Hampton v. State, S07A795.

Decision Date09 October 2007
Docket NumberNo. S07A795.,S07A795.
Citation651 S.E.2d 698,282 Ga. 490
PartiesHAMPTON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Brian Steel, Steel Law Firm, P.C., Atlanta, for Hampton.

Kermit Neal McManus, Dalton, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Robin Joy Leigh, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SEARS, Chief Justice.

In 2005, a Whitfield County jury convicted Jeffrey Allen Hampton of felony murder, aggravated assault, and related offenses arising out of the shooting death of Tara Nicole Swilley. Hampton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, the constitutional effectiveness of his initial post-trial counsel, and the jury instructions regarding the consideration of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence. Finding no merit in Hampton's arguments, we affirm.1

1. Hampton contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to sustain his convictions because his alibi evidence conclusively demonstrated that he was elsewhere at the time of the crimes. The jury evidently found Hampton's alibi defense less than persuasive, a determination amply supported by the evidence in the record. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we have no difficulty concluding that the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reject Hampton's alibi defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.2

2. Hampton contends his initial post-trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of post-trial counsel, Hampton must show that post-trial counsel's performance was professionally deficient and that but for post-trial counsel's unprofessional conduct, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of amended new trial motion would have been different.3

(a) Hampton claims post-trial counsel should have pursued an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on his failure to object when the trial court twice conducted interviews with individual jurors outside the defendant's presence. It is undisputed that Hampton's trial counsel was present at both juror interviews, as were the prosecutor and the court reporter, and that he did not object on the ground that his client's right to be present was being violated. Nevertheless, the State contends that trial counsel's performance was neither professionally deficient nor prejudicial because Hampton waived his right to be present at the two juror interviews. We agree.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a criminal defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against him is a fundamental right and a foundational aspect of due process of law.4 This Court's interpretation of the analogous provisions of the Georgia Constitution has always been in accord.5 However, the right to be present belongs to the defendant, and he is free to relinquish it if he so chooses.6 The right is waived if the defendant personally waives it in court; if counsel waives it at the defendant's express direction; if counsel waives it in open court while the defendant is present; or if counsel waives it and the defendant subsequently acquiesces in the waiver.7

The record shows clearly that Hampton personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present at the two juror interviews and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present. In addition, Hampton waived his right to be present through the representations of his trial counsel made in open court while he was present. Moreover, Hampton subsequently acquiesced in the waiver by counsel. In other words, Hampton utilized all four available methods for waiving his right to be present at the trial judge's discussions with the two jurors.

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient merely because he chose to abstain from raising meritless objections, and his failure to raise meritless objections was, by definition, non-prejudicial. Because trial counsel's performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial, the decision by post-trial counsel not to pursue a spurious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was eminently reasonable. Had he pursued the claim, there is no reasonable probability that it would have succeeded in winning Hampton a new trial. Accordingly, Hampton's claim that post-trial counsel's performance amounted to ineffective assistance on this basis is meritless.

(b) Hampton also criticizes post-trial counsel for allegedly failing to investigate his mental state during the trial. Hampton claims that two anti-depressants he was prescribed while in custody made him so sedated and confused that he was unable to assist in his own defense. Hampton notes that post-trial counsel knew that Hampton was suicidal at the time of his arrest. The State counters that the record shows that Hampton did, in fact, participate fully in his own defense and argues there is no evidence that Hampton's mental acuity was in any way impaired by the two anti-depressants outside of Hampton's own self-serving claims.

At the evidentiary hearing on the amended new trial motion, Hampton's original post-trial counsel testified she saw no indication in the trial transcript that Hampton was impaired, did not comprehend the proceedings, or was unable to assist in his own defense and that, to the contrary, it was clear to her that Hampton participated fully in his defense at trial. She also testified that Hampton never suggested that his mental state might be an issue. Other evidence confirmed post-trial counsel's account. For example, the officers in charge of transporting Hampton to and from trial offered testimony that he was alert, coherent, and conversant. Moreover, there was evidence that Hampton's trial counsel did not believe that Hampton was impaired at trial either.

In its order denying the amended new trial motion, the trial court specifically found that Hampton adequately understood the nature of the charges against him, comprehended his condition with respect to the proceedings, and was capable of aiding in his own defense. The trial court's finding is entitled to particular deference given that the trial judge who conducted the evidentiary hearing on the amended new trial motion was the same judge who presided over Hampton's trial. We will reverse a trial court's findings of fact in connection with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only where those findings are clearly erroneous.8 However, nothing in the record suggest that the trial court's findings in this regard were erroneous, much less clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Hampton has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice in connection with post-trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate his mental state at trial.

3. Hampton argues a new trial is warranted because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider prior consistent statements as substantive evidence only if they were made by someone other than the witness whose testimony they are designed to bolster. The State concedes that the...

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38 cases
  • Lawson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 19 Agosto 2022
    ... ... 12 Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490, 491-92 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) ; accord Robertson , 359 Ga. App. at 330 (2), 857 S.E.2d 485 ; see also ... ...
  • Fair v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 22 Noviembre 2010
    ... ... See also Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 492(2)(a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (stating how a defendant waives the right to be present). Judgment affirmed in part, ... ...
  • Kesterson v. Jarrett
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 18 Junio 2012
    ... ... because exclusion of a party from trial for this reason is such an exceptional event in this State. In this case, however, the trial court excluded Appellant Kyla Kesterson, a young child with ... See also Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 492, 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (holding that a criminal defendant has a ... ...
  • Burney v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 17 Octubre 2016
    ... ... 299 Ga. 820 However, "the right to be present belongs to the defendant, and he is free to relinquish it if he so chooses." Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490, 492, 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007). The right to be present is waived if the defendant personally waives it in court; if counsel ... ...
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