Hampton v. Manson, 2888
| Decision Date | 24 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 2888,2888 |
| Citation | 5 Conn.App. 343,497 A.2d 1044 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John HAMPTON v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Correction. |
Richard T. Biggar, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Vito Mazza, Law Student Intern, for appellant (defendant).
Michael McKenna, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before HULL, SPALLONE and DALY, JJ.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The sole issue to be determined is whether the trial court erred in concluding that our criminal erasure statute, General Statutes § 54-142a, 1 prevents police officers from testifying at a hearing before the Connecticut board of parole concerning their personal observations of the conduct of a parolee if the parolee is later charged with a crime relating to some of that conduct and those charges are subsequently dismissed.
In 1978, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to several counts of larceny and robbery and was sentenced to serve from seven to fourteen years in prison. In July, 1982, he was released on parole subject to certain conditions, including his agreement not to possess any firearms or other weapons.
On December 16, 1982, the plaintiff was arrested in New Haven in connection with an attempted robbery and weapons were found in a car identified as belonging to him. The charges against the plaintiff, which were lodged as a result of his alleged participation in the attempted robbery, were subsequently dismissed because of an illegal search and seizure. In July, 1983, the plaintiff's parole was revoked after a hearing in which two police officers testified from their own personal knowledge and memory concerning the weapons found in the car.
The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the trial court on the ground that under the erasure statutes, the police officers' testimony was inadmissible. Upon the granting of certification by the trial court, the state has appealed.
In order to sustain the action of the trial court, we must either agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the term "record" as used in the erasure statutes encompasses the personal knowledge of police officers as to the suppressed evidence or we must apply the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings. We decline to do either.
The federal courts have given us guidance as to the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings. In United States ex rel. Carrasquillo v. Thomas, 677 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.1982), the second circuit stated in a per curiam opinion that "criminal charges contained in an indictment dismissed with prejudice can form the basis for a subsequent revocation of parole." In United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.1970), the second circuit dealt with a factual situation very similar to that before us and sustained the use of evidence concerning an illegally seized gun in parole revocation proceedings. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, supra, 1163-64. We are firmly in accord with the position expressed by the second circuit and we hold that the exclusionary rule regarding the inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence has no application to parole revocation hearings.
We also hold that the word "record" as used in the criminal erasure statutes does not include the personal and independent observations of the police officers. W...
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Reid v. Commissioner of Correction
...violated the terms of his or her release and, if so, whether a revocation of parole is appropriate. See generally Hampton v. Manson, 5 Conn.App. 343, 497 A.2d 1044 (1985). 8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board stated: "This panel has found reason to revoke your parole effective [as......
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State v. Herring, 13271
...v. Morowitz, 200 Conn. 440, 447-52, 512 A.2d 175 (1986); State v. Gaston, supra, 198 Conn. at 441, 503 A.2d 594; Hampton v. Manson, 5 Conn.App. 343, 346, 497 A.2d 1044 (1985); State v. Anonymous (1980-2), 36 Conn.Sup. 91, 92, 412 A.2d 708 Consequently, the nolled charges, particularly in a ......
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Payne v. Robinson
...States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.1970), has been cited favorably in this court. See Hampton v. Manson, 5 Conn.App. 343, 345-46, 497 A.2d 1044 (1985).2 This case is similar to United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.1975), in which the Ninth Circuit held t......
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State ex rel. Thurman v. Franklin
...of or resort to "closed records" to refresh his recollection or recall the event, would not be incompetent. See Hampton v. Manson, 5 Conn.App. 343, 497 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1985). Although the records of Bradley's arrests are closed by statute, the statute does not close the memories of persons......