Hamrick v. Rutherford Cnty.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-00143-MR-WCM |
| Parties | REBECCA MICHELLE HAMRICK individually and as a parent of her minor children A.H. and K. H.; and, HALEY HARRISON, Plaintiffs, v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of North Carolina; JOHN K. CARROLL, in his individual capacity; KIMBER DOVER-JACKSON, in her individual capacity; and, KELSEY FERGUSON, in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
1
REBECCA MICHELLE HAMRICK individually and as a parent of her minor children A.H. and K. H.; and, HALEY HARRISON, Plaintiffs,
v.
RUTHERFORD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of North Carolina; JOHN K. CARROLL, in his individual capacity; KIMBER DOVER-JACKSON, in her individual capacity; and, KELSEY FERGUSON, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
No. 1:22-cv-00143-MR-WCM
United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
April 17, 2023
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
W. Carleton Metcalf United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) which has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 for the entry of a recommendation.
I. Procedural Background
On July 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Rutherford County, John K. Carroll (“Carroll”), who is the director of the Rutherford County Department of Social Services (the "Department”), Kimber Dover-
Jackson ("Dover-Jackson”), who is a supervisor with the Department, and Kelsey Ferguson (“Ferguson”), who is a social worker with the Department. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 18, 22, 42.
On October 3, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and a supporting memorandum. Docs. 7, 8. Plaintiffs have responded, and Defendants have replied. Docs. 13, 14.
IL Plaintiff s Allegations
The Complaint alleges that on July 13, 2019, Ferguson visited the home of Rebecca Michelle Hamrick (“Hamrick”) and her three children Hayley Harrison (“Harrison”), K.H., and A.H. (collectively, the “Minor Children”). Doc. 1 at ¶ 32. At the time, Harrison was approximately sixteen years old (though she has since reached the age of majority), K.H. was approximately fourteen years old, and A.H. was approximately ten years old. Id. at ¶ 33.
Ferguson visited Plaintiffs at least once more, and both Hamrick and the Minor Children began to trust Ferguson and would “communicate honestly with and confide in her.” Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36.
“In or around late July 2019,” Ferguson called Hamrick and demanded that Hamrick leave work to meet Ferguson at the Department later that day “because Ferguson was going to remove the [Minor Children] from [Hamrick's] home.” Id. at ¶ 37. Hamrick, Hamrick's mother (Susan Hamrick), Hamrick's
sister (Christie Piercy), and Harrison attended the meeting. Id. at ¶ 38. Ferguson and Dover-Jackson also attended. Id. at ¶ 40.[1]
Hamrick alleges that during the meeting, she became visibly upset, and that Ferguson told Hamrick she needed to choose where to place the Minor Children and to execute a Safety Agreement. Id. at ¶ 42. Ferguson also told her that if she did not, the Department “would take her children, place them into foster care, and [Hamrick] would never see them again.” Id.
Hamrick asked to speak with Ferguson's supervisor! Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that Ferguson then directed Hamrick to speak with Dover-Jackson. Dover-Jackson “repeated [Ferguson's] threats if [Hamrick] did not choose where to place her children and execute the [Safety Agreement], [the Department] would take them, place them into foster care, and [Hamrick] would never see them again.” Id. at ¶ 45.
Hamrick was not represented by counsel at the meeting, nor was she able to consult with an attorney. Id. at ¶ 41. “Fearful that she would lose her children forever,” Hamrick agreed to place them with her mother and executed the Safety Agreement to that effect on July 24, 2019. Id. at ¶ 46. Susan
Hamrick, Christie Piercy, Dover-Jackson, and Ferguson signed the Safety Agreement the same day or the following day. Id. at ¶ 47.[2]
Following the meeting, Hamrick took the Minor Children to her mother's home, where they remained for “at least fourteen days.” Id. at ¶¶ 49, 50. Hamrick then “began her efforts to get the [Minor Children] back;” in that regard, Ferguson told Hamrick that she needed to “(1) take out an ex-parte order against her children's father, (2) take out a warrant on her minor children's father, and (3) have her minor children's father involuntarily committed.” Id. at ¶ 52. After Hamrick provided Ferguson proof that Hamrick had done these things, Ferguson told Hamrick that “she could get her children from [her mother's] home and that the [Minor Children] could go back to living
with her.” Id. at ¶ 56'57. On or about August 7, 2019, the Minor Children “went back to living at [Hamrick's] home.” Id. at ¶ 58.
Plaintiffs contend that the Safety Agreement contravened North Carolina law in multiple ways. Id. at ¶ 48 (alleging, for example, that the Safety Agreement did not include certain findings required by statute). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to advise Hamrick of the legal implications of the Safety Agreement, that Defendants failed to provide Hamrick with the opportunity to consult with counsel, and that the Safety Agreement was not properly reviewed by any court. See Id. at ¶¶ 59'60, 61'62, 63-66.
Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their constitutional rights, a claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), various state law tort claims, and a claim for violations of the North Carolina Constitution as follows:
-
Department
Carroll
Dover Jackson
Ferguson
42 U.S.C. § 1983
X
X
X
Monell Claim
X
Negligence
X
X
X
Negligent Misrepresentation
X
X
X
Negligent Supervision
X
Actual Fraud
X
X
X
Constructive Fraud
X
X
X
Civil Obstruction of Justice
X
X
X
Violations of the North Carolina Constitution
X
X
X
The Complaint also requests an award of punitive damages and attorney's fees. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 205-211.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss does not seek dismissal of the claims of actual fraud and civil obstruction of justice against Dover-Jackson and Ferguson and does not address Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages and attorney's fees.
III. Legal Standard
When considering a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd, v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
The court, however, is not required to accept “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Consumer affairs .com, 591 F.3d at 255! see Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192. That is, while “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. In short, the well-pled factual allegations must move a plaintiffs claim from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256.
IV. Discussion
A. Section 1983 Claims
“The Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, imposes civil liability upon every person who, under color of law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Hogan, et al. v. Cherokee County, et al., 519 F.Supp.3d 263, 278 (W.D. N.C. 2021) (citing Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727 (4th Cir. 1999)). Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides...
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