Hampton v. State

Citation39 So. 421,50 Fla. 55
PartiesHAMPTON et al. v. STATE.
Decision Date27 July 1905
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Error to Criminal Court of Record, Hillsborough County; Horace C Gordan, Judge.

Hiram J. Hampton and another were convicted of manslaughter, and bring error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where the death of a person results from the criminal negligence of a medical practitioner in the treatment of the case, the latter is guilty of manslaughter. This criminal liability is not dependent on whether or not the party undertaking the treatment of the case is a duly licensed practitioner, or merely assumes to act as such, acted with good intent in administering the treatment, and did so with the expectation that the result would prove beneficial. The real question upon which the criminal liability depends in such cases is whether there was criminal negligence. Such criminal negligence is largely a matter of degree, incapable of precise definition, and whether or not it exists to such a degree as to involve criminal liability is to be determined by the jury. Such criminal negligence exists where the physician or surgeon, or person assuming to act as such exhibits gross lack of competency, or gross inattention, or criminal indifference to the patient's safety; and this may arise from his gross ignorance of the science of medicine or surgery and of the effect of the remedies employed through his gross negligence in the application and selection of remedies and his lack of proper skill in the use of instruments, or through his failure to give proper instructions to the patient or his attendants as to the use of the medicines. But where the person treating the case does nothing that a skillful person might not do, and death results merely from an error of judgment on his part, or an inadvertent mistake, he is not criminally liable.

The criminal liability of a physician for the death of his patient, brought about by his gross negligence, carelessness or ignorance, may be established upon an indictment or information predicated upon the general statute defining manslaughter. Rev. St. Fla. 1892, s 2384.

Section 2392, Rev. St. 1892, providing as follows: 'If any physician, while in a state of intoxication, shall without a design to effect death administer any poison, drug or medicine, or do any other act to another person which shall produce the death of such other, he shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter'--does not furnish the only exclusive case where a physician can be held criminally liable for the unintended death of his patient brought about by his gross negligence or ignorance. Nor does said section 2392 render the provisions of the general manslaughter statute (section 2384, Rev. St. 1892) inapplicable to cases of death unintentionally produced by physicians through gross negligence or ignorance, where there is no question of the sobriety or intoxication of such physician; but the provisions of said section 2392 were intended as an addendum to the provisions of the general manslaughter statute, in cases of unintentional death at the hands of physicians, to provide for cases that might not be covered by the general statute.

Where a defect in form, and not of substance, exists in an information or indictment, and no assault is made thereon because thereof, and the defendant, without noticing such defect, pleads to the merits and goes to trial, he thereby waives such defect, and cannot avail himself of it for the first time in an appellate court.

Questions tending to disclose the animus or bias of a witness are proper on cross-examination, and should be allowed.

Medical experts may be allowed to express their opinions as to the time when wounds were inflicted upon a subject living at the time of such wounds.

Where an information charges a physician with negligently pulling out the 'intestines' of a patient, whereby her death was produced, it is competent at the trial to prove under such charge that the larger omentum, the mesentery, or any other organ having its place in the abdominal cavity, was pulled out or removed. The word 'intestines,' when used in an information or indictment, must be given its broadest popular and most comprehensive sense, as denoting everything on the inside, within, internal, inward as opposed to external, and, when applied to the human anatomy, includes the bowels, entrails, viscera, enteron, with all of their annexes and appendages; indeed, everything contained in the abdominal cavity.

Because a cross-examination shakes the credibility, or demonstrates the inaccuracy and unreliability, of the evidence deposed by a witness on his direct examination, this furnishes no reason for striking out such evidence in toto; but, if it is otherwise proper evidence, it, with its exposé by the cross-examination, remains for consideration by the jury at its worth.

A party has no right to cross-examine a witness, except as to facts and circumstances connected with matters testified about on his direct examination. If he desires to inquire into other matters, he must make the witness his own.

The trial judge should not, in his charge to the jury or otherwise, so pointedly aim at the credibility of the defendant as a witness for himself as to impress the jury with the idea that the judge, because of the defendant's interest in the case, questioned his credibility.

The following charge: 'If you have a simple doubt, you are not to acquit, but it must become a reasonable doubt; that is, conformable to reason, which would satisfy a reasonable man, under all the facts and circumstances as testified to in this case'--is misleading, confusing, and erroneous, and should never be given.

COUNSEL

Macfarlane & Glen, for plaintiffs in error.

W. H. Ellis, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

TAYLOR, J.

Hiram J. Hampton, the plaintiff in error, together with one Charles S. Stafford, were jointly informed against in the criminal court of record of Hillsborough county for the crime of manslaughter, alleged to have been committed on May 2d, 1904, in said county. On the joint trial Charles S. Stafford was acquitted, but Hampton was convicted of the crime charged, and from the sentence imposed seeks relief here by writ of error. The information upon which the trial was had is as follows:

'In the Name and by the Authority of the State of Florida.

'In the criminal court of record for the county of Hillsborough, state of Florida, at the adjourned May term, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, to wit:

'Be it remembered, that Frank M. Simonton, solicitor for the county of Hillsborough, prosecuting for the state of Florida, being present in said court on the eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, gives the court to be informed and understood that:
'On the second day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, at and in the county of Hillsborough aforesaid, one Luvenia Evans was then and there suffering from some disease and sickness, a further and more particular description of said disease and sickness being to the solicitor unknown, and that one Hiram J. Hampton and one Charles S. Stafford, late of the county of Hillsborough aforesaid, as physicians and surgeons then and there took and had the charge and care of the said Luvenia Evans, and that the said Hiram J. Hampton, late of the county of Hillsborough aforesaid, in the state aforesaid, did then and there on the second day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, with force and arms at and in the county of Hillsborough aforesaid, unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, and by unskillful acts and procurement and culpable negligence, and the exercise of gross ignorance and lack of ordinary knowledge and skill in surgery, and with utter disregard for the health, safety, and life of the said Luvenia Evans in the performance of a certain surgical operation upon her, the said Luvenia Evans, upon the second day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, at and in the county aforesaid and state aforesaid and in the manner aforesaid, did then and there insert, thrust, and strike a certain instrument, a further description of which is to the solicitor unknown, which said instrument he, the said Hiram J. Hampton, had and held in his hands, up and into the womb, abdomen, and body of the said Luvenia Evans, and did then and there in an unskillful, culpable, felonious, and negligent manner aforesaid plunge and force an entrance through the womb of the said Luvenia Evans into the abdomen of the said Luvenia Evans, then and there in the manner aforesaid producing a large rent in and through the womb of the said Luvenia Evans and membranes in the regions of the womb of the said Luvenia Evans, and did then and there in the manner aforesaid pull out the intestines of the said Luvenia Evans, and did thereby then and there unlawfully, feloniously, by his acts, procurement, and culpable negligence, inflict upon the said Luvenia Evans in and about her womb, abdomen, and other internal parts certain mortal bruises, wounds, and lacerations, and created in the said Luvenia Evans a mortal sickness and feebleness of body, of which mortal bruises, lacerations, sickness, and feebleness of body she, the said Luvenia Evans, on and from the said second day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, in the county aforesaid and state aforesaid, did languish, and languishing did live, until the third day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, on which said third day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, in the county aforesaid and state aforesaid, of the mortal
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34 cases
  • Keigans v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • August 3, 1906
    ...the defect cannot avail the plaintiff in error for want of a proper assignment. This difficulty did not actually exist in the Hampton Case (Fla.) 39 So. 421. There specific portion of the charge found objectionable formed a distinct 'ground' in the motion for a new trial, which was assigned......
  • State v. McMahan, 6385.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • January 16, 1937
    ...469, 39 Am.Rep. 187; State v. Hardister and Brown, 38 Ark. 605, 42 Am.Rep. 5; Feige v. State, 128 Ark. 465, 194 S.W. 865; Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421; State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 90 S.E. 781, L.R.A.1917C, 533; State v. Lancaster, 208 N.C. 349, 180 S.E. 577; Fitzgerald v.......
  • State v. McMahan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • January 16, 1937
    ...469, 39 Am.Rep. 187; State v. Hardister and Brown, 38 Ark. 605, 42 Am.Rep. 5; Feige v. State, 128 Ark. 465, 194 S.W. 865; Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421; State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 90 S.E. L.R.A.1917C, 533; State v. Lancaster, 208 N.C. 349, 180 S.E. 577; Fitzgerald v. Stat......
  • State v. McMahan, 6385.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • January 16, 1937
    ...469, 39 Am.Rep. 187; State v. Hardister and Brown, 38 Ark. 605, 42 Am.Rep. 5; Feige v. State, 128 Ark. 465, 194 S.W. 865; Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421; State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 90 S.E. 781, L.R.A.1917C, 533; State v. Lancaster, 208 N.C. 349, 180 S.E. 577; Fitzgerald v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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