Hampton v. State
| Decision Date | 09 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 2741,2741 |
| Citation | 569 P.2d 138 |
| Parties | Herman L. HAMPTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
E. J. Fyfe, Anchorage, for appellant.
Glen C. Anderson, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Joseph D. Balfe, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, JJ., and CARLSON, Superior Court Judge.
After trial by jury, Herman Hampton was found guilty of first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal Hampton advances five specifications of error and also attacks the sentence on the ground that it is excessive. Our analysis of the record and the legal arguments presented by the respective parties has persuaded us that Hampton's conviction should be affirmed and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not excessive.
The relevant facts are as follows: On June 27, 1974, Hampton's friend, Calvin Hodge, met Hampton at his home about 3:00 p. m. Hampton had recently been involved in an automobile accident in which he had suffered a badly broken leg. At this time, Hampton was in a full-leg cast and was unable to move about freely. 1 Hodge went to a liquor store and returned with a fifth of bourbon and 2 six-packs of 16-ounce beers. Hodge testified that they drank approximately two glasses of bourbon and one beer apiece. At Hampton's suggestion, they went out to buy a gun. Hampton purchased a .357 Smith and Wesson Model 28 revolver and one box of .357 hollow point bullets. They bought another fifth of bourbon, 2 more six-packs and some chicken before returning to the apartment. They spent the next 2-3 hours playing records, drinking and eating. At Hodge's suggestion, they decided to ride around the Anchorage downtown area. Then at Hampton's request, they went to the home of Jerry Berfield to obtain something to deaden the pain Hampton was experiencing. Hampton received heroin from Berfield which was injected into his body. Hampton and Hodge remained at Berfield's watching television and drinking. Hampton fell asleep; after he had awakened, Hodge left the room. While Hodge was out of the room, Hampton allegedly shot Berfield five times with the gun he had previously purchased. Hodge and Mrs. Berfield (Berfield's ex-wife), neither of whom actually saw Hampton shoot Berfield, 2 ran out of the house.
When Officers Hyde and Moen of the Anchorage Police Department arrived, Hampton was seated near Berfield's body. When they entered and saw a revolver near Hampton, one officer pointed his weapon at Hampton and told him not to touch the gun. He testified that Hampton stated, "(M)ove it (the gun) before I shoot somebody else." The other officer gave Hampton his Miranda warnings. Hampton asserted that he knew his rights and did not want to talk. Hampton was helped out of the house and was taken to the police station. At the police station, Hampton was interviewed by Officer Rice. Rice testified that he advised Hampton of his rights and that Hampton interrupted him, stating that he knew his rights and that it was a waste of time. Rice completed reading the Miranda form. After Hampton made incriminating statements to Rice, 3 he requested that he be allowed to sleep and said that he might be able to handle it better the next day.
The following day Hampton was interviewed by Officer Carter and Investigator Pennington. After they advised him of his rights, Hampton signed and initialed a waiver form. During the course of this interview, Hampton made a tape-recorded statement admitting that he shot Berfield and that he had previously threatened Berfield's life.
Subsequently, Hampton requested that the superior court suppress his statements made during custodial interrogation. Hampton contended that the statements made to Officer Rice should be suppressed because there was no express waiver of his Miranda rights and because his intoxication rendered him legally incapable of making a valid waiver of those rights. Hampton sought suppression of the statements made to Investigator Pennington on the ground that they were the fruit of the previous unconstitutionally obtained statements. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. 4
Hampton has advanced a twofold constitutional challenge with respect to the statements made by him to the police. First, he asserts that the statements obtained at the police station on the evening of the incident were taken in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. He also asserts that utilization of those statements violated his due process rights guaranteed by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. Thus arguing that the earlier statements were obtained or used unconstitutionally, Hampton asserts that the taped confession of June 28 should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 5 These arguments will be discussed seriatim.
In articulating its reasons for denial of the suppression motion, the superior court, as trier of the facts, made particular note of these significant facts: Hampton asserted vocally that he knew his rights, the officers testified he was responsive, and Hampton "clearly remembers talking to the police and telling them what happened." The superior court concluded:
All of this tends to indicate a certain awareness and an ability to reason on the part of the defendant. His own testimony demonstrates that at the time of the first interview he was not so benumbed or confused that he had no understanding or a realization of what was going on or what he was saying. It cannot be said then as a matter of law that defendant's mental capacity was so impaired at the time of the first interview that he was incapable of making a knowing waiver.
We think the superior court did not err in determining the merits of Hampton's suppression motion.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the accused may waive fifth amendment rights "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Hampton does not dispute that he was advised of his Miranda rights prior to each interrogation. His contention is that he did not effectively waive his Miranda rights. Pointing to the totality of the circumstances, including intoxication from alcohol, injection of heroin, and absence of an express waiver, Hampton asserts that the state failed to meet its burden of showing he made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. 6
In Thessen v. State, 454 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska 1969), we said:
It is entirely possible that one could be so intoxicated or under the influence of drugs that he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. Whether this is so depends upon the facts of each particular case. (footnote omitted)
We thus deem it appropriate at this point to examine the record closely in light of the superior court's determination of the facts pertaining to this issue.
Officer Moen testified that when he entered Berfield's home, Hampton was seated near Berfield's body. He had a drink either in his hand or in his lap. Moen read the Miranda warnings to Hampton and Hampton responded that he knew his rights. Moen testified:
(Hampton) seemed very calm. The only thing that excited him or appeared to excite him or bother him in any way was the fact that the weapon was alongside him, he wanted that away from him. He had been drinking or it appeared to me that he had been drinking.
Moen noticed that there was a smell of alcohol around Hampton; however, Hampton responded to his questions. Moen also testified that Hampton's speech was slurred but understandable, and that had he encountered Hampton on the street he would not have arrested him for public drunkenness.
Officer Hyde testified that Hampton was "nonchalant" when he told Moen that he knew his rights, and that Hampton "reacted very calmly under the situation." Hyde noted that Hampton had been drinking and that his eyes were dilated. However, Hyde testified that Hampton was responsive to questions, spoke clearly and "seemed to have control of his faculties."
Officer Imperial testified that he saw an empty liquor bottle near Berfield's body. He also assisted in taking Hampton to the police car and testified that Hampton's speech was slower than normal.
Officer Rice, who conducted the interview of Hampton at the police station, testified that he gave Hampton the Miranda warnings; Hampton repeatedly interrupted, stating that he knew his rights. Rice asked Hampton if he understood his rights; he indicated that he did. However, Rice did not secure a written waiver. Hampton made incriminating statements to Rice 7 and then said he did not want to continue the interview. They continued talking for another 15-20 minutes. 8 Rice testified that Hampton "appeared alert," "responded to every question," and spoke slowly but not indistinctly. Rice stated:
It was obvious to me that he had taken something. I asked him if he had taken any drugs or I believe I used the word dope specifically. He stated he had not. I asked him if he had had any intoxicants and he indicated that he did (sic ). He indicated he was taking alcohol for, I believe, pain and that he had just about enough to where he was feeling pretty good.
Rice also indicated that he did not believe Hampton "was incoherent or . . . intoxicated." Rice testified that Hampton was very calm and spoke in a monotone except for one occasion when he became angry and blamed Berfield for what had happened, and another when he became irritated with Rice because he was "tired of telling his story."
Officer Dennis, who was standing outside the door when Rice was interrogating Hampton, corroborated...
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