Hampton v. Page

• Decision Date: 06 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1571,96-1571
• Citation: Hampton v. Page, 103 F.3d 1338 (7th Cir. 1997)
• Parties: Lloyd Wayne HAMPTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas PAGE, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1338

103 F.3d 1338

Lloyd Wayne HAMPTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas PAGE, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 96-1571.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 22, 1996.

Decided Jan. 6, 1997.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied March 6, 1997.

Michael B. Metnick, Charles Schiedel (argued), Thomas W. Patton, Metnick, Wise, Cherry & Frazier, Springfield, IL, for petitioner-appellant.

Steven J. Zick (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Criminal Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for respondent-appellee.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Lloyd Wayne Hampton pled guilty to three counts of first degree murder in 1990. He waived his right to a jury at the sentencing hearing and, under the two-phase procedure of Illinois' death penalty statute, the judge first found that Hampton was eligible for the death penalty and next that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6) and (c)). A death sentence was imposed.

The three counts of murder to which Hampton pled guilty arose out of the death by asphyxiation of 69-year-old Roy (Jasper) Pendleton in the motel room in which he lived in Troy, Illinois. In a confession, Hampton said he encountered Pendleton at the motel--either in a hallway or the parking lot--and asked him for a ride to St. Louis, offering to pay for the gas if Pendleton obliged. Pendleton said no. He drove off alone but returned to the motel 10 minutes later and went into his room. A few minutes later Hampton knocked on Pendleton's door and asked if he could use his bathroom. ¹ Pendleton, unfortunately, let him in.

Once inside, Hampton told the elderly Pendleton he was "very foolish" to allow him into the room. Pendleton must have soon realized just how foolish he was, for Hampton ordered him to lie down on his bed. Hampton then began going through Pendleton's belongings. He decided to steal a suitcase and a microwave oven. Hampton tied Pendleton's wrists and ankles and put tape over his mouth. Afraid he would get loose, Hampton also put tape over Pendleton's nose; then Hampton placed his hand over Pendleton's nose and mouth in an effort to suffocate him.

Under the impression that a dead body does not bleed (Hampton had done time in a Texas penitentiary, and the record suggests he picked up this tidbit of information while a guest of the Lone Star state), Hampton cut Pendleton's forehead in several places to see if he was dead. The wound bled, so Hampton placed his hand over Pendleton's mouth and nose for a few minutes longer. To check again to see whether Pendleton was dead, Hampton stabbed him in the throat. This time the wound did not bleed. The butcher knife was stuck in Pendleton's throat when the body was found.

After the murder, Hampton loaded the suitcase and the microwave oven into Pendleton's 1978 Pontiac and drove to Bugg's Lounge, a bar in nearby Livingston, Illinois, where he tried to cash a $500 check payable to Pendleton. He was not able to cash the check, but he did buy a round of beer for the customers in the bar. He then got back into the car and drove to a Texaco truck stop in Troy, where he was arrested on an unrelated charge. The arresting officers recognized the Pontiac as belonging to Pendleton. Hampton also had a $500 check made out to Pendleton and keys to two safe deposit boxes registered to Pendleton at the Troy Security Bank. After the officers confirmed the ownership to the car, one of them went to the motel and discovered Pendleton's body in the ransacked room.

Meanwhile, Hampton was questioned by Troy police officers. He admitted killing Pendleton and gave a videotaped statement detailing his commission of the crime. During the subsequent investigation, Hampton's fingerprints were lifted from the scene, saliva samples consistent with his were taken from cigarette butts found at the scene, and a spot of blood found on Hampton's pants was consistent with Pendleton's and inconsistent with Hampton's.

Hampton pled guilty to: intentional murder; murder in the course of a forcible felony, i.e., burglary; and murder in the course of a second forcible felony, armed robbery. He waived a jury trial at his capital sentencing hearing and was ultimately sentenced to death. At the hearing, Hampton said,

I would say that should I be sentenced to death I am aware of the Supreme Court ruling in April concerning appeals filed in behalf of a condemned man, if he doesn't want those appeals and I would like to state for the record, although it has been pointed out to me that I have State appeals I have to go through, once those are over, I don't wish to have my case appealed by anyone.

Nevertheless, under the automatic review procedure of the statute, § 9-1(I), an appeal was filed on his behalf to the Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the death sentence in 1992. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill.2d 71, 171 Ill.Dec. 439, 594 N.E.2d 291 (1992); reh'g denied, June 25, 1992. He then filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to set aside his guilty plea and sentence. The denial of that request was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1995. People v. Hampton, 165 Ill.2d 472, 209 Ill.Dec. 189, 651 N.E.2d 117 (1995); reh'g denied May 30, 1995.

His federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 followed. Judge Paul E. Riley of the Southern District of Illinois denied the petition and Hampton appeals, raising what boils down to one issue: Did the Illinois Supreme Court find error in the trial court's reliance on an invalid aggravating factor but then affirm the death sentence without reweighing the aggravating and mitigating factors or conducting federal constitutional harmless error analysis?

The alleged invalid aggravating factor is that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary. Because the motel room was Pendleton's residence, the charge should have been that the murder was committed during a "residential burglary." In 1990, Illinois' death penalty statute listed "burglary" as a factor making one eligible for the death penalty, but omitted "residential burglary," an omission since corrected. The resolution of this issue involves our role in evaluating a petition under § 2254 the scheme set out in the Illinois death penalty statutes, and the interpretation of that scheme consistent with guidance from the United States Supreme Court.

Our role in evaluating petitions pursuant to § 2254 has recently changed. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, among other things amends § 2254(d) to specify the appropriate treatment of legal determinations made by a state court:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Because we have found that federal habeas petitioners do not have legitimate expectations about the scope of collateral review and that the amendment does not regulate primary conduct--i.e., it does not change the rules defining or penalizing crime itself--it is applicable to a petition such as Hampton's. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.1996). We therefore look to the decision of the state court to see whether it is contrary to clearly established federal law "as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or whether it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

The Illinois death penalty statute provides for a two-phase sentencing determination. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1. The first phase is the eligibility phase. During this phase, the finder of fact, in this case the judge, determines whether a person is one whom the state may put to death. To be eligible for the death penalty, a person must have committed first degree murder and have been at least 18 years old at the time of the crime. Hampton was 36 years old when he killed Pendleton, and the crime was, in fact, first degree murder. In addition to these elements, one of eight statutory aggravating factors must exist. The aggravating factor at issue in this case is § 9-1(b)(6), which in pertinent part provides for eligibility if the victim was killed in the course of another felony from among those specifically listed, which include armed robbery and burglary, but not, in 1990, residential burglary.

If a person is found to be eligible for the death penalty, the proceeding enters the second phase. At this phase the trier of fact must consider factors in aggravation and mitigation. The statute lists examples of mitigating factors and provides that aggravating factors "may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b)"--that is, factors establishing eligibility in the first phase of the proceeding.

Hampton argues that because the judge characterized burglary as an aggravating factor--when in fact he was not guilty of burglary, but rather of residential burglary--he was sentenced on the basis of an invalid aggravating factor. He then argues that Illinois is what is known in death penalty parlance as a "weighing state," one in which aggravating factors are weighed against mitigating factors. If this is true, he argues, then the scales were improperly balanced against him by the judge's reliance on an invalid aggravating factor. The respondent argues that it has never been decided that...