Hanchey v. Croskrey

• Decision Date: 25 January 1887
• Citation: 81 Ala. 149,1 So. 259
• Parties: HANCHEY v. CROSKREY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

1 So. 259

81 Ala. 149

HANCHEY v. CROSKREY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 25, 1887

Appeal from circuit court, Pike county.

Action of detinue for recovery of personal property.

The complaint in this case was filed July 27, 1885, by Cicero Croskrey, and claimed of Charles Hanchey "one mare mule with a crooked tail." On the twenty-seventh of October 1886, the trial was had, and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. The court, at the request of plaintiff in writing gave the following charge: "If the jury should believe from the evidence that one John O. Brown brought a suit in detinue against the plaintiff, Cicero Croskrey, for the mule in controversy in the present case, under a mortgage made by the plaintiff to the said John O. Brown, and also upon a note against Croskrey which said mortgage was given to secure, and he, (Brown,) in the detinue suit, executed a replevy bond for said mule, and that, after the commencement of the said suit by the said Brown, he transferred and sold the mortgage embracing the mule in controversy, to Blanchard & Burrus, and after the sale a judgment was rendered in said detinue suit, and the other suit, for Croskrey; and if the jury should further believe from the evidence that Brown was defeated in said detinue suit because the mortgage and mule in suit was sold before the judgment was rendered in the detinue suit; and if the jury should further believe from the evidence that Blanchard & Burrus sold the mule to one John T. Barr, and he sold the mule to one John McLaney, and John McLaney sold the mule to one Richard Williams, and that Williams sold the mule to Charles Hanchey, the defendant in the present suit,-then the defendant Hanchey is concluded and estopped by the judgment rendered for Croskrey in the detinue suit, and the other suit of Brown v. Croskrey, and that the merits of the title to said mule cannot be inquired into in the present detinue suit for the same [mule] between Croskrey and Hanchey." The court gave this charge, and the defendant excepted. The evidence in the cause tended to support the averments of this charge, and the action of the court is assigned as error.

P. O. Harper, for appellant.

Gardner & Wiley, contra.

CLOPTON J.

The general rule cannot be controverted that, when there is identity of subject-matter and point in question, matters which have been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction are not open to litigation in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and, while it is expressed generally that the estoppel will be limited to the points actually decided, it extends beyond these to all points necessarily involved, without the adjudication of which the judgment could not have been rendered. In such case the implication that the judgment covers the whole cannot be overcome by proof that no evidence was offered, and no decision actually made as to part. The doctrine of estoppel by judicial proceedings is qualified by the established limitation that the judgment must be a decision on the merits. A judgment founded on non-joinder or misjoinder of parties, or merely defective pleading, or on any technical ground, or collateral or incidental question, whereby the merits of the case were not and could not have been determined, will not preclude an inquiry into the merits in a subsequent suit so instituted as to avoid the objection by which the first was defeated. Gilbreath v. Jones, 66 Ala. 129; McCall v. Jones, 72 Ala. 368; Perkins v. Moore, 16 Ala. 9; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 937.

The appellee brings the action of detinue against the appellant for the recovery of a mule. On the trial, the plaintiff having produced evidence tending to show title in himself at the commencement of the suit, the defendant introduced a mortgage embracing the mule, previously executed by the plaintiff to Brown, who transferred it to Blanchard & Burrus from and under whom defendant claims by successive transfers. To estop an inquiry into the validity and operative effect of the mortgage as vesting title in the defendant, the plaintiff introduced the records of two suits-one detinue for the recovery of the mule, and the other on the note secured by the mortgage-brought in the circuit court by Brown, the mortgagee, against the plaintiff, in each of which judgment was...