Hancock v. Thalacker
| Decision Date | 09 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-0252-MWB.,C 95-0252-MWB. |
| Citation | 933 F. Supp. 1449 |
| Parties | Anthony HANCOCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John THALACKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
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Patrick E. Ingram of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, Iowa, for Plaintiffs.
Forrest A. Guddall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Iowa Attorney General's Office, Des Moines, Iowa, for Defendants.
Does disciplining prisoners for "false statements" made in grievances to prison officials improperly impinge upon the prisoners' due process rights, constitute unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of rights of free speech or access to the courts, or chill the prisoners' right to petition the government for redress of grievances? Although the plaintiff prisoners at the Iowa Men's Reformatory have not made clear which of these rights they assert has been violated, they have nonetheless moved for summary judgment on the ground that punishment of prisoners for "false statements" in grievances is unconstitutional. The prisoners further contend that their constitutional right not to be punished for "false statements" made in grievances was clearly established by a decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, removing any shield of qualified immunity defendants might raise to liability in this case. Defendant prison officials counter that they could properly punish statements violative of prison rules, even if those statements were contained in grievances, because there is no constitutional protection for false statements. Otherwise, defendants contend, a prisoner could "camouflage" conduct in violation of prison rules simply by couching it in the context of a grievance. They further assert qualified immunity on the basis of decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently limiting the holding of the case upon which plaintiffs principally rely.
As a separate matter, the plaintiffs make a renewed attempt to certify a class of all persons who have been, are now, or ever will be prisoners at the Iowa Men's Reformatory. The court previously denied certification of such a class, primarily on the ground that plaintiffs produced no reliable standards or estimates for the numerosity of the purported class, but plaintiffs assert that additional submissions now demonstrate the existence of a viable class action. Defendants counter that the renewed class action still fails several requirements for class certification, most notably numerosity and common legal and factual issues.
These pending motions call upon the court to determine what claims are, as well as what claims may, be asserted, by whom, on behalf of whom, against whom, and for what relief. The court must also determine whether final disposition of any claims is possible on the record presently before the court.
The procedural background of this litigation is unusually complex. Although a complex procedural posture for a ruling is not that unusual, the complexity here arises not just from what procedural steps have occurred, but from what procedural steps have not been taken, in attempting to certify a class of plaintiffs and to obtain favorable summary disposition on behalf of that class.
The original plaintiff in this matter, Anthony Eugene Hancock, filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 16, 1995.1 Co-plaintiff Quentin McGowan filed no application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, nor did he pay any filing fee. Consequently, Mr. McGowan was dismissed from the lawsuit on initial review on July 28, 1995. However, Mr. Hancock was granted leave to file his complaint, styled as a "Class Action Complaint," on July 28, 1995. The defendants named in that complaint were John Thalacker, the Warden of the Iowa Men's Reformatory (IMR),2 Larry Brimeyer, the grievance officer and administrative law judge at the IMR, and Thomas Luensman, a corrections supervisor at the IMR.3 The original "Class Action Complaint," filed by Mr. Hancock under 42 U.S.C. ? 1983, asserts that Mr. Hancock and other members of a purported class of inmates have been denied their First Amendment rights to petition the government for redress of grievances as the result of disciplinary actions against them by defendants for statements made in grievances, which, inter alia, complained about the conduct of certain IMR officials.4 The complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants answered the original complaint on September 5, 1995.
On August 16, 1995, shortly after leave to file the complaint in this lawsuit was granted, Mr. Hancock moved for certification of a class identified as "all persons who have been, are now, or in the future will be confined in the Iowa Men's Reformatory disciplinary lockup because of comments made in grievances."5 Mr. Hancock further suggested that the members of the class are "all persons who have been, are now or will be prisoners at the Iowa Men's Reformatory regardless of whether they were disciplined as Mr. Hancock was." On September 13, 1995, however, this court denied the motion for class certification, finding that plaintiff Hancock had produced no reliable standards or estimates for the numerosity of his asserted class, and that he had failed to identify even the approximate size of the class or to demonstrate the impracticability of joinder. Instead, the court found Mr. Hancock had relied on conclusory statements that anyone who has ever been or ever will be an inmate at the IMR is a class member, which the court concluded will not do. Furthermore, the court found, Mr. Hancock had been able to identify only two other potential class members and only one further potential class member had volunteered his identity. The court concluded that all three of these potential class members could practicably intervene in the present litigation. Thus, the court concluded that it was likely that trying the individual suits would not be inconvenient, because the court could examine the factual basis of each asserted class member's complaint.
In the interim, on August 29, 1995, Benjamin J. Avila, another prisoner at the IMR, moved to intervene in this action as a plaintiff by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, as well as a "Statement of Facts" and "Supplement," which the court construed together as Mr. Avila's complaint. Mr. Avila's motion to intervene was granted, and Mr. Avila's complaint, as construed by the court, was ordered filed on October 10, 1995. Mr. Hancock's counsel...
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...the required size of a class, and what constitutes impracticality depends upon the facts of each case."); Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F. Supp. 1449, 1466 (N.D.Iowa 1996) ("The `numerosity' requirement has produced no rule of thumb in this circuit as to how many potential class members is enou......
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...the bringing of meritorious lawsuits. Alvarez v. City of N.Y., 31 F.Supp.2d 334, 343 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (citing Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F.Supp. 1449, 1486–87 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (“When the right to petition is in question, there is also a heightening of requirements to show falsity or frivolousne......
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...be deemed willful disobedience of a court order, resulting in dismissal . . . pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)." Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F. Supp. 1449, 1461 (N.D. Iowa 1996). Although a "pro se litigant should receive meaningful notice of what is expected of him," he is required to, at t......
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...a few courts outside this Circuit have upheld such discipline, though their analyses and conclusions differ. See Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F.Supp. 1449, 1490 (N.D.Iowa, 1996)(proof by preponderance of evidence that grievance statements knowingly false required to impose discipline); Curry v......