Hampton v. State

• Decision Date: 24 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-385-C.A.,99-385-C.A.
• Citation: 786 A.2d 375
• Parties: Claude E. HAMPTON v. STATE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

786 A.2d 375

Claude E. HAMPTON v. STATE.

No. 99-385-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 24, 2001.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Thomas G. Briody, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

Was a probation violator entitled to notice from either the court or his attorney about his right to appeal the violation finding? If so, was the violator entitled to post-conviction relief (PCR) based upon the failure to provide him with such notice? Even assuming that the violator's attorney should have notified him about his right to appeal from the order revoking his probation, the violator, we hold, was not entitled to post-conviction relief because he suffered no prejudice from this lack of notice.

This is the probation violator's appeal from the Superior Court's judgment denying his PCR application. At the 1998 hearing on this application, the violator, Claude E. Hampton (applicant or Hampton), alleged that when he was adjudged a probation violator in 1992, neither the hearing justice nor his own attorney notified him of his right to appeal from that adjudication. Hampton asserted that the lack of notice by the court violated his constitutional right to due process, and that his attorney's failure to notify him of his right to appeal violated his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Because the PCR hearing justice determined that Hampton was not entitled to this notice, he denied the application.

On appeal, Hampton asks this Court to reverse and to rule that the lack of notice concerning his right to appeal from the revocation of his probation violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons probed below, we decline to do so, holding that the probation-violation justice had no legal obligation to notify Hampton of his right to appeal from the violation adjudication and that the failure of Hampton's counsel to do so did not prejudice him because he was unable to show any colorable appellate issue that might have led to a reversal of the violation adjudication.

Facts and Travel

In 1991, Hampton was convicted of assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault. His conviction resulted in a fifteen-year suspended sentence and fifteen years of probation. Thereafter, in August 1992, Hampton was one of a group of men who were arrested and charged with first-degree sexual assault after a highly publicized and brutal attack on a woman in a Newport park. The next month, at Hampton's four-day probation-violation hearing, the hearing justice found that he had violated the terms of his probation. As a result, the hearing justice ordered him to serve the entire fifteen-year term of his previously suspended sentence. At no time, however, did either the hearing justice or Hampton's privately retained counsel advise him of his right to appeal from the probation-violation adjudication. Moreover, the state never indicted Hampton for the alleged misconduct that led to the revocation of his probation.

Almost six years later, while he was serving his fifteen-year prison sentence, Hampton filed this PCR application in Superior Court, seeking to vacate the finding of a probation violation as well as the fifteen-year sentence that he was serving. He alleged a due-process violation and ineffective assistance of counsel because of the hearing justice's and his attorney's failure to advise him of his right to appeal from the 1992 probation-violation adjudication. The PCR hearing justice, however, rejectedapplicant's contention that the probation-revocation justice had violated his constitutional rights when he failed to notify him of his right to appeal from the probation-violation adjudication. The PCR court found that the probation-violation justice had no obligation to inform Hampton of his right to appeal under Rule 32(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure because the rights described in that rule did not apply to a probation-revocation hearing.¹ The court also rejected Hampton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It did so on the grounds that the attorney had no obligation to inform his client of his right to appeal the violation adjudication. Finally, the PCR hearing justice also ruled that he could not decrease Hampton's sentence because he had failed to request such a reduction within 120 days of its imposition, as required by Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

Standard of Review

"The determination of a hearing justice in an application for post-conviction relief will remain undisturbed on appeal unless there is clear error, or a showing that the hearing justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence." Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 174 (R.I.2001) (citing Beagen v. State, 705 A.2d 173, 176 (R.I.1998)). Alleged constitutional violations, however, must be reviewed de novo. Carillo v. State, 773 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I.2001). In sum, we "afford great deference to findings of historical fact by the hearing justice but review de novo whether constitutional rights were violated in reaching ultimate conclusions drawn from those facts." Id.

Analysis

I Application of Rule 32

A probation-violation hearing (also referred to as probation-revocation hearing) is not part of the criminal-prosecution process; therefore, it does not call for the "full panoply of rights" normally guaranteed to defendants in criminal proceedings. State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 834 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I.1997)). Indeed, it is well established that "[a] probation-revocation hearing `is not a prosecution but is civil in nature.'" State v. Smith, 721 A.2d 847, 848 (R.I.1998) (quoting State v. Hie, 688 A.2d 283, 284 (R.I.1996)).

The hearing justice's role during the probation-revocation hearing is to determine only "`whether in [the hearing justice's] discretion [the defendant's] conduct on the day in question had been lacking in the required good behavior expected and required by his probationary status." State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 886-87 (R.I.2001) (quoting Znosko, 775 A.2d at 834-35). To establish a probation violation, Rule 32(f) requires only a showing that the defendant failed to keep the peace and remain on good behavior. Gautier, 774 A.2d at 887. Furthermore, the state's burden of proof is to adducereasonably satisfactory evidence of the defendant's violation of one of the terms of his probation, but not evidence establishing a violation beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I.1997).

Consequently, it is not the hearing justice's duty to determine the defendant's criminal guilt for any of the underlying misconduct that triggered the violation hearing. Gautier, 774 A.2d at 887. Rather, the hearing justice's only responsibility is to determine, according to the Rule 32(f) requirements, whether he or she is reasonably satisfied that the defendant has violated one or more of the terms of his or her probation.

The applicant asserts that the hearing justice was required by Rule 32(a)(2) to advise him of his right to appeal from the order finding him to be a probation violator. Rule 32(a)(2) provides that "[a]fter imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court should advise the defendant of his or her right to appeal * * *." As noted earlier, however, a probation-violation hearing is not part of the criminal-trial process and a defendant therein is not afforded the same rights as in a criminal trial. See Znosko, 755 A.2d at 834; Smith, 721 A.2d at 848. Thus, even though the rights guaranteed by Rule 32(a)(2) are applicable to criminal-trial proceedings — including the previous criminal proceeding in this case that resulted in applicant's 1991 conviction and fifteen-year suspended sentence — they are inapplicable to probation-violation hearings.

The applicant also argues that, although Rule 32(f) does not specifically provide for notification to the accused of his or her right to appeal from a probation-violation adjudication, that rule should be interpreted to include that right as a minimal due-process requirement. The applicant cites State v. Lawrence, 658 A.2d 890 (R.I.1995) in support of this argument. In Lawrence, the defendant, while awaiting a probation-violation hearing, was held without bail for over ten days under circumstancesbeyond his control. Id. at 892. This incarceration violated a statute that specifically provided that a defendant held without bail while awaiting a probation-violation hearing shall not be held for more than ten days. Id.; see also G.L. 1956 § 12-19-9. As a result, this Court found that the legislative intent was clear that the ten-day limit constituted part of the minimal due-process requirements afforded to alleged probation violators. Lawrence, 658 A.2d 893.

Unlike the Lawrence case, however, no corresponding statute exists here indicating that minimal due-process rights for alleged probation violators include the right to be notified about the opportunity to appeal from a violation adjudication. Again, probation-violation hearings do not provide the same due-process guarantees to defendants as criminal trials. See Znosko, 755 A.2d at 834; Smith, 721 A.2d at 848. Although notice to the defendant of his right to appeal is one of the rights afforded to defendants in connection with criminal proceedings, it is not mandatory for the court to do so in civil proceedings such as a probation-violation hearing. Likewise, the United States Constitution provides no such guarantee. See, e.g., United States v. Allgood, 48 F.Supp.2d 554, 560 (E.D. Va.1999) (holding no constitutional or other mandate required the court to inform a defendant that he has a right to appeal the outcome of the probation-violation hearing). Accordingly, we hold that the hearing justice did not violate Hampton's right to...