Hancock v. State

• Decision Date: 13 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 1--1075A182,1--1075A182
• Citation: 168 Ind.App. 663,345 N.E.2d 244
• Parties: Thomas K. HANCOCK, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 244

345 N.E.2d 244

168 Ind.App. 663

Thomas K. HANCOCK, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 1--1075A182.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

April 13, 1976.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1976.

David P. Murphy, Wolf & Robak, Greenfield, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Elmer Lloyd Whitmer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant Thomas Hancock was charged with and convicted, in a trial to the court, of the crime of second degree burglary. Hancock now appeals that conviction and the overruling of his motion to correct errors, raising the following issues for our consideration:

1) Whether Hancock was denied a fair trial by the failure of the State to comply with discovery motions.

2) Whether it was error for the trial court to overrule Hancock's Motion to Suppress Evidence, and to fail to issue a 'protective order.'

3) Whether Hancock was denied a fair trial by the action of the court in instructing the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney as to the proper laying of a foundation for certain items of evidence.

4) Whether various items of evidence were properly admitted.

5) Whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

6) Whether the verdict was contrary to evidence given at trial.

FACTS:

The facts most favorable to the State establish that at 5:30 A.M. on November 21, 1974, Deputy Sheriff James Hoffman observed that three windows in the office building of Dr. R. W. Kuhn had been broken. After additional manpower arrived at the scene, Hoffman and Sheriff Grass entered the building to conduct a search. Upon entering the premises, Dr. Kuhn was telephoned and he arrived within fifteen (15) minutes. These three persons surveyed the office and noted medicines strewn about, pry-marks on storage cabinets which were open, a bag containing medicines near an entrance, and a screwdriver on the floor near the medicine cabinets. Dr. Kuhn stated that all exterior doors were securely fastened at his last departure.

During this initial investigation of the office, Officer Hoffman went to the attic and searched that area with the aid of a flashlight. Although Hoffman searched the attic for approximately five (5) minutes, he saw no one.

At approximately 12:15 P.M. the same day, Dr. Kuhn was at his office, and was informed by his nurses that noises had been heard emanating from the attic area. Dr. Kuhn decided to investigate, and proceeded to the attic. While in the attic, Dr. Kuhn discovered three bottles of medicine which were normally stored downstairs, and a pair of shoes which were not his own. Also found were two chisels and a screwdriver which were not Dr. Kuhn's property. After spending several minutes in the attic, Dr. Kuhn turned from a window which he was repairing and observed Hancock approaching him from the far end of the room .

Dr. Kuhn and Hancock scuffled near the stairwell, and Hancock eventually broke free of Dr. Kuhn's grasp and either jumped or fell down the steps. Dr. Kuhn gave chase and pursued Hancock out of the building to a point some 150 yards from the office where Hancock concealed himself in a weed patch. Hancock was eventually removed from this area after it was surrounded by Dr. Kuhn and several citizen volunteers who responded to Dr. Kuhn's shouts for help. When apprehended, Hancock was without shoes, and was covered with soot and dust.

I.

Hancock vigorously contends that he was denied a fair trial because the State failed to fully respond to his requests for the production of evidence. Hancock asserts that his motions to produce evidence were timely and otherwise adequate, and that the State's conduct amounts to a suppression of evidence which he considers exculpatory.

The item of evidence about which Hancock's argument revolves is a 'miscellaneous crime report' which was prepared by Officer Hoffman after his investigation Dr. Kuhn's office. The allegedly exculpatory portion of the report is the conclusion of Officer Hoffman that

'It is believed that the burglars left the building through the front door as I checked the back side of the building. At this time we believe that all items were recovered.'

Well before trial, Hancock's request for the production of all memoranda and reports bearing 'upon (his) guilt or innocence' was granted. In response thereto, the State produced a report prepared by Sheriff Grass and a statement by Dr. Kuhn.

During the cross-examination of Officer Hoffman it was discovered that although Hoffman denied making a formal report he had prepared some 'notes' on the investigation which were not disclosed to Hancock. At this point, Hancock asserted his discovery order and requested the notes, as well as all police reports prepared within the prior twenty-four (24) months which dealt with burglaries at the Kuhn office. When these police reports were finally produced, over the prosecutor's objections, it was found that one of the three was the above-noted 'miscellaneous report' which was prepared by Hoffman and kept in the police files.

Hancock ultimately introduced the report into evidence, and at no point was surprise claimed nor a continuance requested.

We agree with Hancock that the State is under a continuing duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Also, we agree that this duty would necessarily prohibit the suppression or incomplete release of such information. See generally, Fair v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 494, 250 N.E.2d 744; Birkla v. State (1975), Ind., 323 N.E.2d 645; White v. State (1975), Ind., 330 N.E.2d 84.

It is our opinion that although the crime report was produced under somewhat questionable circumstances, ¹ the failure by the State to initially reveal said report is not reversible err.

The report was finally produced after several days of trial. However, at the time of its production, Hancock did not seek a continuance due to surprise or newly discovered evidence. Thus, while Hancock cites the great importance of the report, it evidently had no great impact upon his preparation for the remaining portion of the trial.

Further, Hancock was not denied the use of the report for his presentation of evidence. Thus, the report was presented at trial, and there was an opportunity to question both its contents and its author. Therefore, given the facts of this case, we hold that Hancock was not denied a fair trial, and there is no reversible error.

We wish to emphasize that our holding on this issue should not be taken as an endorsement of prosecutorial laxity or misconduct. We shall continue to give such allegations strict review, and we encourage the prompt and complete disclosure of all evidence favorable to a defendant.

II.

Hancock next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence, and in not issuing a 'protective order' with regard to the same evidence. Hancock contends that the evidence should have been suppressed since it was not connected to him, and urges the protective order as the only proper procedure to exclude the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial testimonial evidence.

While it is clear from Hancock's argument that his initial motion to suppress was directed toward both physical and testimonial evidence, the bulk of the argument is directed to a consideration of the applicability of a motion in limine. Much reliance is placed on Burrus v. Silhavy (1973), Ind.App., 293 N.E.2d 794.

After reviewing the cases cited, and the general nature and purpose of such a motion we hold that the 'protective order' was properly denied. This motion is intended to exclude prejudicial matter; to prevent even reference to such evidence. This purpose is based on the recognition that admonitions by the court may, in fact, fail to overcome the effect of improper comment.

We feel, however, that the purposes or reasons for requesting and granting such a motion are greatly, if not completely, diminished where, as here, the trial is to the court. Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, inc. (1973), Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 831. We feel that a trial judge is fully capable of dealing with objections to testimony during the trial, and, because of his training and experience, is able to reject or dismiss improper testimony. We, therefore, hold that the motion in limine was properly denied.

From Hancock's citation of authority, it appears that his objection to the overruling of his motion to suppress physical evidence is based on an incomplete chain of custody. Hancock relies upon Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525, 255 N.E.2d 652, 654, which states

. . . If one link of the chain is entirely missing, the exhibit cannot be introduced or made the basis for the testimony or the report of an expert or officer. If the testimony of the state's expert witnesses as to the narcotic content of the white powder is sought to be offered at trial, then the state should be prepared to establish a 'chain of evidence' by either producing police custody records showing the same or by testimony of witnesses. This is not a new rule in Indiana but rather a shorthand recognition of the well-established evidentiary requirement that a foundation must be laid connecting the evidence with the defendant before it is admissible at the trial . . .' (Original emphasis.)

The evidence to which Hancock objects is all physical evidence, consisting of screwdrivers and other tools, medicine bottles, a duffle bag and other items which were found in Dr. Kuhn's office prior to Hancock's apprehension. Hancock first asserts that inasmuch as no fingerprints were found on any of the items they are not connected to him. Second, it is argued that laboratory tests conducted to discover glass fragments in the offered gloves and shoes were inconclusive or negative, and that such items of evidence were therefore improper.

Hancock is correct that none of the items here objected to were found in his possession, and that to fingerprints link...