.L. around 2:30 a.m. to find out whether she had returned safely. At some point during the conversation, D.L. told Morrison that she heard a knock on her door and that she would talk to him later.

At approximately 11:30 a.m., Smith and Ashley Potter went over to D.L.'s residence. When Smith walked into D.L.'s bedroom, she noticed that D.L. was "sprawled out on the bed [and] naked from the waist down." They decided not to awaken D.L., so they left the house. However, Smith and Potter returned to D.L.'s house later that afternoon. Smith decided to take a shower and she observed some broken glass in the bathroom sink. After showering, Smith walked into D.L.'s bedroom and tried to awaken her. Smith noticed that a blow dryer "was in [D.L.'s] vaginal area." D.L.'s head was lying off the bed, and Smith decided to pull a comforter over D.L. However, she noticed that D.L.'s feet and legs were discolored. She touched one of D.L.'s arms and observed that it was cold. Smith then determined that D.L. was dead. Smith walked around to the other side of the bed and noticed that D.L.'s jeans had been tied around her neck. Smith also observed that a telephone headset was lying halfway beneath D.L.'s body. The phone cord was not connected, and one end of the cord had been ripped out of the wall. Smith also noticed that D.L. was still wearing the shirt she had worn the previous evening. Smith then walked over to a neighbor's house and called the police.

When Dr. Roland Kohr performed an autopsy on D.L., he observed that a blow dryer had been inserted four to five inches into D.L.'s vagina. D.L.'s tongue was also protruding, a condition that is "commonly seen in association with ligature strangulations because of the upward pressure that's maintained on the neck, which causes the laryngeal and tongue-type structures to be pushed upward and outward." Dr. Kohr also observed that D.L.'s eyes were hemorrhaged, which suggested that D.L. may have been smothered before her jeans were wrapped around her neck. A rape kit was collected, and a vaginal swab taken from D.L. indicated the presence of semen. As a result, a DNA profile was developed and entered into the FBI's national index system.

Dr. Kohr concluded that the cause of D.L.'s death was ligature strangulation and was of the opinion that the sexual intercourse had occurred prior to D.L.'s death. Dr. Kohr also determined that the hairdryer was inserted shortly after D.L.'s death. On March 17, 2005, the FBI found that Mr. Hampton's DNA matched the profile that had been entered into the system.

On June 12, 2005, Hampton was charged with murder, felony murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct.

* * *

Hampton was found guilty as charged. At a sentencing hearing that was conducted on December 20, 2006, the trial court vacated the conviction for felony murder. Hampton was then sentenced to sixty-five years for murder, twenty years for rape, and twenty years for criminal deviate conduct. The trial court ordered the sentences for rape and criminal deviate conduct to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for murder. The trial court also ordered the aggregate sentence to run consecutively to a forty-year sentence that Hampton was already serving in an unrelated matter. In arriving at the sentence, the trial court identified Hampton's lengthy prior criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the crimes as aggravating factors.

Hampton I, at pp. 1076-78.

Mr. Hampton seeks habeas corpus relief based on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal that the trial court erroneously refused over defense objections a reasonable theory of innocence instruction.

V. APPLICABLE LAW

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is incustody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). The Court of Appeals has reviewed the standard to be applied here:

When a state court has ruled on the merits of a habeas claim, our review is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-84, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Under AEDPA, we may grant relief only if the state court's decision on the merits "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Plainly stated, these are demanding standards. This Court has recognized that federal courts should deny a habeas corpus petition so long as the state court took the constitutional standard "seriously and produce[d] an answer within the range of defensible positions." Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2000).

Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2012). "Under AEDPA, federal courts do not independently analyze the petitioner=s claims; federal courts are limited to reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims." Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010). "The habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable." Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).

A defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. For a petitioner to establish that "counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal" of a conviction or a sentence, he must make two showings: (1) deficient performance that (2) prejudiced his defense. Id., at 687.

With respect to the first prong, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In determining whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, the court's review of counsel's performance is highly deferential, and the petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Davis v. Lambert, 388 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir. 2004). With respect to the prejudice requirement, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The standard for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the same for both trial and appellate lawyers. Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435 (11th Cir. 1987). An appellate counsel's performance is deficient if he or she fails to argue an issue that is both obvious and clearly stronger than the issues raised. Lee v. Davis, 328 F.3d 896, 900-01 (7th Cir. 2003). To establish the Strickland prejudice prong, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that appellate counsel's failure to raise an issue would have resulted in the reversal of his conviction or an order for a new trial. Id., at 901 (for a claim to support relief, there must be a reasonable probability that the issue not raised would have...