Hancock v. Trammell
| Decision Date | 18 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–6255.,12–6255. |
| Citation | 798 F.3d 1002 |
| Parties | Phillip HANCOCK, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Anita TRAMMELL, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
798 F.3d 1002
Phillip HANCOCK, Petitioner–Appellant
v.
Anita TRAMMELL, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellee.
No. 12–6255.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 18, 2015.
Madeline S. Cohen, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, CO (Lanita Henricksen, Henricksen & Henricksen, Lawyers, Inc., Oklahoma City, OK, and David B. Autry, Oklahoma City, OK, with her on the briefs), for Petitioner–Appellant.
Jennifer L. Crabb, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent–Appellee.
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
In April 2001, Mr. Bob Jett hosted two men: Mr. Phillip Hancock and Mr. James Lynch. An angry altercation ensued, where Mr. Jett tried to force Mr. Hancock into a cage while swinging at him with a metal bar. Mr. Hancock was able to obtain Mr. Jett's gun and use it to shoot Mr. Jett and Mr. Lynch. The two men died, and the State of Oklahoma charged Mr. Hancock with two counts of first-degree murder. Mr. Hancock admitted that he had killed both men, but asserted self-defense. The jury rejected the defense and found Mr. Hancock guilty on both
counts of first-degree murder.1 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (2001). For these murders, the state district court sentenced Mr. Hancock to death. Mr. Hancock unsuccessfully sought relief on direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) and in post-conviction proceedings.
Mr. Hancock then turned to federal district court, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied relief, and Mr. Hancock has appealed. We affirm.
I. The Issues on Appeal
Four issues have been certified for appeal.
The first issue involves an evidentiary ruling. In this ruling, the state district court allowed the prosecution to elicit evidence that Mr. Hancock had been convicted of manslaughter after successfully claiming self-defense for an unrelated killing. Mr. Hancock claims that introduction of this evidence resulted in a deprivation of due process. The OCCA rejected this claim on the merits, and Mr. Hancock contends that the OCCA unreasonably determined the facts by misstating the basis for the state district court's evidentiary ruling. On appeal, we must decide: Did Mr. Hancock show reliance on an unreasonable determination of facts? We conclude that Mr. Hancock has not met his burden because the OCCA's opinion can reasonably be read as factually accurate. As a result, Mr. Hancock has not shown that the OCCA unreasonably determined the facts, preventing us from deciding the merits of the due process claim.
The second issue is whether the state district court misled the jury by giving unwarranted instructions on self-defense and allowing the prosecutor to make misleading arguments in closing. The court gave uniform instructions on self-defense, which addressed identification of the aggressor and provided that the right to self-defense could be unavailable if the victim initiated the altercation but then withdrew. On appeal, the OCCA held that the instructions were supported by the evidence and that the prosecutor's arguments were proper. We ask: Did these holdings constitute an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable determination of the facts? We conclude that the OCCA reasonably applied Supreme Court precedents and determined the facts. As a result, we cannot reach the merits of the claim.
Third, Mr. Hancock alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter while resisting a criminal attempt. The OCCA rejected this claim based on a lack of prejudice. We are asked: Did the OCCA unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that defense counsel's alleged error was not prejudicial? We conclude the OCCA did not act unreasonably, for fair-minded jurists could conclude that defense counsel's theory of manslaughter fit the evidence just as well as manslaughter while resisting a criminal attempt. Thus, we cannot reach the merits of the ineffectiveness claim.
Finally, Mr. Hancock alleges cumulative error. We must decide: Can Mr. Hancock obtain habeas relief based on cumulative
error when the district court did not commit two or more constitutional violations? We conclude that Mr. Hancock is not entitled to habeas relief based on cumulative error. This protection is triggered only when there are two or more constitutional violations. There were not two or more constitutional violations in this case.
Mr. Hancock has moved to expand the certificate of appealability for four other issues: (1) Was the evidence insufficient for the conviction on first-degree murder? (2) Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to effectively impeach the state's witness, Ms. Shawn Tarp, with her previous statements (and was appellate counsel ineffective for failing to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel)? (3) Did the state district court deny Mr. Hancock the right to present a defense by excluding evidence that would have supported a finding of self-defense? (4) Was the evidence insufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of a murder that was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel? Appellant's Am. Mot. to Expand the Cert. of Appealability at 2–3 (filed Dec. 19, 2012). We deny the motion to expand the certificate of appealability on these issues.
II. From a Pack of Cigarettes to Two Dead Men
Mr. Hancock killed Mr. Jett and Mr. Lynch at Mr. Jett's Oklahoma home in April 2001.
A. Mr. Hancock
In 2001, Mr. Hancock lived with his girlfriend, Ms. Kathy Wiggins. The couple broke up, and Ms. Wiggins used drugs at Mr. Jett's house and stayed on his couch.
B. Visit to Mr. Jett's Home
Two days after the break-up, Mr. Hancock was allegedly told to bring Ms. Wiggins home because she was acting strangely. Mr. Hancock complied, going to Mr. Jett's home to pick up Ms. Wiggins. When Mr. Hancock arrived, only two people were there: Mr. Jett and a friend, Mr. James Lynch. Both were in Mr. Jett's “Harley Room,” a small room where Mr. Jett kept his Harley–Davidson motorcycle. Mr. Jett was working on his motorcycle while Mr. Lynch sat and watched.
According to Mr. Hancock, he entered the home through the front door, which led into Mr. Jett's living room. Upon entering, Mr. Hancock noticed an unopened pack of cigarettes and asked if he could have a cigarette; Mr. Jett responded “yeah.” Id. at 211. Mr. Hancock opened the pack, took a cigarette, and joined the two men in the Harley Room while waiting for Ms. Wiggins to return.
C. Threat from Mr. Jett
After Mr. Hancock entered the Harley Room, Mr. Jett allegedly asked Mr. Hancock: “Did you just walk in my house yesterday?” Id. at 212. Mr. Hancock responded that he had done so to retrieve his cell phone from Ms. Wiggins, who had spent the night on Mr. Jett's couch. Mr. Hancock allegedly assured Mr. Jett that he had not meant to cause problems and had only entered the home after hearing “someone say ‘come in.’ ” Id. at 212.
Mr. Jett told Mr. Hancock that he ought to put him in the empty animal cage in the Harley Room. Mr. Hancock testified that the comment had “caught [him] off guard.” Id.
D. Ms. Shawn Tarp
Another friend of Mr. Jett's (Ms. Shawn Tarp) arrived after Mr. Hancock. According to Ms. Tarp, she entered and saw Mr. Lynch sitting in a living-room chair, Mr. Jett working on his motorcycle in the Harley Room, and Mr. Hancock sitting nearby.
According to Mr. Hancock, the four individuals gathered around the living room coffee table and used methamphetamine.
E. Alleged Tension Between Mr. Hancock and Mr. Jett
After the group took drugs, Mr. Jett and Mr. Hancock returned to the Harley Room while Mr. Lynch and Ms. Tarp remained in the living room. Although in different rooms, the four individuals continued to talk. During the talk, two incidents led Ms. Tarp to believe there was agitation between Mr. Jett and Mr. Hancock.
The first incident involved glasses lying on Mr. Jett's table. Mr. Hancock saw the glasses and told Mr. Jett that they were Ms. Wiggins'; Mr. Jett insisted they were his.
The second incident involved a comment by Mr. Hancock, stating: “I should just shut the f* * * up, I'm here to try to be friends.” Trial Tr., vol. VI, at 163. To Ms. Tarp, Mr. Hancock's comment indicated that the two men had experienced a “falling out.” Id.
F. “Get in the Cage ”
The agitation grew as Mr. Jett continued to work on his motorcycle. According to Ms. Tarp, Mr. Jett grew frustrated. At one point, Mr. Jett “threw his hands up” and announced that he was leaving to run an errand. Id. at 162–63. Mr. Jett then went to retrieve his shoes and vest from his bedroom.
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