Hampton v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 27 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. CV-14-02504-PHX-ROS,CV-14-02504-PHX-ROS
• Citation: Hampton v. Ryan, No. CV-14-02504-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Feb 27, 2019)
• Parties: Tracy Allen Hampton, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Tracy Allen Hampton, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents.

No. CV-14-02504-PHX-ROS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

February 27, 2019

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Tracy Allen Hampton's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 40.)¹ Respondents filed a response and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs. 51, 68.) Petitioner also filed a motion for evidentiary development (Doc. 73), which has been fully briefed (Docs. 76, 77). The Court rules as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2002, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of manslaughter and sentenced him to death. The following factual summary is taken from the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court affirming the convictions and death sentence, State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006), and a review of the state court record.

On May 16, 2001, Department of Public Safety officers attempted to serve a traffic ticket on Tracy Allen Hampton. The officers went to a house on East Roberts Road in Phoenix, where Hampton had been staying with Charles Findley and Tanya Ramsdell. Ramsdell was approximately five months pregnant at the time. When the officers arrived, Hampton was not there, but Findley showed the officers a photograph of Hampton, and the officers left.

Early the next day, Misty Ross and Shaun Geeslin went to the house on East Roberts Road. Hampton let them in, and Hampton, Findley, Ross, Geeslin and several others smoked methamphetamine throughout the morning. Sometime after 10:30 a.m., Hampton and Geeslin left. The two returned near noon and entered a back room where Findley was kneeling on the floor working on a lighter. Hampton walked over to Findley and called out his name. As Findley looked up, Hampton shot him in the forehead, killing him. Geeslin and Ross then walked to the front door.

Hampton began following Geeslin and Ross, but stopped and said something like, "Wait, we have one more." He then went to a bedroom where Ramsdell was sleeping and opened the door. Ramsdell told Hampton to get out, and Hampton shot her in the head. Ramsdell and her unborn child died as a result.

Hampton was arrested on May 31, 2001. While awaiting trial in the Maricopa County jail in August 2001, Hampton shared a cell with George Ridley. Ridley testified at trial that Hampton admitted to committing the murders and told him the story of the murders every night for two weeks. Hampton told Ridley that he killed Findley because "he was a rat" and he killed Ramsdell because Hampton was affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood and thought that Ramsdell was pregnant with a Black man's child. Ridley also testified that before leaving the house, Hampton knelt down next to Findley's body and whispered in his ear, "I want to let you know I took care of your nigger loving old lady and her little coon baby, too. Don't worry, they didn't feel a thing."

The jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts. It then found that Petitioner was eligible for the death penalty for both counts of murder and concluded that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The trial court accordingly imposed death sentences for the two murder convictions. It also imposed an aggravated term of twelve and one-half years for manslaughter, to run consecutively to the death sentences. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the convictions on direct appeal.

On August 18, 2011, Hampton filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). He raised six claims:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of trial;

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of trial;

3. Newly-discovered evidence;

4. That the Arizona Supreme Court improperly applied Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004);

5. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and

6. The ex post facto application of A.R.S. §31-230(C) to the imposed restitution.

(See Doc. 51-3 at 158.)

The Court summarily dismissed claims 3 through 6. It concluded that claims 3, 5 and 6 were not colorable, and that claim 4 was procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a). (Id.)

The Court then held a five-day evidentiary hearing on claims 1 and 2. (See id. at 176). Petitioner argued that his trial counsel were ineffective at the guilt phase by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, to call various witnesses and to present evidence in support of a third-party defense. He further argued that they were ineffective at the sentencing phase by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and failing to call mental health experts to present mitigation evidence. The PCR court denied these claims. (Id. at 194.) The Arizona Supreme Court then summarily denied review. (Doc. 54-8 at 138.)

Hampton filed his petition for habeas relief in this Court on October 5, 2015 (Doc. 21), and an amended petition on January 29, 2016 (Doc. 40).

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Federal habeas claims are analyzed under the framework of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The AEDPA defines the substantive and procedural limits on the claims a capital habeas petitioner may bring, and the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases define the types of evidentiary development a petitioner may seek if his claims otherwise meet the requirements of the AEDPA.

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). Under § 2254(d)(1), "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court's factual determination is presumed correct and a petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Satisfying § 2254(d)(2) is a "daunting" burden, "one that will be satisfied in relatively few cases." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro (Robert Murray), 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 2014). A state court's "factual determination is not unreasonable merely because [a] federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Instead, a federal habeas court "must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

The AEDPA requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has properly exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" his claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). Petitioners meet this requirement by describing the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which a habeas claim is based so that state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon the claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).

A claim may also be "technically" exhausted if the petitioner has lost the opportunity to raise his claim on "independent and adequate" state law grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 ("A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him."). Such "technically" exhausted claims, however, are considered procedurally defaulted and are not subject to habeas relief. See id. at 731-32; Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007).

In Arizona, there are two avenues for petitioners to present and exhaust federal constitutional claims in state court: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner is procedurally barred from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). If an Arizona court concludes that a claim was waived under this rule, that independent and adequate procedural ground precludes federal habeas relief. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014).

Procedural default, however, is not an insurmountable bar to relief. A petitioner may raise a defaulted claim if the petitioner "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Generally, "cause" for a procedural default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); accord Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. "Prejudice" is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional error or violation. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). To establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, a petitioner bears...