Hanberg v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 16 June 1914
• Docket Number: No. 9246.,9246.
• Citation: 263 Ill. 616,105 N.E. 720
• Parties: HANBERG, County Treasurer, v. MORGAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

263 Ill. 616

105 N.E. 720

HANBERG, County Treasurer,

v.MORGAN et al.

No. 9246.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1914.

Appeal from Cook County Court; John E. Owens, Judge.

Petition by John J. Hanberg, County Treasurer, against Adah F. Burton Morgan and others. Judgment for petitioner, and the respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Samuel H. Trude, of Chicago, for appellants.

P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Young, of Chicago, for appellee.

COOKE, J.

On April 20, 1906, the county treasurer of Cook county filed a petition in the county court of Cook county praying that Adah F. Burton, Sophia Burton Gagnon, and Robert C. Burton be summoned to appear before said court to show cause why they should not pay certain inheritance taxes alleged to be due from them. The petition set forth that the county judge of Cook county did, on August 28, 1899, fix and assess the cash value of the estate passing by the will of S. Lester Burton, deceased, to each of the persons above named, and did fix the tax to which the estate passing to Adah F. Burton was liable at $444.37, the tax to which the estate passing to Sophia Burton Gagnon was liable at $1,148.34, and the tax to which the estate passing to Robert C. Burton was liable at $1,148.34, and that said amounts, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from January 2, 1896 (being the date of the death of S. Lester Burton), remain due and unpaid. The respondents were not served with summons until December, 1912. Thereafter Sophia Burton Gagnon paid the tax alleged to be due from her, but Adah F. Burton and Robert C. Burton appeared and answered the petition, alleging that the order of the county judge fixing and assessing the taxes upon the property and estates passing to them under the will of S. Lester Burton was void for various reasons set out in the answer and which are urged in this court as grounds for reversal. A hearing was had upon the petition and answer, after which the court entered an order finding that the allegations of the petition were true, and that there was due from Adah F. Burton the sum of $444.37 and from Robert C. Burton the sum of $1,148.34, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the death of S. Lester Burton. The court also allowed in this proceeding an attorney's fee of $50 against Adah F. Burton and an attorney's fee of $75 against Robert C. Burton, and ordered them to pay the amounts found due from them, respectively, together with the attorneys' fees allowed against them, within ten days, and that in default thereof they be held in contempt of court. From that order Adah F. Burton (now Adah F. Burton Morgan) and Robert C. Burton have prosecuted this appeal.

Upon the hearing in the county court the petitioner offered in evidence the report made by John A. Watson, as appraiser, assessing and fixing the value of the estate of S. Lester Burton, deceased, and the value of the portions thereof passing to Adah F. Burton, Sophia Burton Gagnon, and Robert C. Burton which were subject to inheritance taxes under the act of June 15, 1895. The petitioner also offered in evidence the exhibits filed with said report, the order of the county judge approving the report of the appraiser and assessing and fixing the value of the estate passing to each of said parties and the tax to which the same was liable, and a certificate of the county judge showing that notices were mailed to all parties interested, including appellants, informing them of the amount of tax due from each of the devisees and legatees under the will of S. LesterBurton. Appellants offered no evidence, but relied entirely upon the evidence offered by the petitioner to sustain their contention that the order of the county judge assessing and fixing the taxes was void.

[1] It is first contended that the evidence failed to show the appointment of John A. Watson as appraiser, and that there was therefore no valid appraisement upon which to base the order. While no order of the county judge appointing Watson appraiser was offered in evidence, the report of the appraiser recites that he was on August 5, 1897, appointed appraiser, pursuant to the act of 1895, to fix the fair market value of the property of the estate of S. Lester Burton, deceased, subject to taxation under the said act. The order of the county judge fixing the taxes also recites that John A. Watson had theretofore been duly appointed under and pursuant to the statute, and the report made by Watson, as appraiser, was received and acted upon by the county judge in fixing the taxes. This was sufficient to show the appointment of Watson as appraiser. Tibbs v. Allen, 27 Ill. 119;Hess v. Voss, 52 Ill. 472;Crane v. Stafford, 217 Ill. 21, 75 N. E. 424.

[2] It is next urged that the appraiser did not give notice to appellants of the time and place he would appraise the property passing to them under the will of S. Lester Burton. That a notice was given by the appraiser that he would, on February 18, 1899, at 10 o'clock a. m., at his office, room 411, 175 Dearborn street, in the city of Chicago, appraise the property of the estate of S. Lester Burton subject to taxation under the act of 1895, appears from his report, which recites that he sent such notice by mail to all persons known to have or claim an interest in the property of the decedent subject to assessment. No evidence was offered by appellants to show that they did not receive the notice which the appraiser reports he sent to them, but their contention seems to be that as the report shows that the appraisement was made on August 28, 1899, instead of an February 18, 1899, and as it fails to show that the appraiser gave any notice that he would appraise the property on that date, it therefore fails to show that they were notified of the time when and place where the appraisement was to be made. The appraiser's report recites that at the hour fixed, on February 18, 1899, and thereafter from time to time, pursuant to adjournments regularly had, he proceeded to take evidence in writing, under oath, of witnesses, and to appraise the property. The testimony taken is attached to the report as an exhibit and indicates that the hearing was concluded August 23, 1899. After being served with due and proper notice that the appraiser would, on February 18, 1899, at his office, proceed to make the appraisement, if appellants desired to be heard in the matter of the appraisement it was their duty to appear at the time and place specified in the notice, and thereafter at such times and places to which the proceedings might be adjourned. After being served with notice to appear, they were chargeable with notice of all subsequent proceedings, including adjournments from time to time, of which they would have had knowledge had they appeared at the time and place specified in the notice. No new notice was necessary to be served upon them of each adjournment. Niehoff v. People, 171 Ill. 243, 49 N. E. 214; 29 Cyc. 1116.

[3] The objection that the notice was ineffectual because it stated that the appraiser, at the time and place specified, would proceed to appraise and fix the value ‘of the property which said decedent died seised of and which is subject to taxation,’ instead of stating that he would appraise and fix the value of the portions of said estate passing to each legatee and devisee under the will of S. Lester Burton, is extremely technical and is without merit.

[4] The indorsement on the report showing the filing thereof is signed, ‘Philip Knopf, Clerk,’ and appellants contend that this indorsement shows that the report was filed in the office of the county clerk instead of in the office of the clerk of the county court. Such signature, standing alone, might refer either to Philip Knopf, county clerk, or to Philip Knopf, clerk of the county court, and when it appears signed to a certificate of filing indorsed on a document required to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county court, it will be presumed that the word ‘clerk’ refers to clerk of the county court. The cases cited by appellants do not support their contention and are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In McChesney v. People, 174 Ill. 46, 50 N. E. 1110,Glos v. Woodard, 202 Ill. 480, 67 N. E. 3,Glos v. Hanford, 212 Ill. 261, 72 N. E. 439, and McCraney v. Glos, 222 Ill. 628, 78 N. E. 921, the person holding the offices of county clerk and clerk of the county court, in signing the certificate of filing wrote the words ‘county clerk’ after his name, and it was held that with such an indorsement it could not be presumed that the instrument was filed in the office of the clerk of the...