Hancock Gross, Inc. v. United States

Decision Date21 August 1974
Docket NumberCourt No. 69/9241-100299.,C.D. 4555
Citation383 F. Supp. 832
PartiesHANCOCK GROSS, INC. v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

Allerton deC. Tompkins, New York City, for plaintiff.

Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Herbert P. Larsen and Andrew P. Vance, New York City, trial attys.), for defendant.

LANDIS, Judge:

This case involves tariff classification, under the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), of merchandise described in the record as faucet washers and imported from Japan in 1968.

Customs classified the washers under TSUS item 774.60 as articles, not specially provided for, of rubber or plastics, dutiable at 15 per centum ad valorem. Plaintiff challenges the customs classification in an allegation that the washers are more properly classifiable under TSUS item 773.25 as gaskets, of rubber or plastics, dutiable at only 9 per centum ad valorem. Defendant denies that the washers are gaskets and, in an affirmative defense, alternatively alleges that if the washers were not properly assessed under TSUS item 774.60, then they would be correctly classifiable under TSUS item 680.22 as parts of hand-operated and check taps, cocks, valves and similar devices used to control the flow of liquids, gases or solids, dutiable at 16 per centum ad valorem.

In open court, on the day of trial, counsel for defendant stated (R. 4) that "if the * * * washers are shown to be gaskets as claimed by plaintiff under item 773.25, on the ground of relative specificity that claim would prevail against both the assigned classification, which is articles of rubber or plastics, not specially provided for, item 774.60, or by virtue of the general head-note 10(i)(j)1 of the Tariff Schedules against the Government's alternative claim as parts of taps, cocks, valves, et cetera item 680.22." Much of the discussion in the briefs relates to the merit or lack of merit of defendant's alternative claim but, as defendant has conceded in open court, the alternative claim is irrelevant if plaintiff's claim is well taken under TSUS item 773.25.

This brings me to consideration of the issue shaped by the pleadings and argument in this case, viz: whether the imported washers are gaskets in the tariff sense that "gaskets", of rubber or plastics, are provided for in item 773.25.

In determining the meaning of tariff terms, it is established that the tariff law is drawn in the language of commerce, which is presumptively the same as the common meaning, and that the law is not drawn in the terms of science, C. J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 41 CCPA 195, C.A.D. 550 (1954); it is further established that the common meaning of a tariff term is not a question of fact, but a question of law, United States v. Brager-Larsen, 36 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 388 (1948), and that the court is not bound by testimony with respect to the common meaning of a tariff term, as its effect is advisory only, and the court will ordinarily place chief reliance upon court decisions and definitions of dictionaries and other lexicographical authorities, United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora et al., 43 CCPA 111, C.A.D. 617 (1956).

Both sides agree that the imported washers of various sizes are wholly or in chief value of rubber or plastics; some have two flat surfaces (exhibits 1, 2, 3); some have one flat surface and one slightly beveled surface (exhibit 4); they are all circular disks with a hole in the middle, and all are chiefly used with faucets that have a turn stem or spindle to which the washer is attached at the seat end, usually by a screw in a manner that the washer moves with the turn of the stem or spindle, so that when the stem or spindle is turned "open" water flows and when the stem or spindle is turned "closed" the washer is pressed against the faucet seat and the flow of water and leakage is stopped.

The witnesses2 also substantially agree that the imported washers are dealt with in the plumbing trade as "washers"; that the washers are chiefly used by the plumbing trade as pressure seals on faucets, in the manner alluded to above, primarily to assist in shutting off the flow of water and leakage across a joint (R. 36, 129, 191); that pressure seals include such as are called "packing", and such as are called "gaskets" (R. 60, 112, 168); that some pressure seals which are bought and sold as washers are in fact gaskets (R. 134, 164); and that the definition read into the record by defendant's counsel, namely, "a deformable material clamped between essentially stationary faces to prevent the passage of matter through an opening or joint," acceptably defines a "gasket" (R. 65, 106, 163).

Plaintiff, in argument anticipating defendant's contention that gaskets are limited to seals between stationary surfaces, is of the view that such contention must be rejected on authority of Arthur J. Fritz & Co. et al. v. United States, 63 Cust.Ct. 484, C.D. 3940 (1969), affirmed on appeal, 59 CCPA 46, C.A.D. 1036, 452 F.2d 1399 (1971). The Fritz case sustained the customs classification of rubber rings, used to seal a joining of pipes and couplings against leakage, as gaskets, of rubber or plastics, under TSUS item 773.25, rather than as parts of sprayers suitable for agricultural or horticultural use.

In my opinion, the facts in the Fritz case were quite similar to those in the case here for decision. Referring to the court of appeals decision in Fritz, I note the following discussion (59 CCPA at pages 48-49, 452 F.2d at page 1401):

The imported articles were invoiced as sealing rings and are used in irrigation equipment. A ring is positioned at the junction of a pipe and a coupling, and when water is forced through the junction, the water pressure expands the ring so as to effect a seal which prevents seepage or drainage of water at that point. It is undisputed that in this capacity the sealing rings function as gaskets. When the flow of water and pressure is terminated, the ring relaxes and permits water drainage from the pipes. Irrigation pipes are moved frequently in the field, and the residual water is a load which the testimony at trial indicates is so great that movement of the pipe is virtually impossible. The automatic drainage allowed by the imported sealing rings overcomes this problem. Because the rings allow this drainage to occur, the rings are, appellants plaintiffs below urge, more than gaskets.
The Customs Court referred to several dictionary definitions of gasket which read:
Plaited hemp or tallowed rope for packing pistons, making pipe joints, etc.; hence packing for the same purpose made of rubber, asbestos, metal, or other suitable material, usually in the form of sheets or rings. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition (1958).
(1) A thin, flat, annular packing-piece of india-rubber, leather, or sheet metal, placed between two flat surfaces, as a manhole-plate and a boiler-head, to make their joint watertight. (2) A packing of hemp or other fibrous stuff, or of lead, between the bell of one pipe and the spigot or male end of another. Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary of the English Language (1956).
Structurally, the imported articles are, as described by name, rings, and are made of rubber. In structure, and function as well, the merchandise conforms to that commonly understood to be gaskets. The difficulty in distinguishing the rings from gaskets is further apparent from the testimony of the plaintiffs' witness at trial on cross-examination, which was, in pertinent part, as follows:
Q. Mr. Lake, will you further describe how the draining takes place in this operation?
A. The gasket is not a tight fit on the pipe or the coupling until it is expanded by the internal pressure of the water.
Q. In use it is used as a gasket, it seals?
A. It seals, yes, sir.
Q. And it ceases being a gasket, if I understand, according to what you are saying, when
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2 cases
  • Edge Import Corp. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
    • December 17, 1979
    ...classification. United States v. Ignaz Strauss & Co., Inc., 37 CCPA 32, 35, C.A.D. 415 (1949). See also Hancock Gross, Inc. v. United States, 383 F.Supp. 832, 73 Cust.Ct. 72, C.D. 4555 (1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 951, 62 CCPA 100, C.A.D. 1153 Plaintiff's second witness was Mr. Ivan Szanto, the ......
  • United States v. HANCOCK GROSS, INC., Customs Appeal No. 75-7.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
    • June 12, 1975

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