Hand v. Central Transport, Inc., 84-3850

• Decision Date: 03 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-3850,84-3850
• Citation: 779 F.2d 8
• Parties: , 1985-2 Trade Cases 66,872 Monte HAND, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC., d/b/a Mohawk Motor, Inc. and Central Cartage, Inc., and Mohawk Motor, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 8

779 F.2d 8

54 USLW 2354, 1985-2 Trade Cases 66,872

Monte HAND, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC., d/b/a Mohawk Motor, Inc. and Central Cartage, Inc., and Mohawk Motor, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-3850.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 7, 1985.

Decided Dec. 3, 1985.

Rick Drake, argued, Chagrin Falls, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

David M. Schnorf, Schnorf, Wanic, Loyd & Engwert, Toledo, Ohio, Patrick A. Moran, Simpson & Moran, Birmingham, Mich., Vivan B. Perry, argued, for defendants-appellees.

Before JONES, Circuit Judge, WEICK and PECK, Senior Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Monte Hand appeals the summary dismissal of his anti-trust claims brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1 and 15 (1982), against the above named defendants (collectively referred to as "Mohawk"). In his complaint, Hand alleged that Mohawk violated the antitrust laws by "tying" the financing of tractor-trailer trucks with the acceptance of Mohawk's offer of employment. Mohawk filed a first motion for summary judgment challenging the existence of two distinct tied products. The trial judge denied this motion, holding that Hand had raised a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a tying agreement.

Mohawk filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on January 26, 1984. This second motion was referred to a magistrate for a Report and Recommendation. Concluding, primarily under the rule of reason, that Mohawk lacked market power in the relevant tying product market to violate the Sherman Act, the magistrate recommended summary dismissal of Hand's complaint. Hand submitted timely objections to the Report and Recommendation complaining that the magistrate's analysis was defective in defining the relevant tying product market. He proffered evidence that the definition of the relevant tying product market under the rule of reason must include consideration of submarket criteria. Nevertheless, the district court adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation without consideration on the record of Hand's objections and granted Mohawk's motion for summary judgment. Hand appeals from that judgment. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse and remand.

In April, 1973, Hand obtained employment with Mohawk to drive company-owned tractor-trailer trucks. In September of that year, Hand expressed a desire to purchase a tractor so that he could become what is known in the trucking industry as an "owner-operator". Hand asserts that prior to consummating any agreement to purchase a tractor, Mohawk impressed upon him that his employment as an owner-operator was conditioned upon financing the tractor with Mohawk. Thereafter on September 20, 1973, Hand purchased a tractor from Mohawk, financed entirely by Mohawk. Mohawk obtained a security interest in the tractor and executed a one-year owner-lessor lease agreement with Hand, mutually terminable on 30 days notice. This lease agreement was exclusive, requiring Hand to "haul freight only for Mohawk".

We must note preliminarily our standard of review in this matter. This court must apply the same test in reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion that is utilized by the district court. Glenway Industries, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir.1982). In antitrust litigation, summary judgment is particularly disfavored and the standard for granting summary judgment is strict. Bouldis v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 711 F.2d 1319, 1324 (6th Cir.1983); Smith v. Northern Michigan Hospitals, Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 947 (6th Cir.1983); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1197 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931, 104 S.Ct. 1718, 80 L.Ed.2d 190 (1984). The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and that party must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Bouldis, 711 F.2d at 1324; Davis-Watkins Co., 686 F.2d at 1197. Only if the evidence is not disputed as to any genuine issue of material fact should the case be decided as a matter of law. Bouldis, 711 F.2d at 1324. Accordingly, our inquiry is limited solely to determining whether a genuine issue of material fact existed in the record below.

Market conduct of this type is generally analyzed under the rule of reason to determine whether the Sherman Act has been violated. This circuit in Davis-Watkins Co., cited the definition of the rule of reason as follows:

The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are...